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Abstract 
 
 
 In the last forty years, significant developments in neuroscience, psychology, and 
robotic technology have been cause for major trend changes in the philosophy of mind. 
One such shift has been the reallocation of focus from entirely brain-centered theories of 
mind to more embodied, embedded, and even extended answers to the questions, what 
are cognitive processes and where do we find such phenomena? Given that hypotheses 
such as Clark and Chalmers‘ (1998) Extended Mind or Hutto‘s (2006) Radical 
Enactivism, systematically undermine the organism-bound, internal, and static pictures of 
minds and allow instead for the distribution of cognitive processes among brains, bodies, 
and worlds, a worry that arises is that the very subject of cognitive science, the ‗cognizer‘ 
will be hopelessly opaque, its mind leaking out into the world all over the place, thereby 
making it impossible to rein in and properly study.   
 A seemingly unrelated and yet parallel trend has also taken place in feminist 
theorizing about the body over the last forty years. Whereas feminism of the 1970s and 
early 1980s tended to view ‗the body‘ as the site and matter of biological sex, while 
gender was a more fluid and socially constituted mode of existence, more recent feminist 
theory has questioned the givenness of bodies themselves. In other words, rather than 
seeing gender categories as manifestations of the already given sexed body, thinkers such 
as Butler (2000) and Lorber (1992) argue that the very notion of a body is often a product 
of scientific inquiry, which is itself a product of the power structures aiming to maintain a 
rigid binary between feminine and masculine gender roles. If the world at large plays 
v 
such a constitutive role in determining who we are, then this implies that the tools we use, 
the language we speak, and the power relationships in which we are enmeshed are 
components of what it means to be embodied in any genuine sense. For thinkers like 
Haraway (1988) the image of the cyborg is most fitting for this new understanding of 
embodied subjects, as the cyborg is a coupling of machine and human. Gender and even 
biological sex will always be a technologically hybridized ‗monster‘ consisting of matter, 
machine, and mind.  
 The overall aim of my project is thus to bring the two concurrent developments in 
theorizing about embodied subjects into discourse. As  the cyborg features largely in 
recent feminist thought about embodiment, so too has it been a prominent metaphor in 
philosophy of mind, ever since Clark (2003) claimed that we ought to think of our 
‗selves‘ more appropriately as Natural-Born Cyborgs. I therefore focus on this imagery 
as I go on to make the argument that this distributed account of cognition as well as of 
sexual identity is more fruitful for making progress in understanding ‗the human‘ more 
generally. Likewise, I argue that bringing the discussion of sex and gender into the arena 
of an otherwise asexual philosophy of mind, will shed light on some important facets of 
embodiment that have been overlooked but that ought to be addressed if we are to have 
an adequate account of ‗the proper subject of cognitive science.‘  
 My chapters include 1) a survey of the discourse between science and philosophy 
of mind leading to these embodied and extended approaches, 2) a first attempt at 
defending the extended mind thesis, 3) a discussion of how even the supposed resolution 
to the objections raised against extended cognition fails to properly take into account just 
how problematic subjectivity is, regardless of its being defined entirely organismic or not, 
vi 
as organisms themselves are highly malleable and socially constituted, 4) an explanation 
concerning how the same problematization of embodied subjectivity is ongoing in 
feminist theory, especially considering the phenomenology of transgendered 
embodiment, intersex, and technologically mediated bodies, 5) further elaboration on 
technologically enhanced bodies, exposing what I see as a continuum between bodies 
modified by ‗hard‘ technologies, such as implants, prostheses or surgeries, and those 
modified by ‗soft‘ technologies, such as gender norms, the social gaze, and 
technologically mediated metacognition, and last, 6) an argument for the image of the 
cyborg to replace ‗organism‘ in cognitive science, along with the corollary argument that 
cyborgs ought to represent not just embodied minds, but should also be the metaphor in 
attempting to understand ‗embodiment‘ more generally, which must, at its roots, be 
underpinned by gender and sexual identity. I argue that the imagery is fitting for the 
proper study of cognitive subjects as well as sexed and gendered bodies, but moreover, 
that just as the cyborg suggests a blending and hybridizing of seemingly unrelated 
elements, so too should the two areas of inquiry, philosophy of mind and feminist theory, 
pay heed to one another‘s use of this imagery and themselves begin to be more 
integrative in their approaches.  
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Introduction 
 
―I am optimistic that we will soon see the end of those over-used, and mostly ad hoc 
appeals to the ‗natural‘‖ – Andy Clark 
 
―The cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and 
personal self. This is the self feminists must code.‖ – Donna Haraway 
 
 
 In a short but now infamously contentious paper entitled The Extended Mind 
(1998) Andy Clark and David Chalmers begin by posing a rather simple question: Where 
does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? Their question, although seemingly 
uncomplicated, in fact marks the beginning of over a decade of debates, publications, and 
conferences devoted to suitably answering the supposedly straightforward query 
regarding the location of cognition. The thesis they put forth, Extended Cognition, is 
itself a radical shift in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In particular, the last 
fifty years have witnessed the gradual reallocation of focus from entirely brain-centered 
theories of mind to more embodied, embedded, and eventually extended approaches to 
studying the mind. Hypotheses such as the ones Clark and Chalmers suggest, or similarly, 
Dan Hutto‘s (2006) Radical Enactivism, systematically undermine the organism-bound, 
internal, and static pictures of cognition and allow instead for the distribution of cognitive 
processes among brains, bodies, and worlds. Worries arise, however, concerning 
precisely what the subject of cognitive science will turn out to look like; namely, as 
Robert Rupert (2004) has complained, the ‗cognizer‘ will be hopelessly opaque, its mind 
leaking out into the world all over the place, thereby making it impossible to rein in and 
properly study. In response to these objections, Clark (2003) for example, has argued that 
 2 
despite apparent difficulties associated with studying such a subject, it really is more 
reasonable to think of ‗the human‘ as a motley crew of biological organism, non-
biological tools, and language. In other words, when answering the question concerning 
where we are, ‗we‘ ought not be limited to biology; likewise, in answering the question 
concerning what we are, Clark suggests, the best way to conceive of ourselves is as 
blending of organism and artifact – or more precisely, as cyborgs.  
 Around the same time The Extended Mind was published, in the opposite corner 
of the academic universe, we find the feminist theorist, Donna Haraway (1991), asking: 
Why should our bodies end at the skin, or include at best other beings encapsulated by 
skin? Just as Clark and Chalmers‘ paper marks an important change in philosophy of 
mind, Haraway‘s Cyborg Manifesto differs importantly from previous feminist theory 
insofar as it stands as a point upon which the myriad of preceding ‗feminisms‘ 
triangulate. Whereas feminist theory of the 1970s and early 1980s tended to view ‗the 
body‘ as the site and matter of biological sex, while gender was a more fluid and socially 
constituted mode of existence, more recent feminist theory has questioned the givenness 
of bodies themselves. Thinkers such as Haraway and Judith Butler (1992) argue that the 
very notion of a body is often a product of scientific inquiry, which is itself a product of 
the power structures aiming to maintain a rigid binary between feminine and masculine 
gender roles. If the world at large plays such a constitutive role in determining who we 
are, then this implies that the tools we use, the language we speak, and the power 
relationships in which we are enmeshed are components of what it means to be embodied 
in any genuine sense. For thinkers like Haraway (1988) the image of the cyborg is most 
fitting for this new understanding of embodied subjects, as the cyborg is a coupling of 
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machine and human. Gender and even biological sex will always be a technologically 
hybridized ‗monster‘ consisting of matter, machine, and mind.  
Given these similar although unrelated reevaluations of who we are, concurrent in 
philosophy of mind and feminist theory, it is my aim in this project to bring the two 
developments in theorizing about embodied subjects into discourse. As the cyborg 
features largely in recent feminist thought about embodiment, so too has it been a 
prominent metaphor in philosophy of mind, ever since Clark claimed that we ought to 
think of our ‗selves‘ more appropriately as Natural-Born Cyborgs. I therefore focus on 
this imagery as I go on to make the argument that this distributed account of cognition as 
well as of sexual identity is more fruitful for making progress in understanding ‗the 
human‘ more generally. Likewise, I argue that bringing the discussion of sex and gender 
into the arena of an otherwise asexual philosophy of mind, will shed light on some 
important facets of embodiment that have been overlooked but that ought to be addressed 
if we are to have an adequate account of ‗the proper subject of cognitive science.‘ 
 The first chapter surveys the last nearly fifty years in philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science. My aim in this opening chapter, however, is not purely exegetical. 
Instead, the discussion is tailored toward exposing an oversight made by nearly all 
theories of mind to date – namely, how body and situation shape and perhaps even 
constitute cognition. Specifically, I point out the flaws typically associated with 
behaviorism, type physicalism, and token physicalism. Although each is problematic in its 
own unique way – behaviorism runs the risk of too liberally ascribing cognition to 
otherwise non-cognitive entities, and type physicalism is often accused of what Ned 
Block (1980) has referred to as ―species chauvinism,‖ while token physicalism or 
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functionalism can actually be guilty of both of these charges – all three of these attempts 
to explain what cognition is and how it arises take for granted a crucial third element. By 
looking at recent developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), for instance, it becomes 
apparent that where cognition is occurring is assumed at the outset to be solely internal to 
the organism, or the robot as the case may be in AI research. It is this supposition – that 
the mind is simply ‗in the head‘ or ‗internal to the body‘ – that plagues philosophers, 
psychologists, and roboticists in trying to come up with a suitable understanding of how 
cognition works and how we might come to duplicate it in a non-human machine.  
 It is not until theories of embodied cognition (cf. Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 
1991) begin to be taken seriously that we find proper attention not just to the body itself, 
but to embodiment, or how the body is situated in its environment, how the world shows 
up through the body, and how the body actually shapes how we think. It was Gibson and 
his theory of ―affordances‖ (1979; 1977; 1966; 1954) that provided the psychological 
antecedent to this philosophical movement, in addition to the phenomenologists of the 
early to mid-twentieth century, in particular, Merleau-Ponty (1962). These accounts of 
cognition set the stage for one of the most radical, yet, as I argue, most plausible 
hypotheses regarding precisely where we ought to locate the mind. Pushing what it means 
to characterize the mind as embodied, situated, and enacted (cf. Noё, 2004) to its logical 
conclusion, it becomes less and less clear where the mind stops and the external world 
begins. In other words, by examining how the environment can and most often does 
shape the way we think, a case can be made that certain parts of that world – in particular, 
tools that we employ to help ourselves think – should be considered as parts of our 
minds.  
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 In chapter 2, therefore, I spend a great deal of time fleshing out the hypothesis of 
Extended Cognition (HEC) and I rehearse some of the difficulties with accepting the 
view that cognition is a distributed process spanning biological organism and non-
biological circuitry (cf. Clark, 2008, 2003; Clark and Chalmers, 1998). The chief aim of 
this chapter is to highlight the strengths of the HEC while attempting to adequately reply 
to some of the more challenging objections, namely, that cognition is driven by non-
derived content and so must be internal to the ‗system,‘ (Adams & Aizawa, 2010; 2008; 
2001) and that ‗the mind‘ is a natural kind, which disallows for its being constituted by 
an unruly and motley crew of processes, the mergers and couplings of which could never 
be the proper subjects of cognitive science (cf. Rupert, 2004). While I further Clark‘s 
(2010; 2008) replies to these objections to some extent, I also argue that his most recent 
‗retreat‘ – the hypothesis of organism-centered cognition (HOC) – is too large a 
concession. For one, I argue, giving up the notion that the body and the world are ‗equal 
partners‘ in cognition seems to be giving up the original thesis altogether. Furthermore, 
by problematizing what Rupert has claimed must be the proper subject of cognitive 
science – the subject itself – it is clear that even centering cognition on a organism is 
dubious because that biological entity is only one component of a much larger and much 
more complicated story about embodied subjectivity.  
 Developing an account of embodiment and cognitive subjectivity is the focus of 
the third chapter. First, by adopting Shaun Gallagher‘s (2005) distinction between the 
body image and the body schema, we are able to account more phenomenologically for 
the way the body shows up in experience. In particular, my body can be a reflective 
object of my perception and thought – that is, I can imagine it – or, it can be lived 
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through, pre-reflectively, via a motor program executed below the level of explicit 
awareness. Likewise, in non-pathological embodiment, I typically maintain a sense of 
ownership and a sense of agency, not simply over ‗the body‘ itself, but over my 
embodied intentions for action and execution of that action. But just as I am able to 
dissociate from the tools and ‗cognitive aides‘ I use – a potentiality for detachment that 
the intracranialists argue ‗marks‘ these objects as non-cognitive – I am also able to 
dissociate from my own body. To see how this is possible, I look at several cases of 
―body pathologies,‖ ranging from Phantom Limbs to Möbius Syndrome. What we glean 
from these ‗abnormal‘ cases is that cognition occurs on a multitude of levels and can be 
captured by a variety of phenomenological descriptions; it can be constituted reflectively 
and pre-reflectively and can involve robust ownership and agency, only one of these 
dimensions, or potentially neither of them.  This multifarious phenomenology of 
embodiment is, I argue, not limited to pathological cases. Indeed, it ‗marks‘ embodied 
subjectivity generally – the ability to lose agency or ownership over, or to feel ‗not-at-
home-with‘ one‘s body, albeit less extreme in non-pathological embodiment, is a 
constantly present feature of cognition.  
 At the end of chapter three, I suggest comparing the body to other tools we use, in 
particular, regarding cases of breakdown. Just as I can dissociate from my body if I have, 
say somatoparaphrenia, so too can I take a hammer to be wholly other-to me, whereas, in 
pre-reflective, non-pathological, body schematic action, the hammer, much like the rest 
of my body is not present-at-hand. It is rather an incorporated and integral component to 
the larger system of hammering; and similarly, when I perform actions with my body, so 
long as I am not experiencing any dysphoria with any parts of it, I do not explicitly 
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represent it as an object to be manipulated. Indeed, I + my body are one system. So too, I 
argue, should we count me + my prosthetic limb, a blind man + his cane, and Otto + his 
notebook. That is, when the coupled system, at the pre-reflective level, does not show up 
as two or more disparate objects, but rather, as one unified subject performing an action, 
the whole system should count as cognitive. 
 This claim concerning embodied subjectivity – that it is constituted at the pre-
reflective and reflective levels, both as a unified and as a hybrid system – is carried over 
into chapter 4, where I suggest that we ought to consider the ways in which sex, gender, 
and sexuality figure into embodied cognition and subjectivity more generally. For one, 
this facet of ‗the mind‘ has been relatively ignored in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science. Likewise, as I argue, if we are to achieve a comprehensive account of cognitive 
subjectivity, it makes little sense to leave out a discussion of one of the very few 
necessary elements in experiencing myself as a ‗thinking being.‘ That is, ‗I‘ am always a 
sexed and gendered person, although of course, the specifics of these identifications can 
and do change. The argument I defend in this chapter begins with the premise that sexual 
identity, although much more tied to biological anatomy than something like gender roles 
or sexual orientation, remains highly contingent upon embodied practices rather than 
strictly on body parts. In other words, it is only through the lens of sexual reproduction, 
for example, that certain parts of my body show up as ‗feminine,‘ which is itself based on 
a narrative of sexual reproduction.  
 Furthermore, by examining what Merleau-Ponty (1968) has to say regarding the 
―The Body in its Sexual Being,‖ I argue that a case can be made to see sexual identity as 
1) just as malleable and socially informed as the body in its gendered identity and thus, 2) 
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not always a ‗that-through-which‘ I act at the pre-reflective body schematic level of 
awareness. Instead, by looking at examples provided by feminist phenomenologists such 
as Iris Young (2005) and Elizabeth Grosz (1994), we see that very little about female 
bodies translates into hardwired facts about female embodiment. Despite arguments made 
by psychologists such as Straus (1966) concerning the anatomy of female bodies as 
precluding certain actions and confidence, the case is stronger, I claim, on the side of the 
feminist phenomenologists, who, like Gallagher (2005), recognize the role of body image 
in shaping how we come to represent ‗ourselves‘ in embodied practice. What people like 
Grosz, for example, add to Gallagher‘s discussion, is the notion that one‘s projected 
gender identity – in the form of a body image – can and does alter one‘s ‗postural 
schema,‘ or the pre-reflective body-in-action. In this way, ‗thinking like a girl,‘ for one, 
achieves meaning only insofar as we can juxtapose this mode of cognition to some 
‗other‘ – i.e. boy thinking – but also, by altering one‘s imagined gender, the ‗sexed 
schema‘ – if we want to say there is such a thing – also alters. In short, the claim that 
there is anything inherently true and necessary of female embodiment based solely on 
facts about the biological organism is weak to say the least. 
 However, as chapter 5 will explore, it is not so easy to simply dismiss all notions 
of ‗hardwired sex‘ or inherent gender identity. In particular, by looking at Gender 
Identity Disorder, Intersex Embodiment, and Transgender Embodiment, there are reasons 
to consider how an innately ‗sexed self‘ might at least appear to be the most suitable 
phenomenological description. The chapter begins with the proposal that the dysphoria 
experienced by persons who feel trapped in the wrong body can be likened to the 
phenomenology of the bodily pathologies discussed in chapter 3 – in other words, we 
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might say that in cases of Gender Identity Disorder, for example, a person‘s body image 
is misaligned with his or her body schema, or that there has been a disruption in the sense 
of agency, ownership, or both. Examining narratives from transgendered persons is one 
way to affirm that this intuition might provide an accurate explanation, but the problem 
remains that among the narratives, as well as the medical and scientific discourse 
surrounding these phenomena, there is a persistent Cartesian idea that one‘s sexed or 
gendered identity is somehow independent from the reality of the flesh itself. The 
problem is made worse when we consider that the proposed ‗solution‘ to these various 
modes of dissociative embodiment is often surgery – i.e. altering a body that was 
presupposed to have nothing to do with one‘s ‗true self‘ in the first place.  
 In order to address these concerns, I turn from purely phenomenological 
descriptions to the theoretical underpinnings of what has now come to be known as 
Transgender Studies. To this end, a detailed account of Queer Theory and its treatment of 
transgender as a motif for the subversion of traditional conceptions of sex and gender 
provide the best framework. By utilizing Butler‘s (1990; 1992; 2004) argument that the 
figure of transgender serves to illuminate the performative nature of all gender, we can 
come to think of the supposed binaries characterizing sex and gender as fluid, figurative, 
and eminently transgressable, much like I argue, in previous chapters, we ought to think 
of ‗the human‘ more generally. With Queer Theory as a point of reference, I return to the 
proposal made earlier in the chapter and suggest that within the field of Transgender 
Studies, there is evidence that trans-theorists would support the notion that a 
misalignment of body images is the best way to characterize the overarching 
phenomenology of having a ‗true self trapped in the wrong body.‘ Jay Prosser‘s (1998) 
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rendering of Queer Theory is particularly useful here, as it 1) allows for a conception of 
gender identity disorder that resists an unpalatable Cartesianism, 2) helps to further refine 
and clarify the discussion of body image and body schema as they are proposed by 
philosophers such as Gallagher (2005) in order to weave sex and gender into an otherwise 
‗sexless‘ philosophy of mind, and 3) sheds light on all embodied subjectivity and how it 
is constituted in terms of sex and gender.  It is this last point upon which I close chapter 
5, suggesting that we return to ‗the human‘ more generally in order to determine to what 
extent this necessary yet eminently malleable facet of embodiment augments what we 
mean by ‗the mind.‘ 
 The final chapter begins by drawing an analogy; namely, just as the 
natural/unnatural divide serves as a myth to juxtapose non-transsexual with transsexual, 
so too does it work to ‗artificially‘ differentiate between  human and machine. This 
division between ‗us‘ and our machines, I claim, conceals the fundamentally hybridized, 
eminently dissociable, and yet always already technological nature of cognitive 
subjectivity. To defend this claim, I argue that we ought to conceive of gender as a form 
of technology. If we do, then it is clear from chapters 4 and 5 that we are always already 
coupled to this ‗tool,‘ although it can and often does become another to us; or, in 
Heideggerean terms, gender might show up as present-at-hand, a that from which I 
dissociate. To see why we ought to consider gender to be a technology, I further 
differentiate between what Nikki Sullivan (2001) calls ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ technologies, in 
order to show that certain ―sociotechnical systems of use‖ (cf. Kline, 1985) are best 
conceived as technological in nature – that is, they add to, aide, and augment human 
cognition. Based on this much more liberal notion of what counts as technology, together 
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with the idea that gender is a form of technology we are always already coupled with, 
there is yet more evidence to adopt Clark‘s (2003) insights discussed in chapter 2, that 
‗we‘ are best thought of as cyborgs – human-machine symbionts – language, and now 
gender, as two of the chief ‗machines‘ constantly interwoven with our biological 
organism. This idea is argued by Donna Haraway (1991), whose ‗cyborg feminism‘ seeks 
to blend not only human and machine, but is also a call for the blending of theories and 
practices surrounding feminist theory, which itself should be thought of as a hybrid. Most 
importantly, Haraway adds to the discussion so far, something I claim is missing even in 
Clark‘s radical ‗Tools-R-Us‘ account of human cognition, namely, the idea that genuine 
decoupling from our technology is not possible, as it wrongly assumes that there were 
original, non-technological wholes prior to this coupling. Because gender is one of the 
tools with which we are always already conjoined, Haraway‘s case for the cyborg to 
stand in for ‗the human‘ allows for a conception of human cognition that is not only a 
biotechnological, but a sociotechnological hybridization as well.  
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Chapter 1  
 
From Encapsulated to Extended: Situating Cognition over the Last Fifty Years 
 
This is Descartes' error: the abyssal separation between body and mind, between the 
sizable, dimensioned, mechanically operated, infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one 
hand, and the unsizable, undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible mind stuff; the 
suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from 
physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body. – Antonio 
Damasio, Descartes‟ Error 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
 Shaun Gallagher (2008) has recently provided a rich account of the historical 
underpinnings of situated cognition in the hopes of situating, as it were, the current trend 
in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, which has shifted its focus from brains and 
encapsulated egos to organism-environment systems. His approach is not purely 
historical, as he makes clear at the outset: ―My intention, however, is not to provide a 
simple historical guide but to suggest that there are still some untapped resources in these 
past philosophers that may serve to enrich current accounts of situated cognition‖ (35). In 
the same spirit as Gallagher, this chapter is intended to provide an account of recent 
trends in philosophy of mind, a field that now finds itself at a strange impasse. My aim in 
doing so is not just to illustrate the historical progression of ideas; indeed, such a project 
could conceivably tell several distinct stories about many protracted battles: eliminativists 
vs. reductionists, non-reductive vs. reductive physicalists, and of course, the myriad of 
debates over the possibility of artificial intelligence, and these are just to name a few. 
Instead, the story I want to tell focuses on a specific facet of this historical trajectory, 
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namely, the way in which a suitable theory of embodiment has been systematically 
overlooked and avoided, at least until the very recent past few years. Examining this 
oversight will make clear why the particular impasse I have in mind – that between the 
internalist and the externalist – is a culminating point, one upon which many of the other 
disagreements just mentioned eventually converge. 
   In the wake of anti-Cartesian metaphysics, militant physicalism, and the 
neuroscientific revolution, one might expect that in the place of immaterial minds and 
free wills would be instead detailed accounts of bodies. What we tend to find however, is 
either some form of behaviorism or ‗brain-mania.‘ The rest of the body, however, 
remains on the sidelines; it is assumed to be a necessary component of cognition, but this 
is typically all the thought given to human embodiment. It is taken for granted, in other 
words, that human minds have human bodies. This contemporary neglect of the body is 
not unlike the way Descartes
1
 treated it so long ago. Despite his weak proof that bodies 
actually exist, even he was well aware of their intimate connection with minds; he simply 
failed to explain that connection properly. I want to suggest that this failure is not specific 
to Descartes, but is endemic to much of contemporary cognitive science, insofar as it 
affirms the importance of embodiment and yet fails to account for its role in cognition. 
Again, nearly everyone
2
 agrees that the body is integral to cognition; it‘s the lack of 
explanation of how and to what extent this is the case that is the real source of disparity. 
And although I think the so-called mind-body problem has changed very little in this way 
since Descartes, I do intend to argue that the focus has shifted from a debate regarding 
                                                 
1
 See in particular, Mediation VI, Ariew and Cress, ed.  
2
 Certain forms of cognition, in particular, social cognition, might however, turn out to have little to no 
dependence on the body itself per se, but more on embodied interaction. (cf. Goldman & de Vignemont, 
2009) 
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what minds are – what they are made of, what sorts of things they do, and so forth – to a 
debate concerning where we should expect to find minds ‗in the world,‘ and in particular, 
if we are willing to count parts of an otherwise external world as proper parts of the mind.  
 
1.2 Something on the State of the Parts  
When Ryle (1945) exposed what he saw as a ‗category mistake‘ both in Cartesian 
Dualism and in strict mind-brain identity, philosophy of mind was split into two factions 
of materialist monism. Some chose, as Ryle did, to maintain some version of 
behaviorism, Ryle‘s particular brand being a ‗dispositional behaviorism,‘ while thinkers 
immediately in Ryle‘s wake (cf. Place, 1956, 1988; Smart, 1959; Feigl, 1967; Armstrong 
1968) chose to refine and defend mind-brain identity in the name of parsimony. To be 
sure, these two options are not exhaustive, but their complementary strengths, 
weaknesses, and ultimate failures, along with the concurrent advances in computing, 
provide a space from which functionalism as an alternative explanation of cognition can 
easily make advances. The purpose of this project is not merely historical however, and 
functionalism‘s roots and development are surely common knowledge among my 
readers. Thus, I will gloss over many of the details of this history, highlighting instead 
what I take to be significant for the purpose of ultimately exposing a flaw not just 
common to behaviorism and mind-brain identity, but to functionalism itself as well.  
 As Fodor (1981) notes, one facet of logical behaviorism that makes it particularly 
appealing is its ability to explain mental causation. Appealing to material monism of any 
sort sidesteps the intractable problem of interaction between material and immaterial 
substances, but more importantly, explaining mentality in terms of observable behavior 
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allows for a genuine ‗science‘ of mind, with quantifiable, predictable, and observable 
data. Skinner‘s (1953, 1957) original notion that we can accurately predict a person‘s 
behavior given sufficient historical information about their reactions to environmental 
stimuli is similar to what we find in Ryle‘s (1949) argument that the tendency to behave 
in one given way or another depends on certain dispositions, which are themselves 
products of environmental history. Skinnerian and Ryleian behaviorism alike avoid the 
pitfalls of the causal nexuses between immaterial and material as well as between inner 
and outer.  For example, under Ryle‘s account, if I get up from my chair and go to the 
fridge to obtain a beverage, this behavior (the observable physical effect) is said to be 
caused by a dispositional state, namely, that when I desire a drink and the fridge is in 
close proximity to me, I will be disposed to walk over to it and procure a beverage. The 
etiology is captured quite simply by ordinary language, language which, as the positivists 
would have it, is freed from metaphysical obscurity. Mental states cause physical states 
by dint of 1) their both being physical phenomena and 2) the antecedent mental states 
themselves being behavioral dispositions which tend to bring about the corresponding 
outward behavior.  
 One concern with behaviorism is the perhaps insuperable difficulty it faces in 
providing comprehensive dispositional laws for all observable behavior. As Chomsky‘s 
(1959) painting example compellingly illustrates, the human mind seems eminently 
capable of ‗surprising‘ us. In his response to Skinner‘s (1957) operant conditioning as an 
explanatory model for human behavior, Chomsky highlights that while we might be able 
to develop systematic principles for understanding a person‘s behavior based on their 
prior history, there is nothing in that personal history which entails a specific verbal 
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behavior in response to a painting. Taking linguistic behavior as a specific mode in which 
predictability is limited provides this insight: given universal structures of all human 
language, such as infinite generativity and recursivity,
3
 it can be said that language itself 
is unpredictable and hence, human employment of it will depend not solely on prior use, 
or even simply on some dispositional state, but also on the specifics of the situation. As 
the painting example illustrates, we can at best approximate a general list of typical 
responses for each person who views the painting, based on their prior reactions to art or 
their current dispositional state. However, if person A is viewing Painting X under a 
variety of different circumstances, e.g., at one museum versus another, with a large group 
of artists or with a gaggle of schoolchildren, or if person A is trying to impress person B 
who is also viewing the painting, the set of responses grows in complexity. Chomsky 
argues that it would be impossible to predict responses with 100% accuracy. 
Furthermore, if we consider, beyond Chomsky‘s syntactic point, concerns about 
pragmatics and sociolinguistic markers, the issue is further complicated by considerations 
such as what would make a response useful for each possible scenario, what would be 
polite or impolite in each context, and moreover, what sorts of responses might be 
generated based on seemingly irrelevant background information, such as the reaction ‗I 
wonder if I remembered to turn off the coffee maker.‘ Moreover, and this is a point I 
shall highlight in later chapters, Chomsky‘s rejection of behaviorism on linguistic 
grounds points to a unique status that language holds in terms of behavior. Language is 
not just outwardly observable behavior, such as the lifting of a glass to one‘s lips or 
walking purposefully towards the door as Chomsky (1957) successfully demonstrates , 
                                                 
3
 Cf. Chomsky, 1965, in particular, Chapter Three: Deep Structures and Grammatical Transformations. 
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our to ability utilize and understand a language involves an often tacit awareness of 
structures that underlie the surface structures we encounter. For example, when I begin 
stringing together clauses and phrases with conjunctions whilst recounting a story to a 
friend, I have an implicit understanding that this process could go on indefinitely. Indeed, 
the longest sentence in any language is impossible to conceive, hence, a universal 
principle governing all languages, namely, that they are infinitely generative. 
Nevertheless, we never actually ‗observe‘ this infinite generation because it is quite 
literally unobservable, and yet, structures and principles such as these must certainly be 
part of the overall story of how we come to be competent users of a language. To put it 
briefly, language manifests itself as more than mere behavior.  In other words, if 
Chomsky is right, then behaviorism misconstrues language on two grounds: first, while 
some aspects of language are behavioral, it is wrong to claim that language just is another 
behavior. Second, if linguistic rules are the means by which linguistic behavior as well as 
other observable behaviors are often generated, and these linguistic rules, while being 
universal and finite at the deep level, allow for an infinite and unpredictable set of surface 
constructions, then the further claim that all behavior should be predictable given enough 
‗dispositional information,‘ fails miserably. Hence, a major problem for behaviorists after 
Chomsky is the demotion from a theory that can explain all observable behavior to one 
that at best, can explain some of it some of the time.      
 Yet, another worry for behaviorism that has arguably been successfully solved by 
alternative theories is its inability to account for causation between mental states. While 
focusing all of their attention on how dispositions are causal antecedents for observable 
behavior, behaviorists overlook the possibility of unobservable behavior, as well as the 
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point that ‗inner‘ thoughts often cause other thoughts. The assumption that all behavior is 
manifest through external bodily movement or speech is a hasty move at best, but 
perhaps the most damning feature of logical behaviorism is that the brain and central 
nervous system (CNS) are effectively left out of the discussion. To be sure, behaviorists 
are not interested in the nervous system, or they at least think it is of little use in 
understanding behavior; as Skinner argues, regarding a discrete behavioral response:  
 We shall know the precise neurological conditions which immediately precede, 
 say, the response, ‗No thank you.‘ These events in turn will be found to be 
 preceded by other neurological events, and these in turn by others. This series 
 will lead us back to events outside the nervous system and, eventually, outside 
 the organism…The causes to be sought in the nervous system are, therefore, 
 of limited usefulness in the prediction and control of specific behavior [1953; 
 38].  
 
Thus, the appeal to overt behavior assumes that all antecedents of outward behavior are 
eventually traceable back to other outwardly observable behavior – the CNS causes, if 
they count as causes at all, are intermediate and unimportant. Even more unfounded is the 
assumption that all behavior must be of the global, outwardly recongnizable, external 
variety. On a very coarse grained analysis, it might be true that one behavior can cause 
another, but then there is nothing to prevent us from refining our understanding of 
behavior to include things like the behaviors of neurons, somatosensory systems, and so 
forth, all of which are partially responsible for causing the more easily recognized outer 
behaviors of the whole organism. Later, we will see why perhaps delimiting the brain‘s 
importance is a productive strategy, but for now, at this point in the historical 
progression, the denial on the behaviorists‘ part that internally caused thoughts can cause 
other thoughts or even outward behavior is tantamount to claiming that it matters not 
what is going on inside, so long as what we observe counts as ‗mindful.‘ Experimental 
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paradigms such as Heider and Simmel‘s (1944), in which mindless shapes move about a 
screen and people viewing these otherwise mindless objects readily attribute mentality to 
them simply by virtue of their observable ‗behavior,‘ reveals this particular  problem with 
behaviorism. Figure 1 is an image of one frame from the original video, in which the 
circle and triangles have been tracing a wild pattern around the large rectangular shape, 
which itself remains relatively still, except for one of its sides which swings back and 
forth at a 45 degree angle. The shapes‘ movements however, mimic embodied human 
movement; for example, upon seeing two shapes move together, one preceding the other 
until eventually stopping behind the rectangle, subjects claim that these two shapes are 
‗hiding‘ from the other shape. Indeed, the box, if it is supposed to be an occluding object 
of some sort, would prevent a normal embodied human, at certain angles, from seeing 
what is behind it. This is precisely what happens in the experiment; before long, the 
whole scenario is explained in terms of one shape ‗hiding‘ from another, the other 
‗growing angry,‘ and even an ‗argument‘ among the shapes ensuing. If we completely 
disregard the inner causes of behavior, the logical consequence of behaviorism as an 
explanatory mechanism is to allow anything whose outward behavior is characteristically 
‗human enough‘ to count as having mentality just like a human.  
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Figure 1.1: Depiction of Heider and Simmel Experiment. Visual 
representation of the short video played for experimental participants. The 
shapes move about the screen, going in and out of the large box and 
according to most reports, ‗one shape is angry at another,‘ or some similar 
emotional state and corresponding behavior is attributed. One of my 
students, upon viewing this video, went so far as to conjecture that a love 
affair was ongoing with two of the shapes and in this scene, the third has 
found them out and then goes into a manic rage, finally breaking down the 
‗house‘ (the box gets shattered in the end). From: Heider,  F. and Simmel, 
M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behaviour. American 
Journal of Psychology, 57, 243–259. 
  
 
In contrast with traditional behaviorism, central state identity theory allows for 
internally caused mental states by simply identifying them with brain states or processes. 
In the name of parsimony, Smart (1959) for example, advocates a strict mind-brain 
identity whereby any mental process or sensation just is a brain process. This identity is 
argued to be a metaphysical claim about the nature of the mind and not necessarily a 
semantic one. In other words, if Jones is hungry, this does not mean the same thing as 
Jones is having this or that brain process, even if the two events described are in fact one 
and the same. By addressing this point, Smart is able to respond to objections that stem 
from the rather crucial observation that I might have a lack of epistemic access to my 
own brain processes but have perfectly transparent access to my beliefs, desires, and 
motivations.  
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 While mind-brain identity appears to explain what behaviorism could not, it is not 
without its own set of problems. For one, the role of the brain is moved not just back onto 
center stage, but is now the only relevant player in the entire story. We might question, 
for example, whether the rest of the sensorimotor system plays any role in cognition, or if 
mind-brain identity can be forced into an untenable scenario in which thought – the very 
same kind of activity that embodied agents engage in – is possible for beings without 
bodies, the proverbial ‗brain in a vat‘ scenario. I will address this worry more fully in the 
next section, but there is a corollary concern, which is evident if we consider just how 
difficult it is to perform metaphysical reductions without simultaneously performing 
intertheoretic one.  As Fodor (1981) notes, because Smith is in pain does not mean the 
same thing as Smith has X brain state, identity theory allows us to talk about 
psychological types generally, at a level of abstraction from brain states. In other words, 
while minds and brains might just be the same entities, both psychology and 
neurobiology remain vital and necessary sciences, as they concern themselves with two 
very distinct theoretical stances towards a single entity. And yet, the very element of 
mind-brain identity that its proponents praise it for, its parsimony, would seem to suggest 
that if we can have one unified theory of mind, then this would be even simpler than the 
dual-theoretical identity originally proffered by Smart and other central state identity 
theorists.  
 In other words, mind-brain identity runs up against this dilemma: either take 
parsimony so seriously that the end goal really is one unified theory of mind – call it 
neurobiology – or carve up mental states in such a way that a single brain process could 
very rarely if ever be identified strictly with the more global mental process. Although I 
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face many objections, perhaps even from Fodor himself, my reaction to this ‗carving 
problem‘, which he mentions in Something on the State of the Art, is that it forces mind-
bran identity into either an eliminative materialist or an entirely non-reductive physicalist 
position. Thus, if one wants to avoid internal inconsistencies of Churchland-style (cf. 
1986, 1981) intertheoretic elimination as well as avoid being forced into some sort of 
epiphenomenalism or property dualism (cf. Chalmers, 1996), then it would seem that one 
ought to steer clear of mind-brain identity. On the one hand, as I mentioned earlier, the 
simplest theory of mind would seem to be the one that explains the most with as little 
work as possible. If it turns out to be true that neuroscience can actually tell us everything 
we need to know about minds, to the point that all mentality can be understood in terms 
of brain processes, then I see no reason to take issue with Churchland‘s elimination 
thesis. Much like other once poorly understood phenomena (the theory of phlogiston 
being eliminated by the theory of combustion, e.g.), when we learn that there is a better 
theory, we don‘t simply try to allow the old explanatory framework to coexist along with 
the newer, actually true one. We simply eliminate our previous framework, as it has been 
deemed false. I happen to think that neuroscience is not a complete science of cognition, 
and I will defend this position throughout this project. While eliminative materialism 
might in fact allow for a complete science of the brain, assuming that this is all there is to 
‗the mind‘ is no better than behaviorism‘s assumption that brains are of little importance. 
In other words, while behaviorists suffer from brain-neglect, eliminativists seem to suffer 
from the inverse mania, brain-obsession.  
On the other hand, if we take seriously the idea that global psychological states, 
such as pain, might be realized in various ways that are not always entirely captured by 
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simple identification of an exact brain process, then we face even more worries. What is 
strict identity then if Smith can be in pain and Jones can be in pain, but the two of them 
have different types of brain processes occurring? The typical reaction to type identity is 
actually that it does not allow for other life forms or other species to share in the same 
global mental types if they do not have the requisite brain processes, but I think the 
problem runs even deeper than this. Even intra-species wise, if you and I don‘t share the 
exact same types of brain processes, then either we cannot be having the same type of 
mental process, or we do and strict identity does not hold. If we are not having the same 
sensation, pain, by virtue of our different brain processes, then if I claim to be ‗in pain,‘ 
and you assert the same feeling, then one of us is simply wrong about in what we are 
experiencing. This is problematic for identity theses, but even more vexing would be 
accepting the other disjunct, that perhaps type identity just does not hold of many global 
mental states. The identity theorist is ultimately therefore confronted with either rejecting 
the occurrence a vast array of mental phenomena that resist strict identification with 
specific brain processes, or worse, she must reject strict mind-brain identity altogether, 
favoring the phenomenology of non-reductive mental states, whilst giving up the core of 
the original theory.  Of course, the dilemma might be avoided if our constraints on 
identity are not so strong, namely, if it remains the case that mental types are always 
identical to some physical types of process, but they need not always map isomorphically 
onto brain ‗types.‘  In other words, if we adopt a token physicalist view, which would 
mean that every mental event is some physical event, but that these physical events onto 
which mental events must always be mapped are not necessarily type-specific, then 
perhaps there is a third option for identity theory.   
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1.3 The Virtues (and Vices) of Token Physicalism  
 The sort of physicalism put forth by central state identity theorists, is most 
properly thought of as type physicalism, or the thesis that every mental type is a physical 
type. Another way to put it would be to say that since the world is wholly physical, then 
minds must be physical as well, but more specifically, that all mental processes are 
identical to natural kinds, which are themselves physical objects or processes. For 
example, microsaccades of the eye might constitute a natural kind of eye movement.
4
 
Thus, when you and I both look at an object, our eye movements are two distinct tokens 
of that one physical type of eye movement. In terms of minds then, this is a highly 
restrictive notion of what gets to count as this or that mental process. If pain is defined as 
the firing of C-fibers, then any creature, machine, or entity that does not have the 
requisite physical process, will ipso facto not be in the mental state of pain.  
 On the other hand, token physicalism makes a weaker claim insofar as it holds 
that each mental token is identical to a physical token. This does not necessarily imply 
that there are no longer natural kinds under a token physicalist picture, but if there are, 
they will most likely be redefined in terms of their functional roles. For instance, a heart 
might in fact constitute a natural kind of organ, but only insofar as its function is to pump 
blood through the body. Hence, if we invent an artificial heart, even if it is not type-
identical to many other versions of hearts in the world, the token physicalist will have no 
qualms with calling it a heart. Likewise, mental types might indeed turn out to be realized 
by various sorts of physical types, but every instance of ‗pain‘ will always be identical to 
exactly one physical token, which means that C-fiber firing might be a strong indicator of 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed discussion of these eye movements and their necessary involvement in perception, hence, 
an argument that they constitute natural ‗kinds‘ of processes that are themselves constitutive of cognition, 
see Martinez-Conde, et al, 2009; Martinez-Conde, 2009; Tronosco, et al, 2008. 
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pain, but it might be 1) that other physical mechanisms can realize pain – hence the brain 
processes are not always necessary for the specified mental processes – and 2) there 
might be instances of C-fiber firing without an experience of pain – thus, C-fiber firing is 
not always sufficient for experiencing pain.  
 All seems well for token physicalism, except upon closer examination, it really is 
just a dressed-up version of the very general material monist claim that all things in the 
universe, including minds, are material. If we all agree that the world is comprised only 
of physical things then the real goal of philosophy of mind and cognitive science is not to 
determine what a mind is—this has been answered by the unanimous rejection of 
Cartesianism—but instead, we are seeking to provide an explanation of how mentality is 
constituted, what sorts of physical things, collections of things, or processes ought to be 
called cognitive. Given this much more specific aim then, token physicalism is about as 
informative as claiming that all matter is material. If however, we can come up with 
specific functional specifications for the sorts of physical processes that are supposed to 
be counted as ‗cognitive,‘ then the position is no longer bankrupt. Indeed, this is precisely 
one of the virtues of token physicalism – it allows for the possibility of cognition being 
explained more in terms of function rather than physicality. This is because unlike type 
physicalism, which usually entails that mental types and physical types are both natural 
kinds of ‗things‘ found in the world, token physicalism retains the intuitive appeal of 
relegating all phenomena to the natural world, but does not insist that the feeling of 
hunger is so specific as to warrant it only being realized by brain state X. The benefit of 
this more liberal physicalism is that it invites us to seriously consider ‗the mind‘ as an 
open and dynamic system rather than as the encapsulated, skull-ensconced brain, the 
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latter of which is so often portrayed as a reified entity rather than as a ‗process of 
processes.‘ Indeed, the terms ‗mental state‘ and ‗brain state‘ invoke stasis, and as Smart 
(1959), Armstrong (1968), Hill (2001), and other strict mind-brain identity theorists have 
argued, unambiguously, to be in a particular mental state just is to be in a particular brain 
state. To be fair, however, even the strict mind-brain identity theorists will clumsily refer 
to both brain ‗states‘ and brain ‗processes‘.5 Hence, it stands to reason that they recognize 
that the brain is full of processes – C-fiber firing being one paradigm case of such an 
event. Nevertheless, the brain itself is portrayed a closed system. Once again, the 
charitable interpretation would be to say that this is precisely how mind-brain identity is 
defined, and hence, the possibility, for example, that mental processes might be 
constituted by the interaction between brains, bodies, and environments, or that mental 
processes might be realized in a variety of physical mechanisms, some of which might 
not even involve a biological brain, is a non-issue, given the established explanatory 
framework. Put another way, most would agree that the rest of the body contributes to the 
brain‘s overall processing and in turn, that the external environment provides the body 
and brain with input. Where theorists differ is in the setting of boundaries. To the 
question of just how much of the external world ought we count as part of the cognitive 
process, the mind-brain identity theorist can answer, ex hypothesi, ―none.‖  The problem 
is that in answering why this must be so, the best answer afforded is parsimony. We know 
that brains are really important for cognition, so to make things simple, says the identity 
theorist, let‘s just say they are the only important element in cognition. This gives us a 
discrete and finite object – the brain – that can be scrutinized, studied, and mastered, 
                                                 
5
 The title of Smart‘s inaugural piece, ―Sensations and Brain Processes‖ is a good example, as he goes on 
throughout the article to refer both to brain states and to brain processes.   
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thereby allowing mastery of cognition. While parsimony is generally a strong inductive 
move to make in favor of one theory over another, to claim that it would be really nice 
and simple if the brain were the only thing in the world that realizes cognition and 
therefore it is the only thing that realizes cognition, is nothing more than wishful 
thinking.  A virtue of the competing version of physicalism – token physicalism – is 
therefore that it leaves this possibility open, rather than assuming from the start that 
simplicity is the best option. It may turn out to be the case that only biological brains can 
constitute cognition, but if we can find other physical tokenings of functionally 
equivalent systems, then we should be ready to call these processes cognitive just the 
same. Thus, token physicalism is most likely paired with a functionalist interpretation of 
cognition, and functionalism, as we shall see, not only provides a framework for thinking 
about the mind in terms of dynamic and open processing, but it also avoids the major 
pitfalls of logical behaviorism and central state identity theory.  
 It was Putnam‘s (1960, 1975) ‗machine functionalism‘ that first provided a rich 
philosophical argument as to why the defining feature of mentality is not its neurology, 
but rather its computationality. By redirecting the discussion of PAIN from being merely 
a brain state, to being a functional state of the entire organism, pain is not limited to 
identification with some brain state, which is the strict reading of type-physicalism, nor 
must it even be identified with a biological body-state, a more liberal notion of type-
physicalism. And, unlike behaviorism, pain is more than just wincing and groaning. The 
―Total State‖ of a probabilistic automaton involves its physical constitution, its 
dispositions to act in one way or another given certain inputs, and its actual behavior 
given those inputs (Putnam calls these ―outputs‖).  As Putnam claims, however, 
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―knowing the Total State of a system relative to a Description involves knowing a good 
deal about how the system is likely to ―behave‖ given various combinations of sensory 
input‖ (323). Thus, a lot of functionalist literature since Putnam retains a sort of 
behaviorist tendency, as computers themselves, which are ―discrete state machines,‖ to 
use Turing‘s (1950) original phrase, are not too dissimilar from dispositionally governed 
humans. In fact, part of Putnam‘s argument is precisely to claim that ―all organisms 
capable of feeling pain are Probabilistic Automata‖ (1975; 433). The difference between 
machine functionalism and logical behaviorism is the further move of claiming that all 
organisms that feel pain have a corresponding ‗machine-table description‘ – in other 
words, their mentality can be described and indeed must be at least partially understood 
by reference to inner processes. This essentially means that the functional organization of 
an organism, so long as it counts as typically productive of pain-like behavior and 
sensations, will count as ‗being in pain;‘ thus pain does not necessarily have to produce 
pain behavior, which thereby allows for pain to simply be an internal state of the system.   
 Where behaviorism and identity theory fall short, functionalism appears to pick 
up the slack. Not only does it allow for internally caused mental processes, but most 
functionalists are amenable to some sort of multiple realizability thesis, which absolves 
them of the worries associated with strict type-identity. If mental processes can be 
realized in various sorts of ways, from slightly different neural processes to physical 
substrates of entirely alternate ‗type‘, such as artificial neural networks for example, then 
the concerns about an overly restrictive and unrealistic metaphysics of mind seem 
irrelevant. A caveat about functionalism is perhaps in order however: while functionalist 
interpretations usually favor a token physicalism, this is not a necessary entailment of 
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adopting such interpretive strategy. Polger (2006) for instance, maintains that type-
physicalism is possible, indeed a likely outcome of functionalism, given that we will 
eventually have to specify, with some constraints, what sorts of physical mechanisms can 
constitute the functional organization necessary for cognition and hence, only certain 
‗types‘ will fit this bill.  Furthermore, as we shall see in later sections, there are disputes 
as to whether or not functionalism implies extended cognition – a debate which centers 
around the ‗where‘ of cognitive processes more so than the ‗what.‘  
These disputes tend to suggest that functionalism alone is not intended to provide 
a comprehensive ontology of mentality, but is rather an interpretation of how mentality 
works, which in turn is supposed to guide research in the philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science in a particular way – namely, to treat the mind not necessarily as a 
unified object or ‗brain-thing,‘ but as a dynamic processing ‗machine‘ or computational 
mechanism, which may – and usually does – involve a brain, and can include a wide 
variety of other physical processes. On this read however, the nature of what this physical 
system might be is vague. In this sense therefore, functionalism and token physicalism 
are not robust metaphysical theories, but are rather, as Putnam and others originally 
claimed they ought to be: ways to conceive of how minds work. The details of what and 
where minds are in the world remain open questions.  
 Why then adopt a functionalist framework? As stated above, thinking of the mind 
as a machine places emphasis on what minds do, such that the task of answering what 
they are can be reformulated so as to be better asked as such: what sorts of physical 
things out there are in fact constitutive of cognitive processes so understood? Such a 
reformulation does not begin with Putnam of course, as we can see the transition quite 
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clearly by examining the birth of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Even in its infancy, Turing‘s 
‗Imitation Game‘ forced philosophers to reconsider the conditions for the possibility of 
‗having thought.‘ The backlash against ‗strong AI‘ (cf. Searle, 1980) and the minutia of 
the debate is of little concern to me, but what is important to consider is the way in which 
functionalism and AI research are the first frameworks in which the boundaries 
delimiting where or ‗in what‘ cognition can take place begin to be confused. No sooner 
had the ‗neuroscientific revolution‘ which ushered in the hay day of type-physicalism 
occurred, than it is seemingly undermined by functionalism, computationalism, robotics, 
and cybernetics, which suggest that the grey squishy matter between our ears might not 
be the only cognitive player in town. If mental states can be realized by a wide variety of 
physical processes, then the brain-mania brought about by neuroscience should be short 
lived, with functionalism quickly taking its place.  
 Rather than wholeheartedly endorse functionalism however, I want to be more 
cautious. Based on the failures of type-physicalism and behaviorism in providing a 
realistic and comprehensive account of how the mind works, it is reasonable to claim that 
neither of the two alone should be conceived of as the best story we have about the mind. 
Functionalism, on the other hand, as it aligns itself with a thesis of multiple realizability, 
at least prima facie, appeals intuitively to our common sense understanding of cognition. 
If I am to believe that Jones and I can have the same type of thought-behavior schema, 
e.g. we both think that pizza would taste really good and believe that there is pizza in the 
fridge, and thus, we get up to retrieve a slice, from whence does this belief that we are 
both in the same mental state of HUNGER arise? The behaviorist will claim that it is only 
by virtue of observed behavior that we make such an inference, but then this could mean 
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that my friend Jones has nothing in between his ears and is a behavioral zombie as it 
were. There is nothing to prevent maintaining this as a logical possibility under the 
behaviorist framework. However, if I were to answer the question from a type-physicalist 
standpoint, my answer would be something to the effect of ‗as long as the two of us are in 
identical brain-states.‘ This answer is unpalatable because it rules out the possibility of 
Jones having a slightly different neural schema at time t than I do and yet still being 
hungry just as I am. It also rules out the possibility that my dog is hungry, that other 
beings with type-distinct brain states can be hungry, and so forth, unless of course, 
HUNGER as a global state of the whole brain or better, the whole organism, is allowed to 
be realized by a motley of physical systems, in which case, we aren‘t talking strict mind-
brain identity anymore. Based on simple verification procedures, many of which involve 
observing behavior, verbal reporting, etc, it seems counter-intuitive to claim that 
something like PAIN is not being experienced both by me when I stub my toe and by my 
dog when he misses his Frisbee and instead crashes into the fence, even if I learn that my 
dog‘s ‗brain-pain‘ looks nothing like mine.  
Unlike a strictly behavioral interpretation, a machine functionalist interpretation 
has as a virtue, a further specification that there must be a possible machine table 
description for the cognitive state in question, such that not any old collection of 
materials will suffice for the sensation HUNGER. In this way, functionalism shares with 
behaviorism that they both allow for natural, typically effortless attribution of mental 
states to others via behavior, but functionalism also allows that internal mental states are 
causally efficacious. To put it another way, functionalism appeals to the intuitive idea 
that if someone or something is behaving enough like myself when I am in mental state 
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A, and if I believe that this creature is capable of experiencing the world similarly to me 
due to an implicit belief I have about their physical composition as being also similar 
enough to my own, then I will naturally endorse the idea that there are two distinct 
physical realizations of one mental type. 
 For all its virtues, functionalism still carries around a lot of theoretical baggage. 
Chief among this baggage is the grain size problem concerning multiple realizability. As 
discussed above, agreeing that two distinct physical systems are in the same mental state 
depends on what we mean by mental states such as HUNGER or PAIN –whether we are 
talking about general food-seeking behavior, specific cravings, sharp pain, dull pain, 
localized pain, and so forth – in other words, the specificity with which we are 
characterizing the mental process.  As Bechtel and Mundale (1999) note, the irresistible 
urge to claim that psychological states are multiply realizable stems from the typical 
philosophical usage of psychological measures to map the brain. More specifically, the 
inconsistency with which these correlative mappings are made might hint at a case 
against MR. Typically, researchers have used a coarse grain to classify mental states as 
―the same‖ across individuals and species, while a finer grain is used to differentiate 
among brain states. However, as Bechtel and Mundale note, if we keep the grain 
consistent for both the psychological and the neural classifications, the case for MR does 
not fair so well. A more fine grained mental classification would allow for differentiating 
mental states among individuals or even within the same individual over time. For 
example, rather than the coarse mental type PAIN, we might have PAIN-1, PAIN-2, and 
so forth, to denote varying degrees and even kinds of pain, such as burning, sharp, or 
pulsating.  Utilizing this same fine grain to analyze the brain, we might be able then to 
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map these nuanced versions of PAIN onto brain processes that reflect these subtle 
differences. It is usually the case that in apparent instances of different brain activity 
failing to produce apparent differences in mental states, one has usually just not used a 
fine enough grain to analyze mental states (177-8). Bechtel and Mundale go on to argue 
that given a fine enough grain, it will rarely, if ever turn out to be the case that genuine 
multiple realizability is occurring. However, using a coarse enough grain, claims about 
multiple realizability are too easily and too loosely made.  The thesis of MR is appealing 
for precisely this reason however; it is intuitive to claim that I, my dog, and even the 
blood sucking mosquito annoying the both of us can all be hungry. However, depending 
on the context in which the comparison is being made, this might turn out not to be true. 
 Lack of context, Bechtel and Mundale claim, makes it easy to assume that MR is 
a viable thesis about cognition. It might be that Lisa and her pet octopus have the same 
mental states, realized by different neural structures, for example; if they are both hungry 
and this hunger is associated with some general food-seeking behavior. However, 
regarding other factors, such as how the food is sought, what food is sought, under what 
conditions, etc, then the food-seeking behavior and its corresponding mental state are 
different. As Bechtel and Mundale rightly point out, asking whether two things are the 
same or different only makes sense with respect to some third thing. Stating for example, 
Lisa and her pet octopus have the same PAIN, would mean that each of their individual 
realizations of pain share something in common, such that Lisa‘s pain (PAIN-L) and her 
Octopus‘s pain (PAIN-O) are identical just in case they are both instances of PAIN more 
generally. So, PAIN as the third thing could be specified differently for Lisa and her 
octopus; we might say that PAIN can be realized by C-fiber firing in human brains, but it 
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is realized by O-fiber firing in octopi brains. Hence, if we use different ‗third things,‘ it is 
reasonable to assume that Lisa and her octopus have the same mental states, but if we 
consider the context and keep it fixed while doing comparative analysis, both 
psychologically and neurally, then the case for multiple realizability appears rather 
dubious. If the environment has any role to play in an organism‘s realization of PAIN, 
then matters become even worse. It is highly unlikely that, for example, Lisa and her pet 
octopus are actually in the same total state, given the largely different embodied and 
environmental contexts in which they are situated (202-3). In other words, if context must 
be the same in order for two organisms to be realizing the exact same PAIN, then MR is a 
rare occurrence indeed.  
 The example above is just one among many. Lawrence Shapiro (2000), for 
instance, makes a similar argument, focusing his attack on Block and Fodor‘s (1972) 
argument that a psychological entity is often associated with several distinct neurological 
states (238). He claims that in an attempt to forge an existence proof for multiple 
realizability by neural plasticity, the reality of the neurobiological evidence is 
overlooked. The rewiring experiments actually show that the rewired rodents do not see 
exactly the same as normal rodents-i.e. their visual acuity for recognizing light gradations 
is largely impoverished. Furthermore, the auditory cortex of a rewired rodent comes to 
look identical to the visual cortex possessed by its unwired friend. Thus, he argues, we 
have neither a case in which the same function is realized in two different ways – the 
rodents with the different – the rewired – neurology actually don‘t have the same mental 
states, nor a case in which the same function is realized in two different ways - the two 
physical systems realizing the mental state don‘t differ enough such that the difference 
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matters. In other words, if one brain system or component comes to resemble another 
such that they are indistinguishable, then the claim that the two brains can both realize the 
same mental state is uninteresting (2000; 648-9). Surely, there are more objections to MR 
lurking in the literature, but it is sufficient to note here that accepting MR without 
scrutiny is problematic.  
 Perhaps the most important consequence of the grain-size problem is the 
unfavorable bottom lines functionalism can be reduced to depending on how far and in 
which direction we push it. As Block (1980) characterizes it, one can either be forced into 
an unfair chauvinism or an unpalatable liberalism concerning the nature of mental 
processes. That is, if Bechtel, Mundale, and Shapiro are right, then we must either insist 
that only organisms with precisely the correct ‗human brain functionality‘ can have 
human cognition or we allow that anything, so long as it has the proper input-output 
sequencing characteristic of human thought, to be a ‗thinking thing.‘ In other words, 
pushed to one end of the extreme, functionalism entails that only physical systems that 
resemble closely enough the ones that we have established are capable of thinking – 
which just so happens to be humans – can be characterized as properly ‗cognitive,‘ and 
thus, we are back to an undesirable strict mind-brain identity, or as Block calls it, a 
species chauvinism. Pushed in the other direction however, functionalism might force us 
to accept that Heider and Simmel‘s (1944) shapes actually do have minds because they 
act as though they do and furthermore, because the program underwriting them looks 
sufficiently like the machine table description of a human mind. As we move on through 
later chapters, I intend to argue that this latter option is a bit of a straw man version of 
functionalism and hence, the dilemma is falsely constructed, but for now, it suffices to 
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note that if we are not careful in how we specify what sorts of physical processes might 
be capable of functionally organizing in such a way that constitutes thinking, either too 
few or too many entities seem to walk away from this story with minds.   
 Once again, it is helpful to consider that functionalism is not inherently 
metaphysical in its overall claims. By shifting the focus from what a mind is to how it is 
realized, all that is being insisted upon is a change of emphasis. As the above discussion 
illustrates, the big metaphysical questions concerning just what sorts of functions 
constitute cognitive ones and the criteria for delimiting exactly ‗in what‘ these functions 
can be realized remain thorny issues. If we want to avoid slipping back into logical 
behaviorism or type identity theory, these questions demand answers. Rather than 
continuing on with armchair a priori engineering by purebred philosophers, I think 
examining some of the more interdisciplinary approaches to cognition is in order. Not 
only will the intersection of psychology, neuroscience, robotics, and phenomenology 
provide insightful and potentially more realistic ways to approach the problem, but by 
engaging with what has come to be known as ‗cognitive science‘ most generally, it 
quickly becomes evident that when seeking the elusive where of cognition, we have been 
looking in all the wrong places. 
 
1.4 Embodiment, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence 
 Before turning to the more recent trends in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science that take the body much more seriously than their predecessors, I want to first 
consider the project of Artificial Intelligence (AI). My aim here is not to provide an 
historical overview and it is most certainly not in any way an attempt to settle the dispute 
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between the believers and non-believers. Instead, I want to focus on the fact that despite 
serious advances, the type of AI imagined by Kubrick
6
 and others has not occurred as far 
as anyone can tell. This simple point, whether you take it as a signal that the achievement 
shall never happen or believe contrarily, that it is just around the corner, is an example of 
a real-world attempt at applying the functionalist paradigm in order to achieve a 
particular scientific end. The fact that for the last fifty years or so AI has continued to 
come up short in terms of creating sufficiently human-like thinking machines highlights 
the same idea I mentioned in closing the last section. By looking for the mind among 
abstract and highly disembodied machine tables, AI proponents aren‘t just looking in the 
wrong places; they are not looking anywhere for the mind. This question of how 
cognition works, as we have seen, carries with it some notion of in what this functioning 
is taking place, and yet, functionalist-driven cognitive roboticists have systematically 
neglected the body and its role to play in the executing of said table. Hence, we find, as I 
shall discuss, robot after robot that blows itself up, runs into walls, and is unconvincing at 
the Turing Test. Relying mainly on Hubert Dreyfus as well as several roboticists at MIT 
who seem to be exceptions to this general rule of body-neglect, I shall attempt to 
illustrate how and why I think the turn to embodied approaches in cognitive science is a 
reaction to the intractable identity-theory vs. behaviorism debate, but also, a response to 
some of the failures in AI.  
 In What Computers [Still ]Can‟t Do,7 Hubert Dreyfus sketches several of the 
major attempts in AI, along with the assumptions about cognition generally that subtend 
each. I shall not attempt to discuss his account in detail; I think we can glean the relevant 
                                                 
6
 For example, in the Movie, ―AI.‖ 
7
 Originally published in 1972. The revised edition, ―What Computers Still Can‘t Do,‖ is from where I shall 
be citing exact page numbers. 
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details quite simply by a move Dreyfus makes late in the book, in a section titled ―The 
Role of the Body in Intelligent Behavior.‖ This move is a turn back to some of the 
original phenomenologists – Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in particular –  as well as the 
Gestalt psychologists, to show that what has yet to be replicated in any machine is the 
ability to properly understand the situation involved in this or that cognitive action. 
Husserl (1931) referred to this situation as a ‗horizon,‘ and he differentiated between 
‗inner‘ and ‗outer‘ horizons in order to explain the way we are able to recognize objects 
as whole, even when we don‘t experience them as such. For example, in The Idea of 
Phenomenology (1964), Husserl expounds upon the ways we perceive a cube; we can 
only ever see a particular side of it, which is dependent upon the angle at which we are 
positioned with relation to it, both of which are manifest by a particular profile of the 
cube – namely, its position in time and space relative to our own positions, and so forth. 
To put it more simply, we always experience a presence in absence. Things appear to us 
as partial and yet whole at the same time, those parts that are absent visually are 
nonetheless present all at once. How is this possible? In Ideas I, Husserl claims we must 
have background information about the ‗scene‘ such that we can comprehend the whole 
of the encounter with the object as well as understand our own relation to the object, 
spatially and temporally. Hence, we have an outer and inner horizon in which experience 
is made possible. We don‘t just play chess or use language via some internal code written 
into us, nor do we seem to participate in these activities entirely via trial and error. To 
quote Dreyfus on Husserl‘s ―horizons:‖  
 In chess and in recognizing sentences, we find the same phenomenon playing a 
 crucial  role. Our sense of the whole situation, outer horizon, and our past 
 experience with the specific object or pattern in question, inner horizon, give us a 
 sense of the whole and guide us in filling in the details [1992; 242].  
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 What has truly been left uncaptured by roboticists is not the higher-level rational 
functions often assumed to be uniquely human, such as logical reasoning or ideal 
language production and comprehension. Instead, as Dreyfus notes, the part of 
intelligence that we share with animals – pattern recognition – has resisted simulation. As 
well, natural language comprehension and use remains to be perfectly simulated, as even 
the best chatbots such as Suzette – best new bot of 20098 – or A.L.I.C.E9 – three-time 
winner of the Loebner prize –   eventually expose themselves as ‗non-native‘ speakers of 
the ‗human‘ language.  
 Dreyfus thinks that the Husserlian ‗horizons‘ with which we approach each 
perceptual and cognitive experience are what computers systematically fail to come 
equipped with, and this is in part because such knowledge, he claims, must be embodied, 
a point Merleau-Ponty (1962) makes explicit in Phenomenology of Perception. The 
problem with the AI project thus far, as Dreyfus sees it, is that researchers continue to 
insist that this embodied ‗know how‘ can be duplicated via explicit and formalized rules. 
In order for a computer or robot to achieve what Piaget (1966) termed the ―Perceptual 
Constancy‖ with which we can perceive whole objects in each sense modality and 
interact meaningfully with them, there would have to be an internal model of every object 
encountered in every possible sense modality, along with a set of comparative principles 
for each object in each modality. Encountering an object visually and tactilely; therefore, 
it would need to pass through this analysis before the robot could interact properly with 
it. As an example, consider the ease with which a typical human can reach into the 
                                                 
8
 Chatterbot Challenge award recipient. See online at: http://www.chatbots.org/chatterbot/suzette/ 
9
 2001, 2002, 2004 
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refrigerator and obtain an egg. Grasping the egg without breaking or dropping it requires 
a complex set of physical rules governing force, grip, and so forth, as well as the 
interaction of this tactile modality with the visual system‘s information about the size and 
shape of the egg. Most of us never even think about what goes into a simple task like this 
and when asked to explain how we do it, it is likely that our explanations do not even 
approximate the complexity with which the action is actually performed. As I will discuss 
in Chapter 3, when a person‘s nervous system is damaged in a particular way and this 
seamlessness of action is lost, regaining the proper motor functions to complete even the 
most basic tasks can prove difficult, if not impossible.
10
 Instead, for most of us, we are 
able to, as Dreyfus states, ―bypass this formal analysis‖ (249). His doubt that artificially 
intelligent systems could ever achieve this seamlessness of action is due in part to the 
failures in doing so to date, but moreover, by ignoring the way our ―wet engineering‖ can 
and does play a vital role in encoding this information that is to a large extent, below the 
level of conscious awareness, roboticists, he conjectures, will consistently and 
continually fail in their endeavors.   
 There are, however, some roboticists – Rodney Brooks and Cynthia Breazeal, for 
instance – who have taken this phenomenological lesson seriously. Both of these MIT 
roboticists have taken cues from Marvin Minsky, whose robotic arm
11
 was one of the first 
to be capable not only of picking up objects, but navigating around obstacles to obtain the 
objects and use them meaningfully. Rodney Brooks‘ most famous robot, Cog, is a 
continually evolving project that began as just a head, torso, and arms, with nowhere near 
                                                 
10
 In particular, deafferented patients suffer from this problem. One patient I will be most interested in 
discussing is Ian Waterman, who is in fact able to recover a large part of his motor functioning.  
11
 1968, ―The Tentacle,‖ MIT AI Lab 
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the degrees of freedom that a human possesses, but now, according to Cog‘s website,12  
―the major degrees of motor freedom in the trunk, head, and arms are all there. Sight 
exists, in the form of video cameras. Hearing and touch are on the drawing board. 
Proprioception in the form of joint position and torque is already in place; a vestibular 
system is on the way. Hands are being built as you read this, and a system for 
vocalization is also in the works.‖ Below is a picture of Cog in his earliest days with 
Brooks and to the right of that is photograph of the hands Cog will eventually have.  
  
 
Figure 1.2 Rodney Brooks and Cog      Figure 1.3 Cog‘s Hand Prototype 
 
 Cynthia Breazeal has been following in Minsky‘s footsteps but has focused her 
attention more on the ways in which humans perceive and express emotions. Originally 
part of the Cog project, Breazeal‘s unique project, Kismet, is an even more limited robot, 
insofar as it is only a head, but the detail with which the facial features have been 
constructed is beyond comparison with any other project in AI to date. The robot is 
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 http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/cog/cog.html. It is interesting to point out that 
the face portion of Cog currently underway (Edsinger, O‘Reilly, Scasselatti, Scarpino, and Breazeal) has its 
own research team and name – ‗Lazlo‘- as does a currently underway biochemical subsystem (Adams), 
named ‗Meso.‘ In a sense therefore, ‗Cog‘ is slowly being replaced, component by component, by sub-
mechanisms that more genuinely reflect and respond to some of the concerns regarding embodiment we 
have discussed thus far.  
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pictured below and to get an idea of how intricate Kismet‘s construction is, I quote from 
Breazeal‘s website:13  
 Our hardware and software control architectures have been designed to meet the 
 challenge of real-time processing of visual signals (approaching 30 Hz) and 
 auditory signals (8 kHz sample rate and frame windows of 10 ms) with minimal 
 latencies (less  than 500 ms). The high-level perception system, the motivation 
 system, the behavior system, the motor skill system, and the face motor system 
 execute on four Motorola 68332 microprocessors running L, a multi-threaded 
 Lisp developed in our lab. Vision processing, visual attention and eye/neck 
 control is performed by nine networked 400 MHz PCs running QNX (a real-time 
 Unix operating system). Expressive speech synthesis and vocal affective intent 
 recognition runs on a dual 450 MHz PC running NT, and the speech recognition 
 system runs on a 500 MHz PC running Linux. 
 
All of this allows Kismet to express a full array of emotions as well as to respond to other 
humans who express those emotions. In this sense therefore, Breazeal is responding to 
the recent trend in philosophy and cognitive science to view the emotions as fundamental 
to consciousness (cf. Damasio, 2005; 2000) and as constitutive of our embodied social 
cognition (cf. Gallese, et al 2004). The thinking behind Kismet has helped Brezeal launch 
her most recent project, Leonardo (pictured next to Kismet), a fully embodied emotional 
robot, that can learn from instruction, including voice tone and facial expressions.  
 While Brooks and Breazeal challenge Dreyfus‘ claim that roboticists simply are 
not taking embodiment seriously, his point concerning formal rules remains. Because 
Cog and Kismet still operate with a set of formal rules, all of which must be analyzed and 
utilized for each action, the goal of possessing a set of seamless embodied motor skills 
has not yet been achieved. Indeed, neither of these robots can pick up an egg, let alone 
engage in a game of table tennis, activities that humans perform in real time quicker than 
any robot could ever hope to, according to Dreyfus, because of the implausibility that it 
could ever run through all the rule sets quickly enough.  
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 http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/kismet/kismet.html 
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Figure 1.4: Kismet 
 
  
Figure 1.5: Leonardo. Pictured here, Leonardo is learning via behavioral feedback – 
including facial expressions and tonal differences in the voice of his teacher – how to turn 
on one button versus ―all the buttons at once.‖ 
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 A simple rejoinder to Dreyfus‘ argument is to say that speed of processing is not 
sufficient to count or discount a system as cognitive. Just because it takes person A five 
minutes to complete a logic proof but it takes person B twenty minutes to complete that 
same proof, we do not conclude that the former is a thinking human while the latter is 
not. Moreover, these sorts of tasks – logic, mathematics, abstract reasoning – 
interestingly enough, are what most artificially intelligent systems are capable of, more 
so than most humans it turns out. However, the so-called ‗easy‘ component of cognition 
that allows for the continual updating and integrating of the sensory modalities in 
response to input is what has not been properly duplicated, at least not in terms of timing. 
We can see, given the relatively brief history of the AI project, it appears more 
reasonable to conclude that the progress towards replicating the motor skills and 
embodied abilities of humans, regardless of timing, is making serious strides. Consider, 
for example, Boston Dynamic‘s Big Dog14 robot, which is currently being tested as a 
prototype for the U.S. Army ground forces. The ‗dog‘ (pictured below) is able to traverse 
any terrain a human (or dog for that matter) can; it can react to changes, can overcome 
obstacles, and can even respond to challenges not immediately present to its onboard 
‗visual‘ system. For example, in the video provided online, we can see it navigate over 
slippery ice as well as recover from being kicked by a human opponent who has snuck up 
from behind.  
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 http://www.bostondynamics.com/robot_bigdog.html 
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Figure 1.6: Boston Dynamics ―Big Dog.‖ Show here in four different test modes – 
walking uphill in snow, slipping and recovering balance on an icy surface, climbing an 
unstable incline, and jumping over and obstacle.  
 
 All of this is not of course to suggest that Big Dog, or Kismet or Cog for that 
matter, have fully replicated human cognition in all its complexity. Big Dog, for instance, 
is specifically designed to help carry ammunition and supplies over rugged terrain and as 
such, is not endowed with the full array of higher cognitive tasks found in a chatbot such 
as A.L.I.C.E. Moreover, it is not my intention to settle the debate once and for all 
between Dreyfus and proponents of AI; I think settling this dispute involves an empirical 
question that can only be answered in due course. Nevertheless, I have highlighted these 
extremely unique examples in AI in contrast with Dreyfus‘ skepticism for two reasons: 
first, to show how our understanding of our own ‗situatedness‘ has revolutionized the 
study and creation of artificially intelligent systems, but also, to suggest that these 
changes that have taken place in AI have equally contributed to the phenomenology of 
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embodied experience. The more seriously the ‗horizon‘ of experience is taken, the more 
the environment itself begins to take less of a backseat. Indeed, the final iteration of the 
situated theories of cognition – extended cognition – puts the environment in center stage. 
So much of the recent work in AI has influenced philosophers and cognitive scientists, 
but also performance artists such as Stelarc, whose robotic arm and implanted ear 
challenge the idea that the utilization and near seamless integration of tool and tool user 
cannot be replicated. It is to these theories of cognition which find themselves in the 
middle of this awakening in AI that I now turn, as I will be at pains to argue throughout 
this project that it is not just that we see ourselves more and more reflected in our 
machines, but that we see ourselves more and more as a reflection of those same 
machines.  
 Despite optimism concerning the progress of AI thus far, it remains to be seen 
whether a robot possesses all that a human does in terms of embodied cognitive abilities. 
In short, my robot friend is inferior to my human friend when it comes to being able to 
hike along a mountain path, cross streams, dodge tree branches, and duck under rock 
outcroppings, all while taking in the breathtaking views and engaging in a hearty debate 
about Spinoza‘s theory of Substance. The special trick of human cognition, therefore, that 
roboticists have not fully captured in artificial systems is the ability to absorb external 
information, filter it for relevancy, and operate upon such representations of the world in 
meaningful ways, without having to explicitly, at the same time, represent the rules for 
doing all of these things. The same puzzlement vexes philosophers when they confront 
the question of just how the physical brain can represent the very external things that are 
supposed to be causally efficacious in bringing about experience in the first place. In 
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other words, that the body and mind are open systems is not denied; we take in food, 
light, minerals, perceive and learn from the environment. We allow the external world to 
penetrate our minds, but for the most part in the history and theories of philosophy of 
mind and cognitive science, it has never worked the other way around; our minds do not 
penetrate the world because our minds remain stuck in our heads. To be sure, the brain is 
active, insofar as it is constantly in motion, sending signals to this or that bodily system, 
even working while we sleep to create fanciful dreams or file away the day‘s experiences. 
Nevertheless, these processes take place solely behind closed curtains, within or inside 
the confines of our skulls, and hence, a dual-world of process arises from this picture. In 
other words, the received view has been that mental representations of the world go on in 
the brain and thus, internally, while the processes or objects that these mental processes 
represent take place in the external world.  
The trouble with this view of representation as taking place in a head is that it 
treats the brain ultimately as a passive receptor of information and effectively ignores its 
active contribution to the world beyond its skin and skull boundary. This is problematic 
because it is difficult to explain how a closed neural system such as the brain can actually 
‗picture‘ the external world. The ‗magic‘ of representation begins to lose its mystical 
nature however, when we take the mind itself as a dynamic and open perceptual system 
and allow it to reach beyond its biological brain-barrier to actively create and change the 
world it inhabits. Gibson (1977, 1979) spoke of ecological ―affordances‖ in just this way. 
Perception of the world involves, he argues, potentials for action. We see not simply a 
world of inert objects, but rather, action-ready situations and hence, our minds actually 
constitute the world in terms of what is action-ready and what is not.  His theory has 
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helped usher in a new wave of cognitive studies, which involve understanding cognitive 
processes as embedded (Haugeland, 1998), enacted (cf. Noё 2004, 2009; Hutto, 2005; 
Menary, 2006b), and even extended (cf. Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 1998, 2003, 
2008; Rowlands, 2003) in the world.  
1.5 Conclusion: On the Path to Extended Minds 
In order to explain how representation is demystified by adopting these views of 
mind which emphasize its embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended character, it is 
helpful to look at the ways representation is de-located under these accounts. 
Furthermore, if each of these four characteristics of cognition, which result from the 
Gibsonian and Putnamian traditions are placed on a continuum ranging from minor to 
radical de-location of representation, then it becomes easy to see the gradual 
relinquishing of the ‗hard problem‘ pertaining to dual phenomena in a physicalist world. 
In its stead are left the problems of explaining action, situatedness, and coupling – much 
less ‗magical,‘ indeed. In fact, as we progress along the continuum, the very existence of 
representations themselves will be called into question, or at least will need to be 
drastically reconfigured if we are to keep with what I consider to be a more sensible view 
of consciousness, namely, that it ‗ain‘t all happening in the head.‘ 
The location of cognitive processes is fairly clear, or at least can be more easily 
posited, as being somewhere in the body if boundaries are set at the skin and skull. In 
other words, embodied cognition (cf. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Thelen & 
Smith, 1994; Thelen, 2004; 2001) is a theory that could support a minimal mind-brain 
identity, or at least a mind-body identity; namely, the mind is embodied in the physical 
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workings of the brain. If the brain barrier seems too strict, then the mind can be expanded 
to encompass other bodily processes, but nevertheless, ‗the mind‘ is still comfortably 
‗situated‘ in a biological ‗body‘ incased by skin.  Haugeland (1998) asserts that 
―everyone agrees that the mind is embodied‖ (211), and hence, to understand why the 
same people who claim to be defending  a version of embodied cognition nonetheless 
argue as to whether or not this means the mind functionally decomposes to biological 
systems, it is necessary to examine precisely what embodiment entails. For Fred Adams 
or Ken Aizawa (cf. 2001; 2008; 2010), having a body means having a precisely defined 
boundary between ‗the cognitive‘ and the world of non-cognitive objects. More 
specifically, having a brain is necessary for cognition and hence, ―the mark of the 
cognitive‖ is not exemplified by computers or animals with brains too dissimilar from 
human brains. For Haugeland, however, since embodiment is essential to cognition, and 
embodiment is not just about the biological brain, and not even just about the biological 
body, it cannot be reduced to either of these constituents. 
An embodied account of cognition need not locate the mind entirely within the 
brain and as we move along the continuum of locality, a more embedded mind emerges. 
Namely, while Haugeland is certain that bodily situatedness is necessary for conscious 
experience, he also thinks that ‗the body‘ as a clearly defined system that subsequently 
marks off one mind from another is misguided. While Haugeland assents to the idea of 
‗bodies‘ – i.e. physical systems that persist in the world and do indeed shape our 
conscious experience – he nonetheless thinks that this taken-for-granted assumption often 
―misleadingly enhances the apparent significance of bodily surfaces as relevant interfaces 
for the understanding of other phenomena, such as intelligence‖ (214). What he means by 
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this is that cognitive processes are not necessarily reducible to those processes readily 
differentiated by biological function, surface discontinuity, or spatiality.  
A mind ―embodied and embedded,‖15 is one that is intimately tied to the 
environment in which it is situated. Rather than assume that the ―low-bandwidth‖ 
interfaces of the perceptual organs like the eyes and ears are where the world can sneak 
into the mind, Haugeland argues that representational beings such as humans are in a 
―high-bandwidth,‖ interactive and intimate relationship with the world. Thus, the mind, 
brain, body, and world are not necessarily distinct components that interpenetrate one 
another along narrowly defined interfaces; rather, in coming to represent something, or to 
have an experience more generally, there is a ―slicing‖ across of these layers. This 
multidimensional, non-reducible, and integrative characterization of representation de-
centers the brain and places much more significance on the embedded element of 
cognition. 
For Haugeland, representations might better be termed ―presentations,‖ as 
Dreyfus (1972; 1992) and Manzotti (2003), for instance, have suggested.  Rather than the 
internal copies of perceived objects, there is simply the manner in which the object is 
given coupled with the perceiver who intends
16
 it in this or that manner. While the 
intracranialist would have it that a representation is the result of internal symbol 
manipulations and transduction between and among sub-systems in the brain, Haugeland 
sees the ability to represent the world as the result of collaborative efforts among these 
various levels of interaction. The very word he uses to describe cognition, interactive, 
                                                 
15
 The title of chapter 9 in Haugeland (1998). 
16
 ‗Intend‘ here, of course, referring to taking an intentional stance towards an object and could thus be as 
simple as seeing the chair as a chair, e.g.  
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points to another departure from the rigid localization of mind in a physical body, by 
calling into question the passivity of the mechanism (whatever it is supposed to be on the 
internalist‘s account) responsible for receiving inputs. Instead of setting up yet another 
dichotomy between perception and action, the former of which merely sits there and 
inceives sensory data, it is better, Haugeland argues, to view perception and action as a 
unit, a commingled occurrence happening in real time.
17
 Since it is reasonable to suppose 
that perception is a large part of representational ability, then a more enacted story about 
perception means a more ‗active‘ story about representations. In fact, given our 
discussion so far, as one moves along the enactive continuum, the story tends to become 
more and more anti-representationalist. Indeed, as Manzotti‘s insight suggests, perception 
results in presentations – active constitutions of our world – but never do we genuinely re 
– present. What we typically think of as representations are therefore simply new 
presentations. 
Indeed, the enacted account of perception that Haugeland alludes to is taken up by 
many (cf. Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Noё, 2004; Noё & O‘Regan, 2001), and as 
I see it, is yet another small move along the line of gradual de-localization of 
consciousness. Arguing that perception amounts to ‗knowing how to act,‘ Noё (2004) 
clearly takes up the Gibsonian tradition of the environmental ‗affordances‘ playing a key 
role in our abilities to represent the world. Representations just are, on this view, action-
potentials, gleaned from a dynamic web of collaboration among the mind, body, and 
world. It is not simply that the outer environment is actively penetrating our sensory 
inputs whenever we have a perception, but ‗we‘ are just as active in contributing to the 
                                                 
17
 1998, 221. 
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meaning-making that constitutes rendering the objects of perception as action-ready in 
the first place. It is much less clear where to draw the line therefore, between ‗us‘ and the 
world, when the very constituting element of our cognition, interaction, results from a 
commingled, active, and intimately collaborative slice of many levels, such that teasing 
them apart, studying each one in isolation, or speaking of one causing the other in a 
necessarily linear fashion is not as straightforwardly plausible as the intracranialist would 
like us to believe.  
We find a view similar and yet more radical than Haugeland‘s (1998) embedded 
mind and Putnam‘s (1975) externalized meaning in the thesis of active externalism (cf. 
Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Not only do the environment and the tools we use aid in 
cognition, but in the type of high-bandwidth enacted coupling that occurs when a person 
uses an ‗artificial‘ memory device such as a PDA for example, that tool is said to actually 
participate in the cognitive process. The classic example of active externalism comes 
from Clark and Chalmers (1998), who argue that not just meaning, but beliefs extend out 
into the world. Not able to recall important information due to Alzheimer‘s, Otto must 
consult his notebook, which contains every memory he has stored for the past several 
years, including directions to the museum at which he is scheduled to meet his friend, 
Inga. The simple moral of the story is that when asked to draw a distinction between 
Otto‘s remembering where the museum is located, and Inga‘s remembering, no 
principled difference can be given. To be sure, Inga‘s brain alone retrieves the 
information, while Otto uses an external notebook, but in the larger context of what sort 
of action is being performed – namely, desire to get to the museum, belief that it is on 
53
rd
 Street, and acting in ways that will fulfill this desire – these are functionally 
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indistinguishable. Furthermore, all of the standard objections one might raise about 
Otto‘s fallibility, the notebook‘s possibly being lost, etc, are easily remedied by 
reminding the reader that these same dysfunction potentials are equally applicable to the 
internal brain and hence, it is unfair to leave Otto‘s notebook out of the description of 
Otto‘s cognitive processes. Therefore the mind, as Clark and Chalmers claim, ―ain‘t 
entirely in the head.‖  
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Chapter 2 
 
A Decade of Dissent: Defending and Re-Defending The Extended Mind 
 
The idea of environment is a necessity to the idea of organism, and with the conception of 
environment comes the impossibility of considering psychical life as an individual, 
isolated thingdeveloping in a vacuum. – John Dewey, The New Psychology 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 As the first chapter has shown, the failure to properly account for the 
‗situatedness‘ of cognition has resulted not only in unrealistic models of the mind and 
inadequate AI engineering. It has also led to a schism between those who do take the 
embodied, embedded, and enacted aspects of cognition seriously – thereby choosing to 
‗extend‘ mentality out into the world – and those who claim that these elements are 
indeed important but can nonetheless be explained via a framework of intracranialism. In 
other words, given the undeniable claim that the environment and one‘s bodily 
comportment play a role in cognition, one can either take a radical position concerning 
the degree to which these non-brain factors actually constitute cognition, or, one can 
maintain a conservative view, allowing that embodiment and situation contribute to the 
overall cognitive experience, but are not proper parts of it. There are intermediate 
positions to be sure, but in this chapter, I want to to follow the debate, as it has raged on 
now for a little over a decade, between the so-called EXTENDED (cf. Clark, 2008) 
proponents and the intracranialists (cf. Adams and Aizawa, 2008). In so doing, I intend to 
provide support for the externalist side, but I will also highlight some inconsistencies and 
oversights with this position. The aim is to develop an even more radical view, one that 
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sticks more closely to the original 1998 thesis, as I think this argument remains the best 
we have so far in explaining cognition.  
   In a recent critique of the Extended Mind (EM) hypothesis, Adams and Aizawa 
(2010) accuse Clark and Chalmers (1998) of committing ―coupling-constitution fallacy.‖ 
That a notebook or any other object or process might be coupled to a cognitive agent and 
thereby aid in her cognitive processing, they claim, has been conflated with the idea that 
such coupling implies that the object or process is actually a constitutive part of the 
agent‘s cognition. To illustrate the point, they cite this example:  
 Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4 
 Clark‘s Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician. [Adams & 
 Aizawa, 2010; 67]. 
  
This misunderstanding, Adams and Aizawa argue, highlights what is wrong with pretty 
much all accounts of extended or distributed cognition (cf. Haugeland, 1998; Clark, 
2001; 2005), as such arguments mistakenly attribute cognition to objects or processes 
simply by virtue of their being tools used by a cognitive agent. What makes a process 
cognitive, they assert, is not what sorts of external objects are employed, but rather, 
cognition is marked by what is going on ‗in the head‘ of the agent.  
 Adams and Aizawa go on to clarify that ―the mark of the cognitive‖ or ―what 
makes something a cognitive agent‖ must be understood in terms of specific underlying 
causal processes and the type of content produced by them. They argue that ―cognition is 
constituted by certain sorts of causal process that involve non-derived content‖ (69). As 
Clark (2008) notes, there are two elements to this argument; on the one hand, the claim 
about content says that in order for a process to count as cognitive, the representations, 
concepts or information employed must be non-derived, non-extrinsic, and internal to the 
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system doing the processing. On the other hand, the claim about causality says that only 
specific kinds of processes are sufficient for bringing about such non-derived content.  
 I will examine this particular criticism of the hypothesis of Extended Cognition 
(HEC) as well as the responses Clark (2008; 2010) and others have offered to counter it. 
Rather than proceed simply by way of recasting the debate and further buttressing the 
externalist arguments, I will instead reconstruct Adams and Aizawa‘s objection in such a 
way that the accusatory finger they have pointed might be better turned back on their own 
argument concerning ―the mark of the cognitive.‖ Essentially, they have indicted Clark‘s 
account of extended cognition on two charges: first, they claim, extended cognition 
unnecessarily imbues discrete parts of coupled systems with cognition. As their critique 
suggests, in a system such as a blind man using a cane to navigate his way through town, 
extended cognition would have us believe that the cane itself actually ‗knows‘ where to 
go, what obstacles to avoid, and so forth. In other words, Adams and Aizawa have set up 
the argument such that if extended cognition is true, then this entails implausible and 
undesirable consequences. Second, they have charged Clark with overlooking the special 
sorts of processes that subtend cognition, namely, that it involves trading in non-derived 
content and that this ability is caused by nomological regularities which happen to be, as 
far as we can tell, specific to human neurobiology. This second accusation can also be 
reformulated as a denial of an undesirable consequent; if extended cognition is true, then 
the ‗received view‘ of what cognition is and where it is found will need to be revised.   
 In this chapter, I intend to show that neither of the two conditionals regarding 
HEC hold. For the first, the idea that HEC implies that cognition can quite literally be 
found in any object, so long as it is coupled to a human is based on a misunderstanding of 
 57 
what distributed accounts of cognition are supposed to offer. In the end, I will suggest 
changing the metaphors slightly, such that the often misleading label, ‗extended‘ might 
better be understood as ‗distributed‘ or ‗networked.‘ But more importantly, Adams and 
Aizawa fail to recognize the reductio behind their own accusation.   As Clark (2008) 
notes, if we ask of a V4 neuron, how does it know that the museum is on 53
rd
 street, and 
answer, because it is coupled to the human agent, the absurdity of the original objection 
is glaring. ―Talk of an object‘s being or failing to be ‗cognitive‘ seems almost 
unintelligible when applied to some putative part or aspect of a cognitive agent or 
system‖ (87). If what you are calling a cognitive process is for example, a person 
engaged in a recall task, then the whole person is the cognitive system, not each of his or 
her arms, legs, or neurons. And even if it turns out that only human brains can realize 
genuinely cognitive states, this in no way implies that a brain cannot be or is not already a 
coupled system. As we shall see, many genuinely cognitive systems, which include at 
their core, a human brain, remain largely coupled either to brain implant technology, or to 
external tools, all of which can arguably be said to constitute this or that particular 
cognitive process.   
 The second conditional is a bit trickier to dismantle, as it involves arguing that the 
received view of human cognition is flawed.  Nevertheless, it is my contention that a 
large part of the internalist-externalist debate is not just about where cognition is to be 
found, but is also about what sorts of processes we want to call cognitive. Examining 
Clark‘s responses to the content and cause components of Adams and Aizawa‘s 
objections will highlight the ways in trading in non-derived content is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for a system to be marked as cognitive. Second, in order to address the 
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worry that coupled systems will fail to allow for a genuine ‗science‘ of mind due to the 
improbability of locating the specific causes underlying cognition given an externalist 
picture, I will look further at the ways in which Rupert (2004) pushes against the HEC, 
but will argue that the objection from ―cognitive bloat‖ does not rule out the idea that a 
cognitive system can be caused by the coupling of human organisms and artifacts.  It will 
not be sufficient however to simply re-defend extended cognition (HEC) via Clark‘s 
latest concession of Organism-Centered Cognition (HOC). Although his response 
provides a way to stave off some of the worries raised by Rupert and Weiskopf, it is also 
an overhasty retreat. Thus, in order to disprove this second condition of Adams and 
Aizawa‘s I will ultimately return to and defend a claim implicit in the original HEC, 
namely, that the received view of what cognition is and where we can expect to find it 
might need serious revision.  
 
2.2 Non-Derived Content 
 In order to expose the problematic nature of ―cognition‖ as defined by Adams and 
Aizawa, Clark examines each component of their definition in turn. The first necessary 
characteristic of cognitive processes, according to Adams and Aizawa, is their being 
comprised of non-derived content. Paradigm cases of items bearing non-derived content 
are they say, ―thoughts, experiences, and perceptions,‖ while items that bear derived 
content would be things like ―traffic lights, gas gauges, and flags‖ (2005; 662). As an 
immediate response, one might demand that Adams and Aizawa provide a way out of 
such viciously circular stipulations. Indeed, if the question at hand is what makes 
something count as thinking, and you answer, if it bears non-derived content, to which I 
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reasonably ask, what then, is non-derived content, and you reply, thinking, then I will 
hardly have learned anything interesting about ‗the mark of the cognitive‘ other than that 
it is, well, cognitive.  
 The explanation Adams and Aizawa provide regarding how and why non-derived 
content actually constitutes thought spans a large amount of text (1992; 2001; 2005; 
2008; 2010; Dennett, 1990) and a full discussion of the debate concerning it is too time-
consuming and not entirely relevant for our purposes here. The way they defend non-
derived content can be summarized as thus: mental content arises from very different 
sorts of processes than non-mental content; in other words, mental content is said to be 
non-derived just insofar as it is intrinsic to a cognitive agent and are therefore not 
dependent or at least are only partially dependent on external objects or processes. To 
further illustrate, they cite an example from Clark (2005) in which he seeks to defend the 
idea that derived content can genuinely be said to characterize cognitive processing in a 
case such as thinking about set theory by way of representing Euler circles to oneself. 
Clark argues that the meaning of the Euler circles, even in our heads must still be derived 
from social convention, but nevertheless, the circles feature as part of our thought 
process. Adams and Aizawa respond first by charging Clark with overlooking a crucial 
difference:  
 Intersecting Euler circles on paper getting their meaning is one thing; intersecting 
 Euler circles in mental images getting their meaning is another.  Clark apparently 
 overlooks this  difference, hence does not bother to provide a reason to think that 
 Euler circles in mental images get their meaning via social convention [2010; 72]. 
 
So, according to Adams and Aizawa, there is a principled difference in the way mental 
items become meaningful and the way external objects do. Nevertheless, they can be 
accused of precisely what they charge Clark with; namely, they never provide a 
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compelling reason to believe that such a principled distinction exists. What they do go on 
to argue is that mental items are constituted by different sorts of processes than non-
mental items. To quote them at length:  
 It is like this.  The dependence of meaning of the mental image of intersecting 
 Euler circles on the social contrivance regarding the intersection of Euler circles is 
 just like the dependence of the meaning of a mental representation of a car on the 
 contrivance of a car. Had the car not been invented, there would not have been 
 mental images of cars. Had the usage of Euler circles not been invented, there 
 would not have been mental images of Euler circles for set-theoretic purposes. 
 This sort of historical truth, if it is a truth, does not show what Clark might want it 
 to show, namely, that the content of certain mental items derives (in the relevant 
 sense) from a social convention [2010; 74]. 
 
Here we see the idea that non-derived content might be partially dependent upon external 
objects – without the invention of cars, we would not have the relevant mental images – 
but this, they argue, does not entail that the mental image we have of a car is derived 
from social convention. Another way to put it: mental content most certainly depends, at 
least in a large part, upon our having perceptions of external objects, but in order for it to 
be considered derived, mental content must be said to arise solely via socio-linguistic 
convention.  
 However, Clark is not concerned with showing that the actual content is not itself 
intrinsic; rather, that the meaning of the intersection of the Euler circles must be 
extrinsically derived. In this sense therefore, Clark‘s point is quite simply a harkening 
back to classical semantic externalism. The content of a mental state, such as the wetness 
of water or its drinkability, can be non-derived, but its meaning, namely, that it is H20, is 
a product of linguistic convention and social agreement that the term ‗water‘ in fact picks 
out the stuff that is composed of hydrogen and oxygen molecules. We might think of it in 
this way as well: clearly, thoughts, perceptions, and the like usually depend on some 
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external objects in order to be contentful. Indeed, every thought and every perception are 
thoughts and perceptions of something. This is one level or type of mental content, while 
meanings are often much more complex and often do derive entirely from social 
convention. The idea that one of the Euler circles functions as a representation of a 
particular set, whose members are in some way related to other sets of entities 
represented by other Euler circles, is all part of the larger social contrivance known as set 
theory. While the truths of set theory might indeed be human-independent or perhaps 
even Fodorian innate concepts (in which case they would be entirely non-derived), set 
theory as a practice, the way we come to know these truths and understand them, is an 
external, social practice, from which mental meanings involving set theoretic principles 
are entirely derived.  In this sense therefore, we can think of the relationships among 
pieces of mental content as the sorts of cognitive content that Clark wants to claim can be 
derived and hence, something can be extrinsic and still count as genuinely cognitive.  
Adams and Aizawa foresee this objection, as they claim: 
 Insofar as there must be a social convention regarding the intersections of Euler 
 circles in order to have a mental representation regarding the intersections of 
 Euler circles, this is not a fact about the constitution of the content of a mental 
 image of the intersections of Euler circles. [2010; 73]. 
 
Again, the idea is not that the images are what Clark is claiming to be derived, but 
precisely the ―mental representation regarding the intersections of the Euler circles. 
Clearly, information about what those intersections mean, imply, denote, and so forth, 
should count as cognitive and yet, even as Adams and Aizawa claim, these 
representations are constituted by social convention.  
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 Adams and Aizawa go on to argue therefore that the original thought experiment 
in which Otto consults his notebook in order to remember the location of MOMA (Clark 
and Chalmers, 1998) involves nothing more than a coupling in which an external object, 
the content of which is derived, aids in Otto‘s ability to get to the museum. Whatever 
cognition we want to attribute to Otto must still be going on within his head, most likely 
in the form of a standing belief that his notebook is a reliable source of information that 
supplements his imperfect memory. The ability to execute actions based on these beliefs 
arises solely internal to Otto‘s organism, and more specifically, it is caused by certain 
neural patterns of activation which produce their content intrinsically.  
 In response, Clark (2008) claims that Otto and his notebook is not ipso facto a 
story about extrinsic content. Based on Clark and Chalmers‘ (1998) original Parity 
Principle, if we can imagine that a process which is otherwise external to a system were 
going on inside of it, and then would have no qualms about calling that external-turned-
internal process cognitive, then the divide between internal and external is not in itself 
sufficient for marking off cognitive processes from non-cognitive ones. Neither is 
location of processing a sufficient marker for derived versus non-derived content.  As he 
suggests, the words in Otto‘s notebook might in fact require interpretation and 
convention to be utilized, but ―that need not rule out the possibility that they have also 
come to satisfy the demands on being, in virtue of their role within the larger system, 
among the physical vehicles of various forms of intrinsic content‖ (90). In fact, Adams 
and Aizawa (2005) endorse this very idea when they provide an exposition of their view 
on non-derived content by way of machine intelligence. If, as they suggest, we were to 
design a thinking machine modeled on human thought, there must be symbols or 
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representations that mean something to the machine solely by virtue of their being 
internal to the machine‘s processing. To be sure, the cause of such meanings might be 
originally engineered by the machine‘s designers, but that symbols mean something to 
the machine, cannot be derived. And yet, Adams and Aizawa concede that it might turn 
out that ―the symbols in the machine ‗X,‘ ‗Y,‘ and ‗Z‘ could mean X, Y, and Z in virtue 
of satisfying conditions for both derived and non-derived content‖ (665). Thus, within the 
larger system of Otto + Notebook, it is conceivable at least that the entailment conditions 
for something being both derived and non-derived are indistinguishable.  
 Even if we must admit that the notebook encodings are entirely derived, the 
demand that absolutely no part of a cognitive system can trade in conventional 
representations, argues Clark (2008, 2005) is too stringent. Suppose there were Martians, 
he suggests (2005), who had an extra-biological mechanism responsible for storing 
bitmapped images of blocks of text, such that they could later recall and use the images, 
much in the same way Otto utilizes his notebook. Surely, Clark argues, we would grant 
that the images stored even prior to retrieval count as part of our Martian friend‘s 
cognitive processing, and if we can accept that some skin-and-skull bound processes 
trade in extrinsic representations, then it makes no sense to claim that only those 
processes involving derived content that occur in the head count as cognitive. Thus, if 
other forms of memory are going to count as memory at all, then, as the Parity Principle 
holds, it would be overly presumptuous to exclude synonymous cases of memory based 
solely on the fact that the confines of the brain have been breached.  
 Based on the functional similarity of memory retrieval in these various cases, 
Clark (2008) concludes that every truly cognitive system need not operate entirely with 
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intrinsic representations, nor must every proper part of a cognitive system operate with 
such representations. Interestingly, Adams and Aizawa (2008) claim to have never made 
such demands in the first place: ―it is unclear to what extent each cognitive state of each 
cognitive process must involve non-derived content‖ (2001; 50). In one sense, it could be 
said that Clark has misrepresented their position and that their actual argument runs 
something like this: for something to count as truly cognitive, it must trade in non-
derived representations at least some of the time. But then, if this is the case, what good 
does such a specification do if we are trying to define and delimit the mark of the 
cognitive? If the answer is simply that some of the system‘s content must be non-derived, 
then Otto and his notebook can easily be smuggled back into the picture, as quite clearly, 
some of Otto‘s mental content is intrinsic. Furthermore, if this is truly the position Adams 
and Aizawa want to maintain, then they are not at odds with Clark‘s original claim that 
cognition might be characterized by one or the other or both kinds of representational 
processes. At the end of the day, nevertheless, Adams and Aizawa stubbornly resist the 
idea that certain sorts of extrinsic content, especially that content which is externally 
derived, could ever feature as a proper part of a genuinely cognitive system. In order to 
understand why they keep returning to this intracranialism as an explanatory marker for 
cognition, we must now turn to the other of their two conditions, namely that genuinely 
cognitive processes arise from specific types of causes, none of which could be external 
to the system or agent in question. 
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2.3 Kinds of Causes  
 The motivation for claiming that specific causes of cognitive processes are 
necessary for determining the ‗mark‘ of cognition in general seems to be twofold. First, 
we find in Adams and Aizawa a continuation of the claim that what makes human 
thought special is that it involves non-derived content and this kind of content can only 
be caused by specific processes. Second, and closely related to Adams and Aizawa‘s 
concerns, Rupert (2004) echoes the notion that if cognitive science is to remain a 
meaningful enterprise whatsoever, it should proceed like any other unified science, by 
attempting to discover causal regularities or nomological features of the human mind. In 
fact, we should expect that cognition should be explicable in terms of as few laws as 
possible, if we are to believe that there is a ‗science‘ of mind and that this science, like 
any other, should strive to be elegant and simple.  
  I have explained above why it is at least dubious that the mark of the cognitive 
will be made solely on the basis of finding systems that trade in non-derived 
representations, but even if we accept that this is what truly characterizes cognition, 
intracranialism is hardly a quick inference to be made. Adams and Aizawa seem to help 
themselves to the assumption that non-derived content must be internally produced, 
without explaining precisely what the mechanism is that is responsible for such 
production. They are not foolish enough to claim strict mind-brain identity, as Clark 
(2008) notes, and yet, it is ―a matter of contingent historical fact‖ that such 
representations are manufactured by human brains (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, my 
emphasis). Is it really a fact that the brain is the only means of intrinsic content 
production? Or is this the very debate we are trying to settle?  
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 There are several problems with the ‗special kinds of causes‘ argument as it is so 
far construed. First, I have only been hypothetically granting Adams and Aizawa the 
original claim that cognition is marked by non-derived content, and so, if this turns out 
not to be the case, , looking for special kinds of causes solely for non-derived content is 
rendered pointless. However, if their argument were to work, it would still not follow that 
what goes on inside the head is the only place to look for the cause of non-derived 
content. On the one hand, perhaps the entire organism plays an essential causal role in 
producing these representations; in fact, one need not stop with the organism itself, but 
could conceivably argue that many environmental factors actually cause intrinsic content. 
This might seem to countervail the very definition of intrinsic as being entirely generated 
from within, but it need not. The very question on the table is what exactly do we mean 
by a cognitive system and so, if our answer rests on the notion that it must internally 
produce content, then the next step must be to determine what counts as the ‗inside‘ of 
the system and what counts as the ‗outside.‘ Indeed, if it turns out that 
Otto+notebook=one entire cognitive system, then surely, the notebook can produce non-
derived content. Nevertheless, Adams and Aizawa do not find this crucial piece of the 
puzzle compelling enough to discuss. They simply assume that the whole of cognition is 
captured by a technological virgin human body, and in their more extreme moments, a 
naked brain.  
 But let‘s suppose that we grant them the weaker claim, namely, that cognitive 
processes must involve at least some operations whose content is intrinsic. It becomes 
immediately clear that this only hurts their case, as we no longer know precisely how 
much of the system must trade in these non-derived representations, how often, and to 
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what extent. Determining the law-like causal nature of a system we don‘t fully 
understand seems a rather arduous task. Besides, if we open the door to allow that some 
derived or even socially constructed content might actually constitute certain cognitive 
processes, then intracranialism is not only a difficult inference to make, but a foolish one. 
Perhaps Otto and his notebook constitute a cognitive system and to be sure, Otto has 
some intrinsic content, such as the standing belief that the notebook is trustworthy, that if 
he desires to go somewhere, he ought to consult it, etc. But then the occurent belief, that 
the museum is at such and such location, which is content that surely features as a proper 
part of the cognitive process, is a matter of socially contrived symbols and scribbles in 
notebook.  So, Adams and Aizawa are faced with the dilemma of either having to stick to 
their original guns, thereby begging the entire question concerning the what and where of 
cognition, or they retract and then must deal with the consequences of allowing that 
cognition is hybridized and often causally dependant on extrinsic content.  
 Suppose Adams and Aizawa did concede the second horn of this dilemma and 
accepted that at least some of the time, cognition is constituted by more than mere neural 
activity and can include coupled systems such as Otto and his notebook. The worry 
remains for them and for Rupert (2004) however, that there would be no end to the odd 
couplings we might consider to be cognitive and hence the laws governing such systems 
will grow increasingly complex and unwieldy. In the name of parsimony therefore, we 
should assume that cognition is bound to the human organism, or maintain a hypothesis 
of Human Embedded Cognition (HEMC). While coupled systems might in fact facilitate 
cognitive processes, the actual cognitive process itself remains embedded within the 
organism, such that cognitive science remains holistic and intact, its subject matter 
 68 
simply being the human brain or perhaps the entire human organism.   
 While it should be granted that a science of mind should have a unified set of 
processes it studies, this demand in no way proves that the causes subtending such 
processes are entirely within the organism. For one thing, by insisting that we look for 
specific kinds of causes for cognitive processes, Rupert tacitly sneaks in the notion that 
the effects, the cognitive processes themselves, have been comprehensively catalogued 
and comprise a unified set. To be sure, we have some very coarse-grained mental types—
MEMORY, BELIEF, HUNGER, etc., but these cognitive kinds 1) are not the only types 
of cognitive processes that make up ‗cognition‘ generally, and 2) many of them were not 
at all discovered by examining brains or even entire organisms for that matter. Surely, 
memory, belief and hunger were psychological phenomena long before we had any idea 
that the brain even played a role whatsoever in any of these events. Take depression, for 
example. While we can identify dopamine levels as indicative of emotional states, this is 
at once only a recent discovery and furthermore, as any critical philosopher of science 
will attest, brain chemistry is at best strongly correlated with more complex 
psychological states. So how did we go about determining that persons can be in a 
cognitive state of sadness over long periods of time before we had neuroscience? It seems 
that observable behavior – lack of eating, sleeping, loss of interest, and quite simply, 
verbal reporting – is a large part of how we come to understand that there is a type of 
mental state called depression.  To be sure, behavior is belongs to an organism, but often, 
it is generated by organism-environment interactions, which extend well beyond the 
scope of processes internal to our brains or bodies. If we are using such broad descriptors 
to define the suitable types of processes to be studied by cognitive science, then, as Clark 
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(2008) asks, what principled reason do we have for rejecting the idea that the ‗science of 
mind‘ will eventually concern itself with a ―motley crew of mechanisms‖? The flaw of 
the argument for scientific kinds, he claims, resides in ―its assessment of the potential for 
some form of higher level unification despite mechanistic differences‖ (96). So, on the 
one hand, our coarse-grained psychological types are hardly unified or agreed upon in the 
first place and thus, it is a bit hasty to go looking for their causes, meanwhile delimiting 
those causes to the skin and skull barrier; on the other hand, even if we do have a 
common sense understanding of what sorts of processes are to count as types of 
cognition, such understanding is so often  on the human + her tools, the human + her 
environment, or the human + her culture, and not the isolated and encapsulated brain.  
 Another worry that is implicit in Clark‘s responses, but one he perhaps does not 
spend enough time discussing, is that by insisting that 1) cognitive science should study 
only natural kinds, we must also accept the corollary argument which is 2) that only 
natural kinds can have causal regularities. This further suggests 3) an assumption that we 
have some principled way to distinguish between natural and non-natural types of 
processes. In turn, this often leads one to suppose that 4) ‗the mind‘ will eventually be 
shown to be a natural kind. Regarding 1), this is an assumption made by nearly all natural 
science, hence the term natural modifying science, and yet, why should we believe that 
cognitive science is necessarily a natural science? As Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) define 
it, cognitive science is already an assortment of other sciences: neuroscience, psychology, 
linguistics, and even philosophy, the last of which could hardly be said to only study 
naturally occurring kinds of processes. If cognitive science is itself not entirely concerned 
with natural kinds, then perhaps part of its reaches go beyond law-like regularities. Even 
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if the case were made successfully that cognitive science, like any other science, must 
proceed by discovering causal regularities, nowhere in any of this reasoning is the further 
entailment that what we might call a non-natural process could not have law-like 
regularity of which we could easily discover and record. A paradigm case of a non-
natural kind would be computers, as they are prototypical human artifacts. Nevertheless, 
such artifacts – technological memory-enhancements, calculating devices, and word 
processors – are surely describable in terms of causal regularity, hence we have 
‗computer science.‘ What we are interested in describing in computer science is 
computation, and is generally not whether that computation takes place in a Mac or a PC. 
In other words, the causal regularities studied in science are often functional roles and 
have little to do with the realizers of those processes.  
 So, on the one hand, we might think that the distinction between natural and non-
natural kinds is of no use insofar as both natural and non-natural kinds of stuff can still 
realize the same processes of which we are interested in studying in natural science. The 
very simple point Kim (1992) makes concerning the non-naturalness of Jade applies here. 
Jade can be said to be a composite, itself not being a natural kind, but instead composed 
of two naturally occurring kinds of minerals, jadeite and nephrite. Nevertheless, we treat 
jade as one jewel, much like we treat a cake as one object, and one ‗natural‘ object at 
that. To be sure, cakes are composed of other ingredients, but we don‘t typically say that 
a cake is unnatural simply because it is made of flour, milk, eggs, and so forth. 
Furthermore, cakes have specific causal regularities governing them. They burn if baked 
at too high of a temperature, they grow mold if left out for too long, and they have certain 
saturation thresholds. Thus, what we typically assume to be naturally occurring ‗wholes,‘ 
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including the human organism or the brain for that matter, arguably decompose into 
parts, some of which are not entirely biological themselves. A brain has no meaning or 
function if not to control a body and hence, many people now speak of the brain and the 
central nervous system as one thing. Likewise, we typically mark off bodies by virtue of 
referring to the skin barrier that seems to provide a boundary from environmental 
outsiders, and yet, the body remains constantly penetrated by these external factors, 
especially in the case of technologically enhanced bodies transformed by prostheses and 
implants. Nevertheless, we would like to think that ‗humans‘ represent one kind of 
specie, regardless of their penetrative and alterative qualities. Hence, the lesson to be 
learned from these ‗cyborgs‘ as Clark (2003) calls us,  is that the biological matter of 
which we are composed is not what makes us natural kinds. If we are natural kinds at all, 
it is only by our being consistently ‗non-natural‘ – plugged in, wired up, and 
technologically modified – that we achieve our status as human kinds. Hence, Clark‘s 
peculiar verbiage, ―natural-born cyborgs.‖  
 Another point to consider regarding natural kinds and causality is that even if we 
were forced to admit that causal regularities are the means by which we discover natural 
kinds, it does not follow that cognition is itself a natural kind. Indeed, as the previous 
discussion indicates, we have plenty of reasons for thinking that cognitive processes are 
caused by a whole array of phenomena, from biological to technological and hence, law-
like regularity regarding such a diverse set of causes seems dubious at best. As Levy 
(2007) suggests, ―if it is true that causal regularities pick out natural kinds, then the mind 
is not a natural kind. It is a compound entity comprised of at least two (and probably 
many) natural kinds‖ (51).  
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 We can summarize the implications of the discussion above as follows: Science 
deals in kinds. If it only deals in natural kinds then if cognition is a natural kind, we 
should expect causal regularities governing it that we can pick out and study. It is 
possible that these nomic structures exist even if cognition does not occur entirely within 
the organism. Hence, the claim that EC violates the ‗natural kinds‘ principle of science 
fails. On the other hand, if science simply deals in ‗kinds‘ then if cognition turns out to be 
a non-natural kind, it still can be the subject of cognitive science. In other words, 
something can have law-like regularity and still not be considered natural, such as an 
extended mind. The larger point here seems to me to be that it is arbitrary whether we call 
something natural or non-natural in science. What matters is whether sufficient law-like 
regularity is present so as to study the entity or process in question. Extended cognition, 
be it natural or not, passes this litmus test, despite Rupert‘s protests.   
 So much for relying on natural kinds of causal processes as a means for marking 
off cognitive from non-cognitive phenomena; nevertheless, a worry remains, namely that 
without causal regularities we cannot identify with any regularity, the cognitive agent, 
which is of course, the real subject of cog sci. To be sure, there is a sense in which 
accepting HEC entails some difficulty in setting boundaries on what the phrase ‗cognitive 
agent‘ denotes. Is this a worry specific to HEC however? It would hardly seem so and 
here is why. The problem as I see it, according to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa, et al, is 
that without the ability to reference regularly occurring causal kinds, there will be no way 
to effectively decide what is the proper subject of cognitive science and what is not. 
Traditionally, they claim, the human mind, or more broadly, the human, is the what 
cognitive science studies and if we begin extending what it means to have a mind or to be 
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a cognitive agent too far, we will thereby relinquish the entire science that concerns itself 
with otherwise regularly occurring natural phenomena. While I concede that humans are 
regularly occurring phenomena, this by no means suggests that limiting the study of their 
cognition to what goes on inside their heads will magically make clear what it means to 
be cognitive agent. If Rupert is so worried about the loss of unified personhood in the 
wake of HEC, he might do well to consider that this problem is not specific to HEC. 
Indeed, as far back at least as Hume we are forced to realize that defining a person is 
treacherous business, and this lineage continues with Parfit (1971), Perry (1975) and 
others, who remind us that even referring to a body as the bounds of personhood will 
never be a sufficient criterion for marking of one agent from another, nor will memories, 
personality traits, or phenomenological descriptions. Thus, pointing the finger at HEC 
and charging it with dissipating the subject of cognitive science merely distracts one from 
recognizing the same inherent difficulty of HEMC or any other theory in which ‗the 
cognitive agent‘ is the central focus of discussion.  
 It would seem therefore that Rupert (2004) conflates two worries that he thinks 
are endemic to HEC: 1) the dissipation of the cognitive agent and thus, the subject matter 
of cognitive science and 2) the over-saturation of the mental into an otherwise endless 
purview of coupled systems, or what he terms ―cognitive bloat.‖ As to 1), this problem is 
better left to another project altogether. As we have seen, the issue arises with or without 
extended cognition and furthermore, it is a separate concern that we need to define and 
delimit cognitive agents as opposed to cognitive processes. Regarding 2), this appears to 
be the chief concern underpinning all criticism levied against HEC.  Thus, Clark (2007, 
2008, in press) has recently presented a more modest view, Organism-Centered 
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Cognition (HOC), in an effort to assuage some of the paranoia which accompanies 
envisaging a world bloated by cognition.  
 
2.4 HOC: Moderate Resolution or Hasty Retreat? 
 The only real danger of HEC, Clark (2008) argues, ―is that it may blind us to the 
genuine extent to which human cognition, though not organism bound, remains 
importantly organism centered‖ (138-9). The hypothesis is that at times, cognitive 
processes might in fact reach beyond the skin and skull barrier of the human organism; 
nevertheless, the organism and in particular the brain/central nervous system, remain the 
core constituents of human cognition. Thus, Organism-Centered Cognition (HOC) 
represents somewhat of a withdrawal from the original thesis of HEC, as it places the 
human organism in the role of a ―senior partner‖ in constituting cognition. Although 
Clark (2008) still thinks HEC can be maintained and hence, HOC is merely a 
modification of it, in some sense, HOC places constraints, sets boundaries as it were, on 
an otherwise unruly HEC. The worry expressed by Adams and Aizawa‘s (2010) 
mathematician+pencil coupling, for example, seems to center on HEC as providing no 
such bounds and hence allowing more for an ―equal partner‖ thesis,18 such that the 
human and the pencil both share to the same extent in the cognitive process. Clark‘s 
reformulation ameliorates this concern by reminding us that the brain, although not the 
only component involved in cognitive processes, remains the chief executor of them.  
 Has the worry entirely subsided? The HOC still suffers from the inability to 
specifically mark cognitive processes from non-cognitive ones, insofar as the only claim 
                                                 
18
 The senior partner/equal partner description is borrowed from Dan Hutto, personal communication. 
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being made is that the human organism is a necessary component of cognition. Surely, 
having a human body or brain will not suffice for cognition all by itself. Furthermore, 
EXTENDED, as Clark (2008) now calls it, still governs the overall picture we should 
have of minds; namely, that while organism-centered, mental processes are not always 
bound to the organism. Thus, the question remains, just how far do they reach? Is it 
possible, as Clark and Chalmers (1998) suggest that a belief about what time a meeting is 
to be held can be constituted by a coupled system involving two organisms, one of whom 
is an absent-minded business person, the other being her secretary? Clark‘s (2008) appeal 
to what Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007) term ‗common-sense functionalism,‘ or the 
idea that a functional description of cognitive processes should allow some degree of 
multiple realizability, even across various physical substrates, does little work here. 
Common-sense functionalism would seem not to extend so far as to include couplings 
such as literally coupled people; if I cannot ever seem to remember where the theater is, 
but my spouse can and, upon driving to a show, I depend on his memory to get me there, 
it hardly seems like something the everyday functionalist would endorse as a singular 
cognitive process. Moreover, it would be difficult to determine whose mind is extending 
in such a scenario. We might appeal to a senior partner thesis once again, such that 
whoever is actually driving the cognitive process along most robustly would around 
whom we would say cognition is centered. Indeed, if I have a faulty memory and my 
spouse is responsible for remembering how to get to the theater, in some sense, ‗I‘ don‘t 
play an extremely important role in achieving this part of the equation. However, it would 
not quite be right to say of my spouse and me, if we both arrive at the theater on time, 
that only one of us was thinking. Based on HOC, of course, we both have brains and 
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under normal circumstances, would be considered separate and distinct organisms. 
Hence, if cognition is organism-centered, then the coupling of two organisms seems to 
muddy the waters.  
 On the other hand, if what is meant by ‗organism‘ is itself not entirely based on 
biology, but instead admits to degrees of flesh-machine or even person-person couplings, 
then perhaps the common sense functionalist need not be concerned. However, Rupert‘s 
(2004) worry about the HEC, namely that it suffers from cognitive bloat, wherein the 
whole world is potentially imbued with cognition, is only that much more exacerbated by 
this revised version of ‗organism.‘ If we begin counting two persons as one organism, a 
corollary organism bloat – counting any and all organism-like configurations as 
organisms, seems to follow. Even Clark (2003) recognizes in great detail how much of 
embodiment is infiltrated by technology as well as by the ‗ultimate artifact‘ – language, 
and hence, so much of the world actually gets incorporated into our bodies and likewise, 
our bodies are constantly being pushed beyond their usual biological barriers. To be sure, 
the biological body, by definition can only include what has already been deemed 
biological kinds of processes but the human body with its plastic hearts, its cochlear 
implants, and its prostheses, is hardly limited to strictly biological parts.  
 A further complication arises when we consider the possibility of disembodiment 
that is often afforded at the intersection of bodily subjectivity and technological 
enhancements, such as those found in virtual worlds. For example, consider Microsoft‘s 
new gaming console, Natal, in which the controlling device is neither a joystick nor a 
remote motion mechanism (such as that used in Nintendo‘s Wii) but is instead the 
player‘s body itself. Mounted cameras and motion detectors capture the player‘s bodily 
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frame and kinesthetic movement in order to produce a real-time avatar on the screen, one 
which the player then controls with her body. If one were playing a wakeboarding game, 
the player‘s body would therefore go through most of the range of motion that would 
accompany being towed behind a live boat and maneuvering through real water. In a 
scenario like this, while the organism is indeed an integral part of the overall gameplay, 
where the player experiences herself is arguably not anywhere near that biological mass 
of cells, but rather, ‗she‘ is on the screen, participating in a highly intense sporting 
activity and can arguably be said to have left her body in some capacity. This is not to say 
that a person playing Natal is experiencing anything like a genuine Out-of-Body 
Experience (cf. Blanke & Metzinger, 2009), as the body remains integral to the gameplay 
and is never taken as a separate object to behold in the way patients who have suffered 
from OBEs often claim to have been floating above their bodies looking down upon 
them. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which a person participating in a highly realistic 
virtual world has displaced his or her self from the center, such that organism-
centeredness does not hold up so well. While the brain may still play a role in driving the 
processes behind the control of the body, the feedback from the game itself must also 
play an important if not essential role. Not only this, but when asking where the action is 
happening in this situation, one need only observe a crowd of video-gamers, in particular 
an audience of them, to see that no one cares what is going on with the controllers (even 
if those controllers turn out to be embodied subjects) but their eyes are, like the player in 
the game, glued to the screen.  
 What this small digression illustrates is that the worry Rupert has raised about 
locating a cognitive subject for the purposes of fruitful cognitive science is a serious 
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concern, one that is not ameliorated by claiming that cognition is organism-centered. This 
is because what Rupert has touched upon is not simply the task of marking off one 
biological body from another. Given current definitions of organisms in biology, this 
should be relatively straightforward. Rather, Rupert has charged HEC with the inability 
to mark off one human from another. In other words, he has claimed that if we don‘t keep 
cognition ‗in the head‘ then we will have no other way of understanding how anything 
like subjectivity in general is possible.  
 
2.5 Conclusion: Problematizing Subjectivity is Everybody’s Concern 
 To a large extent, Rupert is absolutely correct – defining and delimiting cognitive 
subjects is difficult. Where he goes wrong however, is in assuming that this task is made 
more challenging by assuming that cognitive processes are dynamically distributed over 
brains, organisms, and external tools. It would seem, with a quick scan of the entire 
history of philosophy that no one has yet to pin down precisely how subjectivity is 
experienced, and this has certainly not yet been accomplished by reducing subjecthood to 
biological processes. Thus, to point to finger at HEC for its impotence in solving the 
mystery of subjectivity is only to accuse any theory, intracranial or otherwise, of the same 
failure. To be sure, Rupert is concerned specifically with defining ‗cognitive subject‘ for 
the purposes of engaging in scientific study of persons, psychologically, cognitively, and 
linguistically, and hence, he might rightly point out that an entire account of subjectivity 
is not needed for such endeavors. Cognitive science can and has indeed been conducted 
in the absence of a suitable theory of how ‗persons‘ are constituted, and relies heavily 
upon the one-body = one-person model for its purposes. Again, this is where Clark will 
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agree that the organism plays an key part in locating cognitive experience, but to think 
that human bodies themselves are sufficient for understanding all of cognition, 
psychology, and subjectivity in general, is a huge oversimplification, one to which even 
Rupert will not likely assent. Surely, when someone is engaged in scientific study of a 
‗cognitive subject‘ they are examining behaviors, past histories, relationships, 
interactions, and transactions with the world; hence, cognitive science must somehow 
include all of these external ‗props‘ if we are truly to comprehend the cognitive subject. 
 The brain may not be sufficient for such a vast array of experience, but then, is the 
body enough? Rupert wants to keep cognition confined and embedded and his HEMC 
proposal attempts to rein it in once and for all. Likewise, Clark, although allowing for 
cognitive processes to extend beyond the bodily boundary, insists that the body is ‗where 
it‘s at‘ for the most part. However, the body is not so easily tracked with its implants and 
prostheses, along with the experiential domain which often has persons feeling as though 
parts or all of their bodies are not even their own. It will be worthwhile therefore, to 
examine problematic embodiment in some detail in order to see why neither HEMC nor 
HOC are entirely suitable answers to the question ‗where am I?‘ By embodiment 
however, I will not be referring strictly to ‗the body‘ as it is conceived in biology or in 
any other science in which it is an object, relatively static, and highly constrained by 
genetic, chromosomal, and cellular processes. Embodiment includes ‗the body‘ but also 
denotes the way that body is experienced. This phenomenological consideration and the 
juxtaposition it affords us between ‗bodies‘ and ‗embodied subjects‘ is I think crucial to 
understanding first, why the experiential domain properly understood must be distributed 
over more than mere biological bodies, but also, that when we understand just how 
 80 
problematic embodiment is, we will begin to see why subjectivity itself, the very element 
Rupert thinks he can locate in ‗the body,‘ is a fluid, dynamic, and distributed web of 
interactions. Much like I will argue that embodiment is not reducible to bodies, I will 
push this argument further to suggest that cognitive subjects are never wholly contained 
within that skin-skull barrier. In other words, by properly problematizing embodiment 
and subjectivity, something I think Clark and the externalists have failed to do thus far, I 
will be able to marshal an even stronger case against their intracranial opponents.  
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Chapter 3 
Not Just Anybody: Bodies, Embodiment, Embodied Subjectivity  
But because I who am a man have seen the cadavers of men dissected, because I have 
read articles on physiology, I conclude that my body is constituted exactly like all those 
which have been shown to me on the dissection table or of which I have seen colored 
drawings in books [Sartre, 1956; 401] 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre spends a great deal of time 
distinguishing between the ‗for itself‘ and the ‗in itself‘ (por soi and en soi) and often 
applies this distinction to the experience of the body. While the body, taken as a ―this 
among other thises,‖ can quite conceivably be a thing - an object for science and 
medicine to investigate – if we try to understand our own peculiar existence solely in 
terms of the body, in itself, we shall always come up short. The way my body shows up 
for me, he argues, cannot be grasped by trying to unite my consciousness with ―the body 
of others,‖ much as in the way the quote above suggests we often do. Sartre is in some 
sense, therefore, prefiguring the anti-reductionist response to claims regarding the 
‗Neural Correlate of Consciousness‘ (NCC), and the purported ability to understand, once 
and for all, the ‗mystery‘ of conscious experience entirely by an objective neuroscience. 
He is also highlighting a crucial difference between how we might experience our own 
embodiment in ways indescribable by objective accounts of bodies. In other words, when 
I experience my body, I do not do so in the same way I experience the bodies of others, 
nor do I experience it like any other object, such as the cadaver on the operating table 
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Sartre mentions. I might be able to conceive of having a body like all the others out there 
in the world, but I achieve this only through my body and hence, my body is also my 
being.  
 Recalling that, as Rupert (2004) argues, in order to be a meaningful and 
worthwhile pursuit, a science of cognition must ‗locate‘ cognitive subjects,‗the body‘ 
might provide just such a point of reference. Indeed, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, based on parsimony, thinkers like Rupert argue for something very much like a 
reduction of cognitive subjectivity to an objective body-object, be it the whole body or 
perhaps even just a specific part of it, namely, the brain (cf. Adams and Aizawa, 2010). 
Thus, the reductionist idea that cognitive processes are always contained in a body-object 
is at least a working theory worth consideration. Even if, as Clark suggests, we allow that 
cognitive processes are not bound to the body, but are instead typically centered on it, the 
question remains: what precisely are the limits of this body? In other words, given bodily 
malleability, it is not a straightforwardly simple task to definitely state where the body 
ends and the rest of the world begins. In turn, marking off cognitive subjects is a tricky 
business because ‗my‘ cognitive experience might at one moment be centered on more 
than just my biological body and may even, as the CEO-secretary example from Chapter 
2 illustrates, center on two or more such bodies.  As it turns out, this question of 
embodiment, or, the question of how I live through my body, is problematic for 
intracranialists and externalists alike. In what follows, I intend to expose some of the 
difficulties in pinning down ‗bodies‘ as proper ‗objects‘ for cognitive science. As I hope 
we shall see, given some of the strange ways in which ‗my body‘ is not always 
experienced in the way science would deem that it ought to be, there is often a disconnect 
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between the objective ‗organismic‘ view of where we are and the subjective 
phenomenological account of where I find myself.  
  
3.2 Having AnyBody, Being Somebody 
 What it means to have a body is not as straightforward is it may seem. The very 
utterance I have a body is enigmatic insofar as it sets the subject, I, in opposition to the 
body, as an object for me. The history of this problem is long and complex and I shall not 
attempt to sketch it in detail, but will instead jump immediately into contemporary 
discussion. Indeed, by doing so, one can see the same thematic difficulties that have 
persisted for centuries continually resurface, as nearly all language surrounding 
ownership of the body, both in philosophical and scientific quarters, channels the 
Cartesianism these disciplines have sought for so long to disavow. The paradox of bodily 
having, or the idea that the body is something owned by me, is what I seek to further 
clarify in this section.  
 To begin, consider human bodies from a post-neuroscientific revolution vantage 
point. For the ‗brain-obsessed,‘ the rest of the body is treated more like an extremity to 
the brain. When it comes to something like mind-reading, the ability to infer what 
someone is thinking or feeling, for example, it is assumed that this ability is localized in 
the brain, possibly in the mirror neuron system (Goldman & Gallese, 1998) or distributed 
among several systems. The debate between simulationists (e.g., Goldman, 2006) and 
theory-theorists (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Perner, 1991), is about how the process 
is carried out, not about where the process takes place. It is an unspecified preconception 
that the execution of mindreading is a brain-event. Even in hybrid theories (e.g., Nichols 
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and Stich, 2004), although Fodorian (1983) anti-localization modularity talk pervades the 
discussion, the idea that the substrate of these activities, whether we want to call them 
modules or mechanisms, is the brain and the brain only.  
 Brain-centered cognitive science and philosophy of mind is perhaps most fervent 
when it comes to the question of how conscious experience in general is made possible. 
The hypothesized answer – the Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC) – has yet to be 
found, but the assumption that consciousness can be reduced to a brain process or set of 
processes is certainly guiding the research (e.g., Koch, 2004). Subsequently, proposals 
such as Manzotti‘s (2006), that conscious experience might better be explained under an 
externalist framework,  are rarely taken seriously and thus represent the ‗fringe‘ of 
consciousness studies.     
 The very idea that the NCC is presupposed as existing is telling. It is not a general 
bodily correlate of consciousness, but a specifically neural one. Embodiment has 
purposefully and systematically been left out. To be sure, a brain is a body, or part of a 
body, but ‗scientists of consciousness‘ often treat brains as if they were isolatable bodies 
that retain their functioning, meaning, and significance with or without the rest of ‗us.‘ 
This is not an entirely fair assessment, given that it is obviously presupposed in studies of 
say, vision, that eyes are a necessary component and the recent focus on saccades and 
microsaccades (cf. Martinez-Conde, 2008, 20072009; Martinez-Conde, et al, 2009) is a 
testament to such awareness. Furthermore, we might consider that a person needs, in 
addition to eyes, the extra-ocular muscular system and good control over head posture 
and movement in order for the eyes – and the saccading they perform – to function 
properly. These things depend further on the vestibular and proprioceptive systems for 
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general body control. In other words, neither eyes nor brains float around detached and 
disembodied whilst realizing visual and cognitive awareness, and yet, for the many of the 
NCC investigators, the brain represents the sin qua non of answering the ‗where‘ 
question about mentality.  
 If we therefore ask a brain-centered NCC investigator what it means to have a 
body, the answer might go something like this: ‗having a body consists in being aware of 
oneself as situated in this or that particular biological organism, one that is controlled and 
recognized by the brain to which it is attached.‘ In other words, given that the correlate of 
awareness is supposed to be ‗in the head,‘ then the brain is where we should expect to 
find that sense of ownership, that consciousness of oneself as embodied. But notice how 
such a view homuncularizes the ‗owner‘ of the body, such that we imagine the brain as a 
sort of comptroller executive ‗self‘ in charge of the rest of the body. Therefore, to 
understand what it means to ‗have a body‘ is simply to take stock of this very 
relationship, one in which the balance of power is in the hands of a senior partner, 
namely, the brain. The idea of distributed control among brain and body, or even brain, 
body and world is often ignored or dismissed, as is of course, the more radical view that 
brains and bodies and environments are all ‗equal partners‘ (cf. Hutto, 2006). 
 There is a similitude between the senior partner view of the brain and  the 
immaterial Cartesian soul, that disembodied ego which Husserl (1960; 1931) later 
referred to as the I-pole of experience. Even though the brain-centered theorists of the 
late twentieth century claim to be denouncing any form of dualism, a persistent form of it 
remains nonetheless. There is one ‗I‘ who is in ‗my brain‘ that owns the rest of ‗my 
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body.‘ Likewise, for Husserl, in the Cartesian Meditations and elsewhere,19 the ‗I‘ who 
stands over and above the body, who takes his or her body as an object for this or that 
intentional thought, is that ―pure I‖ which is responsible for the mode of having in the 
first place.
20
 Owning the body for the physicalist and phenomenologist alike therefore 
amounts to admitting somewhat of a dual-natured self. Even in the naturalistic world 
consisting solely of physical objects and processes, the utterance ‗I have a body‘ 
mysteriously splits my self into both a subject of my experiences and an object for me. 
The difference between physicalism and phenomenology regarding this split between the 
body-as subject and the body-as-object is that while the former tends to brush the 
problem aside, the latter takes it as an issue worth exploring and indeed ‗incorporating‘ 
into discussions of cognition and embodiment (e.g. Legrand, 2006). Physicalists, for 
example, often attempt to explain the apparent fissure by suggesting that ‗I have a body‘ 
really means ‗I am a body‘– in other words, whatever dualism is present is simply a 
grammatical consequence (e.g. Ryle, 1945).  Nevertheless, it is not simply a matter of 
linguistic convention that motivates proponents of the NCC to think that the brain is 
somehow the ‗comptroller,‘ indeed, the ‗owner‘ of the rest of the body. Even though it is 
not a substance dualism, like the Cartesian picture of bodily-having, the ‗captain in the 
ship,‘ as it were, has been identified as the brain (the captain) and the rest of the body, a 
mere vessel. Of course, any good physicalist will renounce the idea that the brain and the 
body are ontologically distinct and can thus avoid the pitfalls of Cartesianism and yet, 
                                                 
19
 Cf. Ideas, but see also in Rudolf Bernet‘s collections of Bernet, et al., 2005, for critical commentary and 
various other translated fragments from the archives in Leuven, esp. 1964. 
20
 Husserl, albeit at times quite Cartesian, is not always as strongly so. He expresses a different conception  
in Ideen II where he sets out his view of the lived body and something akin to an enactive view – all of 
which influenced Merleau-Ponty. Also, the transcendental ego was not regarded as a spiritual substance in 
the Cartesian way. 
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when it comes to explaining the problematic nature of having a sense of ownership of my 
body while simultaneously being that body, little more than hand-waving typically 
results. It is taken for granted by Koch (2004) and others that this supposed body-as-
subject/body-as-object split, like consciousness more generally, will be eventually be 
describable in strict neurobiological terms. These assumptions are not the basis of the 
phenomenological method and, as we shall see, not only does the sense of ownership 
over one‘s body matter to the phenomenology of mind, but according to many (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962; Gallagher, 2005; Zahavi, 2006), problematizing and describing this 
relationship ‗I‘ have to my body is necessary if we are to attain a comprehensive account 
of cognition.  
 As we have seen so far, not everyone in cognitive science and philosophy of mind 
has reacted to the neuroscientific revolution in the way reductive physicalists have. While 
the brain remains an important source of thought, Gibson‘s (1967) theory of an 
‗ecological body‘  has resulted in other thinkers (cf. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; 
Haugeland, 1998; Gallagher, 2005) stopping to reconsider the role the ‗body-whole‘ 
plays in cognition. The Gibsonian tradition invites serious discussion, for example, about 
proprioception and its contribution to cognition. Where the body is in relation to other 
objects is ascertained via a concatenation of all the sensory modalities, and has been 
argued by some  to provide us with the basis for experiencing the ‗whole body.‘ 
Proprioceptive awareness can be further analyzed, as Gallagher (2005) suggests, into the 
different roles it plays in what he calls a body image and a body schema. The former 
draws on multiple (including sensory and emotional) inputs to create an explicit 
representation of ‗the body‘ as an object that is uniquely tied to ‗me,‘ while the latter, 
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which primarily serves the demands of motor control, involves a much more tacit 
awareness of the body and its situatedness in the world. If I think about my body and 
decide it is out of shape, I am conjuring an image, or if I participate in an unfamiliar 
activity like learning to dance the tango for the first time, I will benefit from paying very 
close attention to my feet, my posture, and the position of my arms, which means I will 
be employing a body image. Contrast these examples with waking in the middle of the 
night to obtain a glass of water or putting on clothes while simultaneously watching 
television. When action is habitual or automatic, there is no need to take the body as an 
object for movement. For example, I do not need to pay attention to what my fingers are 
doing as it buttons my shirt; rather, the body itself provides a schema for action such that 
in a way, it knows what it‘s doing whether or not ‗I‘ am explicitly aware of it. Thus, in 
normal and familiar action, Gallagher argues, the body schema plays a crucial role. In 
cases of body schema breakdown, such as in the case of Ian Waterman (henceforth, IW), 
for instance, who, as a result of a viral infection and subsequent mylenated nerve fiber 
damage, which resulted in the loss of proprioception and tactile sense below the neck, is 
unable to perform everyday tasks with the automaticity most of us are accustomed to, the 
body is no longer a transparent lived-through medium. Rather, the body, as Gallagher 
suggests, must be used as a tool, its image manipulated and controlled to produce the 
desired action. More will be said about IW and other embodiment abnormalities later, but 
it suffices at this point to note that there seem to be two modes of bodily having; one in 
which ‗our bodies‘ are not explicitly ‗for us,‘ but really seem to ‗be us,‘ and the other in 
which we do explicitly take our bodies as representational images, objects to behold, 
manipulated, and ‗owned.‘ This distinction was made explicit in Merleau-Ponty‘s 
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Phenomenology of Perception (1962) when he discusses the ways in which perception 
involves motor skills and is not reducible to simply experiencing an array of sensory data. 
His example, that of touching silk, is one that begins as a confused sensory state, but with 
practice, transforms into an automatic and immediate recognition, one that it is nearly 
impossible to explain.  In such processes, Merleau-Ponty claims that our bodies do not 
appear to us as objects to manipulate, nor do our senses present us with heterogeneous 
information; rather, if I am skilled at something, such as recognizing silk, my body is ―a 
ready-made system of equivalents and transpositions from one sense to another‖ (235). 
Dreyfus (2001; 1990) furthers this idea by suggesting, in what he calls ―skillful coping,‖ 
that such as occurs when we go from awkwardly splashing and nearly-drowning to 
smoothly gliding across the water in an effortless swimming stroke, we have acquired the 
requisite ―muscular gestalt‖ which allows our bodies to drift into the experiential 
background. The objects of our perception are therefore no longer bodily movements or 
specific body parts, but instead are the tasks in front of us (249).  
 In addition to Gibson, the phenomenological tradition has greatly influenced 
thinkers like Gallagher (2005), when it comes to bodily having; but also, thinkers like 
Clark (1998, 2003, 2008), Haugeland (1998) and Zahavi (2003, 2007) have all taken cues 
from phenomenological investigations when attempting to understand a mind that is 
embodied and embedded in a world. Similarly, Heidegger (1962) and Scheler (see Zahavi 
2003) who in turn influenced thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty (1964) and  Sartre (1966), 
set their phenomenological sights more towards being embodied, and being-in-the-world 
(and, as we‘ll see, in a way that is always already imbued with the ‗mark‘ of cognition). 
As Heidegger (1927) notes, the world is not wholly other to me, but I am always involved 
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it and because of this pervasive involvement, I often fail to notice the primary 
relationship between me and my body, my tools,  and even language, because for the 
most part, that relationship is invisible to me. I will return to phenomenological 
descriptions as a means to complement and add to the discussion of embodiment in 
cognitive science in a later section however, as I think getting clear on precisely what the 
current trends are with respects to bodily having is where one should start.  Rather than 
engage in a standard historical project in which the origins of or influences on current 
theories is somehow unearthed, I think by beginning with the varying viewpoints on 
embodiment and then examining the ways in which phenomenological descriptions are 
employed, either implicitly or explicitly will illuminate the historical underpinnings in a 
much more interesting manner.  
 An analogy can be drawn between Gallagher‘s body image/body schema 
distinction and the distinction Heidegger (1927) draws between the present-at-
handedness (Vorhandenheit) and ready-to-handedness (Zuhandenheit) with which objects 
show up to us. The well-known hammer example is intended to point out that in most 
cases, the tools we use are barely noticeable; when using a hammer for example, one 
does not focus on the hammer itself but more on the hammering and in this sense our 
tools are often more like extensions of our bodies – thereby becoming part of the body 
schema. In cases of breakdown, malfunction, or in moments of theoretical reflection 
however, the hammer becomes present-at-hand, an object we consciously think about and 
see as distinct from ourselves.  As Gallagher points out, our bodies can similarly be  
thematized and reified, such that ‗I‘ might feel a bit distanced from ‗my body,‘ and can 
therefore take it as an object, or even a tool for my use, and thus treat it as present-at-
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hand (as– in the form of a body image). For the most part, however, we walk, talk, move 
around, and interact with one another in a much more holistic and unreflective way. In 
other words, our body is most often ready-to-hand, because we are most often operating 
with what Gallagher terms a body-schema. This analogy between the way tools appear to 
us and the way our own bodies are lived-through and represented is not perfect of course, 
because we don‘t typically think of our bodies as tools, nor do we think of tools as 
inherently attached to our bodies. Nevertheless, in some cases, our bodies do feature 
more like present-at-hand tools, when, for example, we feel detached, dysphoric, or just 
simply clumsy and awkward, such as in the case of taking a ballet class for the first time. 
Likewise, as the overarching aim of this project is intended to argue, the ready-to-hand 
feature of tools we are most often accustomed to experiencing, means that our body 
schema can actually ‗incorporate‘ otherwise external objects into itself, thereby extending 
the limits of what is understood to be ‗my body.‘  
 The idea that my body can at times fade into the background and at other times, it 
is more like an explicit object I must manipulate, is phenomenologically uncontroversial. 
Contention arises, however, when we attempt to take this phenomenological description 
and utilize it in a philosophical or scientific explanation about cognition generally. As the 
previous paragraph suggested, we can experience ourselves as if detached from our 
bodies, or so at least it seems. It is an interesting question to pursue therefore, if we ask, 
just how severe can this feeling of detachment be? Answering this question would point 
towards a more general answer to the question, how much does our cognitive experience 
depend on our being attached to a body? Moreover, by examining the phenomenology of 
embodiment, we can begin seriously to ask to what extent is the body schema plastic and 
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extendable, such that tools and other external objects might become part of the body-
whole. If it turns out that embodiment, even in cases of what I will collectively term 
‗body dysphorias,‘ is essential for cognition, but it also can be shown that this 
embodiment is malleable, then it would have to follow that cognition is better understood 
in terms of a ―shifting coalition of tools‖ rather than a singular, unchanging, and unified 
body.  
 As is the case in much of cognitive science, one way to approach the question 
concerning ‗normal‘ embodiment and cognition, is to examine ‗abnormal‘ or pathological 
cases in order to see what sorts of breakdowns are occurring. These breakdowns typically 
highlight what, in non-pathological scenarios, is at play. There are hosts of possible 
‗abnormal embodiments‘  to consider, but I will limit the discussion to five, as each 
highlights a unique dissociation between the objective body and subjectively lived-
through embodiment, and provides clues for understanding how embodiment plays a role 
in cognition and action. In particular, by looking at the levels of experienced dissociation, 
we can approach an answer to the question concerning how much cognition is dependent 
upon a feeling of attachment or unity with one‘s body.  Thus, I will begin with the rare 
case of Ian Waterman, who suffered deafferentation, and will then proceed to discuss 
aplasic phantoms, somatoparaphrenia, alien hand syndrome, and Möbius syndrome.  
 
3.3 Bodily Breakdowns  
 The following examples of abnormal embodiment are found regularly throughout 
the literature, from cognitive science to gender studies and from philosophy of mind all 
the way back to classic phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Despite the 
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regularity with which cases such as phantom limbs or Somatoparaphrenia are simply 
explicated, once beyond simple description, the interpretations vary wildly. Nativists, 
intracranialists, externalists, essentialists, and post-modernists have all weighed in on at 
least one of the cases below, and because of such disparity, I shall proceed first by simply 
citing evidence and exemplars from each category of bodily breakdown. Then, in the next 
section, a closer look at the supposed philosophical implications of each will be 
undertaken. 
 
3.3.1 Deafferentation: The Story of Ian Waterman 
 Ian Waterman (IW) is by far the most discussed single patient in the 
contemporary literature on proprioception. This is because his condition is extremely rare 
and intriguing, as he suffered damage to the large myelinated nerve fibers in his 
peripheral nervous system, which are normally responsible for proprioceptive awareness 
and the sense of touch. The damage resulted in his loss of automatic motor control below 
the neck. Speech, facial expressions, and head movement remained normal. However, his 
implicit proprioceptive awareness – a feature of embodiment taken for granted by most of 
us – has been lost. In normal bodily action I am able to engage in the smooth coping that 
Dreyfus describes; I‘m able to move around the world and engage in instrumental action 
often without thinking about my body or having my limbs in my visual field. For IW, 
however, to move about, dress himself, or do anything normal-functioning persons can 
do automatically, he must instead concentrate with great intensity on the task at hand. 
Indeed, he must maintain whatever part of his body he wishes to manipulate within his 
visual field in order to achieve the desired action. Therefore, performing multiple tasks at 
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once, such as walking while talking on the cell phone – abilities often taken for granted 
by those who engage in them routinely – are difficult for IW.  He has no trouble talking, 
since the proprioceptive loss is from the neck down, but the amount of concentration he 
requires to walk distracts him from the conversation.  
 Gallagher (2005) explains IW‘s case in terms of a distinction between his use of 
body image and body schema, the former being the explicit representation of one‘s body, 
while the later is the more pre-reflective sense of bodily location and relation to objects 
outside of it. In other words, for most of us, buttoning our shirts while slipping on shoes 
is mundane everyday activity because we don‘t have to stop to consider ‗where we are,‘ 
how far each of our limbs are from one another, from external objects, and so on. In 
normal functioning, the body schema provides the control needed to sit upright, walk 
straight, and touch one‘s hand to one‘s head, even while carrying on a conversation about 
Sunday‘s game. In IW‘s case however, he must manipulate an explicit image of himself, 
concentrating with great intensity on posture and his arm as it moves to grasp an object, 
or his legs as he places one in front of the other as he walks across uneven surfaces. 
Practice does not make his movements any more automatic; each time he reaches to grasp 
something, for example, he has to think through the action.  Only a few aspects of his 
locomotive movement have come close to being automatic – namely, certain aspects of 
his leg movements while walking, and this is the case only on relatively smooth surfaces. 
IW is able to drive an automobile, but he will never be able to drive while talking on the 
cell phone.  
 IW‘s case, interesting in its own right, also sheds light on what is normally the 
case in non-impaired persons. As Gallagher (2005) and Noё (2004), for instance, have 
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emphasized, when we interact with the environment, vision, sensorimotor control, and 
proprioceptive awareness usually work seamlessly together, such that we hardly ever 
notice them as distinct systems. Nevertheless, even in non-pathological experience, we 
are often confronted with tasks in which we don‘t feel so ‗at home‘ in our bodies.  An 
example Dreyfus (1972) cites in this regard is driving, It is safe to assume that every 
person who has ever learned to drive a car, despite how quickly and easily they may have 
picked up the skill, went through a phase in which all of the discrete components of the 
task – the steering wheel, the brakes, the gears, and so forth – were individualized and 
consciously reflected upon. As we become more accustomed to the rhythm of checking 
the road, accelerating and decelerating, and gauging the sharpness of upcoming turns 
however, the need to ‗think about‘ driving diminishes until finally, we find ourselves 
talking on a cell-phone, smoking a cigarette, and adjusting the temperature, all while 
speeding down the highway and zipping in and out of traffic.  
 Although Dreyfus‘s example is helpful, a possible rejoinder to the idea that the 
beginning stage of driving is somehow analogous to IW‘s lack of control would be to 
argue that even in clumsy and inefficient driving, our ability to move our limbs in space, 
to unreflectively control our bodies, and to execute actions without explicit visual 
imagery remains. In other words, the reason a task like driving begins so awkwardly is 
not a feature of our embodiment per se, but is rather a lack of mastery over our tools. We 
have not ‗skillfully coped‘ with our environment. In the following chapters, I will attempt 
to show that this difference in coping with one‘s body versus coping with one‘s tools is 
really a distinction without a genuine difference; however, even if it is the case that the 
driving example is insufficient to demonstrate that in non-pathological actions, we can 
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experience something similar to IW‘s condition, I think there are other examples that do 
succeed. If I am accustomed to jogging along a particular path, I might very well engage 
in a conversation with my running partner or if I am alone, it might even be the case that I 
entirely ‗zone out,‘ such that after completing the trail, I have little to no recollection of 
the jog itself, but instead have outlined a paper or planned a party. Contrast this familiar 
experience with jogging on a path that is entirely new, one that contains many unknown 
obstacles such as rocks, tree roots, and fluctuating topography.  Quite literally in this 
scenario, if I don‘t maintain my feet within my visual field, I could fall over, much like 
the way in which Ian  must watch what his feet are doing at all times. Add to this of 
course, the fact that if Ian or I, in our respective situations, don‘t also monitor what is 
going on at eye level, we might smack into a tree, another person, or a building.  For me, 
but not for IW, over time, the manipulation of discrete body parts, calculated movements, 
and detailed planning become more automatic. I can eventually ‗lose sight‘ of this 
monitoring and hence, my movements don‘t just appear automatic; they genuinely are, 
and I no longer represent my body to myself as a manipulable object.  On the other hand, 
although he might be able to ‗pass‘ as normal to an outside observer, his movements 
seeming automatic, to Ian, the maintaining a visual awareness of his body and utilizing 
his body image remains a constant necessity and hence, the body schema with which 
genuine automaticity is achieved in non-pathological cases, is not part of Ian‘s 
experiential framework.
21
 
 What we can glean from this discussion of IW, as well as the comparisons 
between his case and non-pathological embodiment is two-fold. First, we learn that in 
                                                 
21
 It is worth noting as well that Ian‘s walking never truly looks normal, while he has mastered fairly 
normal-looking grasping and reaching. 
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normal, everyday andfamiliar actions, there is no need to consciously monitor sensory 
input, motor action, vision, and prorprioception. At the pre-reflective level of bodily 
experience, ‗my body‘ and ‗I‘ really are one. In other words, I do not experience any 
dissociation with my body; it is not an object for me when I am say, walking through my 
house while talking on the phone. It is also not the case that I feel uncomfortable in my 
own skin in these familiar modes of embodiment. IW‘s case however, shows us that this 
at-homeness can be disrupted to the point that in order to engage in otherwise simple 
tasks, taking the body as an object for me is absolutely essential. Hence, the second thing 
we learn is that there are non-pathological experiences in which I can become more 
distanced from my body; indeed, it is helpful to do so in some cases, such as learning a 
new skill. A question mark hangs over these phenomenological findings however: when 
one takes one‘s body as an object, exactly where is the control? Who is the controller? 
More importantly, have we not resurrected a troublesome dualism by suggesting that not 
only in pathological cases, but in everyday uncomfortable or awkward actions, we can 
tease ourselves apart from our bodies? In order to answer these questions, I will turn to 
several other examples of ‗abnormal embodiment‘ to gain more insight into this supposed 
fracturing of the cognizer from his or her body. As I will continue to highlight throughout 
these cases however, there appears to be a need to distinguish between a pre-reflective 
and reflective level of awareness when discussing automatic versus non-automatic action. 
Herein, I think, will be the key to understanding from whence bodily dissociation, in all 
its various forms, arises.    
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3.3.2 Phantom Limbs 
  While cases such as IW‘s are extremely rare, another form of bodily breakdown 
involving loss of one or more limbs is not so uncommon. Amputations in the U.S. are 
estimated to affect one in every 200 persons (Adams, et al, 1999) with reasons for the 
surgery ranging from injury, to cancer, to dysvascular complications, the latter being the 
most common and increasingly prevalent cause.
22
 The typically accompanying phantom 
limb syndrome has fascinated philosophers, psychologists, and doctors alike for ages. 
Sensations felt in parts of the body no longer present led Descartes, for instance, in a fit 
of radical skepticism, to doubt that we can really ever trust our senses and that all bodily 
knowledge is dubious. Even more astonishing is that persons born without one or more 
limbs (aplasic) often claim to experience phantom sensations in the missing limb. Aplasic 
phantoms affect a much smaller percentage
23
  of the population, but nonetheless, their 
existence has suggested to many (Melzack, et al, 1997; Ramachadran & Hirstein, 1998) 
that ‗the body‘ is an innately specified boundary, such that we are born with a 
representation of the ‗body-whole‘ encoded in our brains. 
 Although the symptomology is not entirely agreed upon in the medical 
community, the received view (cf. Simmel, 1958) about phantom limbs has been that 
they are only experienced in patients who have had amputations late enough in life so as 
to be able to ‗remember‘ once having the now missing appendage. However, 
countervailing evidence obtained by Weinstein and Sersen (1961) shows that a 
significant number of persons born without a limb do experience phantom symptoms. 
Despite the phenomenological accounts of aplasic phantoms, several theorists (Melzack, 
                                                 
22
 Fact sheet for U.S. amputations, National Limb Loss Center, 2008. 
23
 Cf. Wilkins, et al. (1998), in which it is estimated that only 7.6% of persons with congenitally missing 
limbs experience phantom sensations. 
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1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Poeck, 1964) have argued that the phenomenon of 
forgetting, which is present only in amputees, makes a big difference as to how we ought 
to interpret the role of body schema in shaping the experience of the missing limb; in 
other words, the phantom symptoms of an amputee and an aplasic are markedly different 
and hence ought to be referred to as distinct phenomena.  ―Forgetting‖ is the phenomenon 
in which amputees who otherwise are fully aware that their limb is missing, will still act 
as though it were present in an attempt to use it. Examples from Poeck (1964) such as leg 
amputees who continue to attempt to walk with both legs, suggest, according to 
Gallagher (2005), that ―the missing limb continues to function schematically in motor 
behavior for an indefinite time. It continues to play a part in the organization of 
instrumental or locomotive actions. Its absence is not taken into account‖ (90).  Put 
another way, amputees experience their phantoms representationally – at the body image 
level – to be sure, as they claim to have kinesthetic experiences of pain, itching, and so 
forth in the missing limb. But they also experience their phantoms pre-reflectively, as part 
of their body schema, and hence in automatic, sensorimotor action, there is no sense of 
loss. They simply forget what they already ‗know‘ about themselves. 
 Gallagher goes on to argue that even in cases of aplasic phantoms, there must be 
an innate body schema. While the debate concerning nativism is far beyond the scope of 
this project, it is interesting to see how assumptions concerning the ‗hardwiring‘ of the 
body schema shape his discussion of phantom sensations. First of all, as he argues 
concerning amputees and forgetfulness:  
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 The phenomenon of forgetting is actually a normal part of normal motor action. 
 Movement in general and specifically the continued functioning of a phantom part 
 in movement, does not depend on a vivid representation or percept of the body, or 
 specifically of the missing limb. Rather, forgetting is normal and possible 
 precisely because motor behavior does not ordinarily require that my limbs be 
 included in my perceptual awareness. [2005, 91] 
 
Likewise, therefore, persons with congenitally missing limbs do not represent the limb to 
themselves in normal motor action. So, does their ‗non-forgetfulness‘ necessarily imply 
that their body schema innately includes or does not include the missing limb? Hardly so, 
and it is just as conceivable that forgetfulness and non-forgetfulness alike are products of 
learned behavior, or what Merleau-Ponty (1962) calls the ―habitual body.‖ As we have 
seen in chapter two, ‗where‘ memories are actually stored is nowhere near a settled issue. 
To be sure, a pattern of neural activation might in fact be what subtends many of our 
memories, but as the Otto case, and pretty much any human who is highly dependent on 
an external device such as a day planner can attest, a lot of our memories seem to be out 
of our heads. If so, then why would it be such a stretch to claim that the phenomenon of 
forgetting might also be the result of bodily encoded behavioral memories, memories that 
extend beyond the brain and into the rest of the body which also learned at one point to 
interact with the now missing limb? Even more along the lines of an externalized 
explanation of phantom phenomena would be to take what Meuse (1996) asks us to 
consider, which is that body images are often culturally informed and highly dependent 
on social practice, and to then conceive of the source for aplasic phantoms as entirely 
socially derived. This proposal, which could be put in terms of shaping our own body 
image in terms of others‘ bodies, is a viable alternative to the theory about an innate body 
schema (see, e.g., Brügger, who suggests the involvement of mirror neurons).   
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 Whether the mind is endowed with innate representations, of one‘s body or of any 
other information for that matter, is, once again, beyond the scope of this project, and 
furthermore, is arguably an intractable debate, especially when it comes to aplasic 
phantoms. There is no evidence of the phenomenon until late childhood and by then, a 
vast array of motor, linguistic, and cognitive skills have been acquired, not to mention, a 
large amount of social information has been absorbed by the child. Determining if the 
experience of a phantom limb is entirely the result of an innate bodily representation, 
deeply embedded social ideals about the body, or some combination of the two would 
require first, that the neuroscientific accounts were conclusive and second, that the 
phenomenology of aplasic phantoms were somehow unified and systematic. Although 
embryonic studies have been undertaken (cf. Hepper, et al. 1998) in order to determine at 
what point lateralization of the left and right limbs occurs, they have been interpreted 
both as providing evidence for innate bodily representations (Ramachadran & Hirstein, 
1998) and for the necessity of environmental interactions beyond what goes in utero for 
the phantoms to occur (Price, in press). Moreover, some congenital para- and 
quaraplegics claim to have experienced phantom symptoms ―for as long as they can 
remember‖ while others only begin to have sensations in the absent limbs later in 
development. Given all of this disparity, it would appear fruitless to try and determine, 
from the occurrence of aplasic phantoms alone, whether something as complex as ‗my 
body‘ could ever be encoded innately in the brain.  
 What does present itself as plausible, however, is that we could investigate further 
the phenomenological descriptions of phantoms, both reported by the aplasics 
themselves, and the third-person accounts given by doctors, scientists, and philosophers. 
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What sorts of sensations are felt in the missing limbs, for what duration, and with what 
frequency? When engaging in everyday actions such as dressing, walking about, or 
cleaning the house, are the patients aware of the limb as missing, or is it more that the 
proprioceptive awareness had by aplasics seems to include the missing limb as if it were 
really there, when one is acting automatically, at what Gallagher (2005) would refer to as 
body schematic level of pre-reflective bodily know-how? In other words, dividing 
experience into the two levels of explicit body image versus tacit bodily action might 
prove beneficial in determining at what stage of body-world interaction the phantom is 
prevalent. As Gallagher argues concerning amputees and phantom limb syndrome, the 
body schema is predisposed to ‗re-member‘ – either due to training or by some innately 
specified predisposition – and hence, when we observe someone ‗forgetting‘ that they are 
missing a limb (trying to walk on an absent leg, e.g.), what is actually happening is that 
the body schema is simply producing the sorts of movements we would expect to occur 
for anyone pre-reflectively. The same is true of aplasic phantoms insofar as pre-
reflectively, the limb shows up as really there, and hence, before there is even time to 
pause and consider the nature of the sensation, my proprioceptive awareness tells me that 
there is pain in my left arm. It is only in reflective experience that persons experiencing 
phantoms will state that they are aware that the limb is actually non-existent. Aplasic 
phantoms and standard phantoms alike illustrate that embodiment is experienced pre-
reflectively as unified, undifferentiated, and for the most part, without awareness of its 
discrete parts. In this sense, we need not worry about whether the body schema is 
innately specified to encode four limbs or whether aplasic phantoms result from some 
psychological response to perceived norms of embodiment. Those questions miss the 
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point that at the schematic level, something like ‗four limbs‘ could not really be properly 
understood, as this is to already attribute too much reflective ability to a system which is 
by definition, pre-reflective. It would seem therefore that whether in pathological or non-
pathological cases, if fully functional, the body schema operates as a unified and non-
dissociating whole. 
 
3.3.3 Somatoparaphrenia 
 While aplasic phantoms represent a case in which the holistic nature of the 
schema can result in a pre-reflective sense of owning more limbs than one actually has, 
on the other end of the spectrum, the somatoparaphrenic renounces ownership of one or 
more appendages that really do exist. In extreme cases, denial of an entire side of the 
body occurs. Technically, somatoparaphrenics are not simply asomatognosic, meaning 
they do not just deny ownership of a body part, but they also attribute it as belonging to 
someone else, often claiming it must belong to a previous patient in the doctor‘s office, or 
a relative, etc. Nevertheless, patients with somatoparaphrenia are born with ‗normal‘ 
bodies, and as such, phenomena surrounding the disorder are much the inverse of those 
accompanying aplasic phantoms. Where the former is deluded into thinking the limb 
actually attached to his or her body is in fact not part of the body-whole, the latter 
experiences sensations in limbs that are not even present.  
 While little is known about somatoparaphrenia, it is generally characterized as 
one of the many sub-versions of the more general delusion, anosognosia, which is the 
denial of an illness or injury. This is because in most cases of somatoparaphrenia, the 
patient has suffered a stroke resulting in right hemisphere damage with 
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hemiparesis/plegia. The refusal to accept the brain damage is translated into some form of 
disregard for the correlated paretic or plegic limb; in other words, from the patient‘s 
perspective, the source of the problem is not in his or her head, but instead resides with 
the troubled appendage. The problems are not limited to denial of ownership of body 
parts, which is in fact labeled asomatognosia, but, according to a questionnaire given to 
hemiparetic stroke patients by Baier and Karnach (2005), anosognosia is further 
subdivided into somatoparaphrenia, or the attribution of ownership of one‘s limbs to 
someone else, anasodiaphoria, or a lack of concern/notice of the limb, misoplegia, which 
involves a specifically negative attitude towards the limb, personification, or the naming 
and/or anthropomorphizing the limb, kinetic hallucinations, or the feeling that the limb is 
moving of its own volition, and perhaps most striking, patients may claim that the limb 
simply appeared, as if by magic, a condition known as supernumerary phantom limb 
syndrome.  
 The above catalog of syndromes highlights the nuanced pathologies that 
accompany specific brain damage. Although it might be said of all the various forms of 
anasognosia, that they are of common origin, namely, a hemiparetic stroke, simply 
relying on the neuropathology as an explanation of the varied psychopathologies is not 
very illuminating. Thus, in a later section, we will investigate the various modes of 
ownership and agency operative in these forms of anasognosia, paying particular 
attention to somatoparaphrenia, as it shares some similar phenomenology with various 
other pathologies that have hitherto been otherwise ignored. Examining cases of bodily 
pathology, such as somatoparaphrenia, shows not only that we can and often do become 
dissociated from all or parts of our bodies, but also, that there is an important difference 
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between the way the dissociation shows up to us in conscious experience as opposed to 
how it is realized neurobiologically. For example, in IW‘s case, the neuropathology alone 
would suggest a permanent loss of his ability to find his bodily place in the world and yet, 
through a manipulation of his body-image, he is able to override the otherwise disabled 
system. Likewise, in somatoparaphrenic patients, it is quite possibly the case that brain 
damage alone is insufficient to describe what it‘s like to experience a limb as foreign or 
unowned. For instance, Katerina Fotopoulou, at the University of London, reports an 
interesting case. Fotopoulou has a post-stroke patient with somatoparaphrenia.  Her left 
arm (paralyzed and without proprioception or sensation), she claims, belongs to her 
granddaughter. This is her response when she is asked about her arm and made to look at 
it. But when she is shown her full image in a mirror, and asked about her left arm as it 
appears in the mirror, she correctly identifies it as her own.  When asked about her 
granddaughter‘s arm she looks down, directly at her left arm.  Whenever she looks 
directly at her arm, she identifies it as her granddaughter‘s; whenever she looks at it in 
the mirror she identifies it as her own.
24
  This suggests that there may be different kinds 
of perception of body-as-object, as Gallagher (2010) suggests.  But it also suggests that 
this cannot be explained purely in terms of damaged brain areas.  Nothing changes in the 
damaged brain areas when the woman looks into the mirror and re-establishes her body 
image on the basis of a visual and literal image in the mirror.  The brain, damaged as it is, 
plus the body, paralyzed as it is, cannot provide an explanation of this re-established 
image.  To the brain and the body, one needs to add a particular instrument in the world, 
the mirror, to explain this re-established unity.  This renewed body image is thus not 
                                                 
24
 A similar phenomenon of mirror correction has been found to cause immediate recovery from 
anosognosia for hemiplegia (Fotopoulou et al. 2009). 
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reducible to brain processes; it extends to processes that include engagement with the 
environment beyond the body.  
 
3.3.4 Anarchic Hand (or Limb) Syndrome 
 One such condition that receives relatively little attention from philosophers 
concerned with agency and freedom of the will is Anarchic Limb Syndrome (ALS). 
Typically affecting a hand or arm, patients with ALS experience a loss of control over a 
part of their bodies such that one hand will reach out and grab objects, repeatedly touch 
things, and perhaps violently strike other persons or even the person to whom the rogue 
extremity belongs. Because it is a syndrome, this means that little is known about the 
precise cause of the disorder. Neurologically, ALS has been shown to occur after strokes 
or brain trauma; in particular, damage to the basal frontal lobes and the corpus callosum 
is often correlated with the occurrence of the syndrome (Josephs and Roessler, 2001). 
Nevertheless, there exist a large number of subtypes of ALS, ranging from a ‗levitating 
hand‘ which is thought to result from posterior parietal lobe damage, to a more complex 
phenomena often termed ‗intermanual conflict,‘ in which patients, typically those who 
have had a corpus collascotomy, will actually ‗self-diagnose‘ the actions of one limb as 
opposed to the other, as if the two originated from distinct cognitive agents with distinct 
intentions (cf. Nishikawa, et al., 2001).  
 As this quick survey suggests, the disorder is far from a unified pathology and 
thus has no cure. Likewise, the phenomenology behind ALS is rife with inconsistency 
and variation. One constant that seems to emerge however, is that patients with any form 
of ALS report a lack of control (a lack of a sense of agency) over their rogue limb either 
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some or all of the time. This fact will be of key importance when we attempt to tie 
together all these various modes of ‗abnormal embodiment‘ into one very general 
phenomenological story.  
 
3.3.5 Möbius Syndrome 
 Another way persons might feel detached from or not in possession of their 
bodies is found in patients with Möbius syndrome. An extremely rare syndrome, 
affecting approximately .002% of live births per year,
25
 it results from underdeveloped 
cranial nerves, the nerves emerging immediately below the brain stem. In particular, 
numbers VI and VII are most often the affected nerve pairs, as these two, which are 
motor and sensorimotor respectively, control movement of the eyes and facial 
expressions, particularly oral movements involving smiling, frowning, pursing of lips, 
and even chewing and saliva regulation. With these nerves impaired, Möbius patients are 
expressionless, and babies often have trouble nursing, often uncontrollably drooling, a 
problem that persists into adulthood if not corrected. Möbius patients however, are 
typically otherwise unimpaired, having normal intellectual and physical development. 
Socially, on the other hand, they struggle with conveying and recognizing emotions. In 
other words, their social cognition is impaired – the ability to gauge others‘ intentions, 
thoughts, and feelings, as well as effectively communicate their own in a non-verbal 
manner –  and as a result, they are often mislabeled as either  autistic or even mentally 
disabled. (Cole, 2000; Cole and Spalding, 2008) 
                                                 
25
 Verzijl, et al (2000) 
 108 
 Because Möbius syndrome is congenital, like aplasic phantom syndrome it raises 
some interesting questions about innate body representations, albeit in importantly 
different ways. Simulation theorists (cf. Goldman, 2006; Proust, 2002) and Theory of 
Mind Theorists (cf. Stich, 2007; Baren-Cohen et al., 2000) alike have argued that social 
cognition, which is largely dependent upon facial recognition, is an innate ability, one 
that is impaired when certain parts of the body are underdeveloped or damaged at birth. 
Nevertheless, cases such as Möbius syndrome, as frequently happens in the cognitive 
sciences, often yield wildly varying interpretations as to what the mechanism behind 
learning to understand others‘ mental states is. Once again, this is a debate that is outside 
the scope of the present discussion, and yet when persons with impairments are used as 
illustrations of what ‗normal‘ social learning must be like and decisive agreement is all 
but missing, such disparity suggests that not enough careful consideration is truly being 
given to what it‘s actually like to experience such bodily and emotional dysphoria. If we 
think of a Möbius patient as simply lacking the appropriate theory of mind or simulation 
skills, then the actual experiences of the patients are often overlooked, leading to an 
overintellecutalized (―in the head‖) understanding of emotion, which is not readily 
available for translation in ‗normal‘ expression. As James, a patient of Jonathan Cole 
(2000) explains:  
 I do think I get trapped in my mind or my head. I sort of think happy or I think 
 sad, not really saying or recognizing actually feeling happy or feeling sad. 
 Perhaps I have had a difficulty in recognizing that which I‘m putting a name to is 
 not a thought at all but it is a  feeling, maybe I have to intellectualize mood. I 
 have to say this thought is a happy thought and therefore I am happy. (p.254) 
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3.4 Toward a Phenomenology of Bodily Having 
 In this section, I will attempt to bring together the bodily pathologies discussed in 
3.2 by highlighting some similar features found in the phenomenological descriptions 
from both the patients and those who study them. As it turns out, there are some 
persistent ‗phenomenological pathologies‘ to be found lurking in such descriptions, 
which often paradoxically bespeak a  Cartesian ideology about the body as a mere vessel 
for one‘s ‗true self‘, while simultaneously endorsing a psychophysical reductive 
explanation about who and what ‗I truly am,‘ which is to say, a physical body.  By taking 
a closer look at the body image/body schema distinction and the sense of ownership and 
sense of agency one has over one‘s body (Gallagher, 2005) as well as the important 
lessons we can learn from experiences and experiments in what I collectively term ‗body 
bending,‘ I think such confused accounts of subjective experience can be better 
understood.  
 If, as Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) have argued recently, the phenomenological 
method is not pure introspection – or simply a collection of subjective descriptions of 
experiences – but is rather an account of how those subjective experiences are made 
possible in the first place, then we can begin to uncover how the body may in fact show 
itself to an individual subject as ‗other‘ or as the ‗container‘ (and quite often the 
obstructer) of that person‘s true self. While it is important to take seriously these 
subjective descriptions of embodiment, a phenomenology that remains faithful to 
Husserl‘s (cf. 1910; 1965) original insights must attempt to reconcile what we might 
discover in terms of the eidetic or essential structures of experience on the one hand and 
the ways in which objects (and the subject‘s own body) might appear in various modes of 
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experience. In this regard, I will suggest that once again, a look at the pre-reflective and 
reflective levels of awareness might provide just such reconciliation. Rather than 
assuming that individual and subjective descriptions of experience are contradictory to 
current empirical science, it is more defensible to think of the two modes of explanation 
as operating on different levels. While neuroscience may indeed inform us about some of 
these essential structures of experience – those that phenomenologists would argue are 
the proper parts of an overall account of subjective experience generally – there are 
important lessons to be learned from the level of reflective awareness as well, such as the 
fact that in reflection, one can often become detached from oneself and hence, will come 
to think of one‘s embodiment in ways that run counter to the supposed ‗facts‘ found in 
neuroscience. 
 
3.5 Ownership and Agency at the Reflective and Pre-Reflective Levels  
 We need not simply assume that body image can affect body schema if we 
consider IW once again. In IW‘s case, his body schema was effectively destroyed and 
because of this, even maintaining an upright position in a chair was at first impossible for 
him. Through careful manipulation and perceptual focus on certain areas of his body, he 
has been able to achieve more controlled movements, however, so much so that he has 
sort of recreated a body schema, as Gallagher and Cole (1996) suggest, a virtual one. 
However, he will never regain genuine somatic proprioception, as the nerves that subtend 
it are forever destroyed. Thus, when Gallagher, Cole and McNeill (2001) experimented 
with IW‘s ability to gesture, they found that even when his hands were occluded from his 
visual field, he was still able to gesture, although he lacked the topokinetic control that 
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would normally occur when someone‘s body schema was intact.  This lends support to 
the argument that he creates a sort of virtual body schema, facilitated by linguistic and 
communicative processes. As long as his hands are in his visual field, he maintains 
topokinetic control over them and can appear to gesture as automatically as someone with 
a fully intact body schema; but when his hands are not within visual proximity, this 
ability is lost. Thus, if the interpretations of phantoms and IW lend credence to the 
argument that the body schema is susceptible to manipulation or substitution, 
respectively, by the body image, the question concerning the nativity of the body schema 
mentioned earlier can be replaced by a the more relevant question having to do with 
plasticity and hard-wiredness. Just how malleable is the body schema? It would seem, 
regardless of its innateness or whether or not it is neurally locatable, that it must be 
somehow ‗more hardwired‘ than the body image, at least insofar as it is the means by 
which regular motor action is made possible and in most cases, it is prior to an explicit 
body image. However, it might make sense to think of both schema and image as being 
partially hardwired and partially ‗soft assembled.‘ If there are cases in which the schema 
can be shown to be malleable and likewise, if there are cases in which body image is 
arguably more hardwired than we might have guessed, these would be sufficient 
counterexamples to the claim that the one is more ‗innate‘ or prespecified than the other. 
In order to explore this option, I will look in further detail at the sense of ownership/sense 
of agency distinction as it occurs in abnormal, manipulated, and normal embodied 
actions. The aim is to show that how I experience myself as the owner and/or author of 
my actions as well as my body, is a function of both schematic and imagistic levels of 
awareness. If both of these can be shown to be equally composed of hardwired and 
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manipulable components, then it would seem that embodiment generally is soft 
assembled, constituted by biologically hardwired features as well as coalitions of tools, 
social roles, and interpersonal relationships. ‗The body,‘ albeit a necessary component of 
cognition, is essentially a self-organizing system, open to environmental influence, 
machine interfacing, and a vast array of soft-assemblages. Thus, while we might be able 
to say that there are facts about bodily systems or sub-systems that are ‗hard-wired,‘ the 
rigidity of this wiring seems to be contingent upon very specific developmental and 
environmental interactions. In other words, expose the body to very different stimuli and 
it will follow suit, changing and molding to its situation, thereby allowing for ‗rewiring.‘  
 The image/schema distinction however, is only part of the story. Embodiment is 
not just about schematic processes underpinning action and imagistic awareness of one‘s 
body for the purposes of manipulating it and acting with it. To be sure, in cases of 
abnormal embodiment like IW‘s we can clearly see a disruption of the former, which 
thereby forces the burden of executing actions onto the body image, a feature that, as we 
learn in normal everyday action, is not readily utilized for such purposes. But what is 
missing in this account is an understanding of the ‗executor‘ part of action. In other 
words, as an embodied subject, I also experience a sense of ownership of my body – it is 
mine and does not belong to any other subject – and a sense that ‗I‘ am the one causing 
the actions it performs. Unless external forces act upon me, I have a sense of agency over 
my body when I go to pick up an object, take a walk, or feed the cat.  
 In the cases we have looked at concerning abnormal embodiment, some or all of 
this sense that I am the executor of my actions is absent. Perhaps most salient among the 
cases is ALS, as the patients with this syndrome almost uniformly report not having 
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control over the alien limb. The alienation one experiences between themselves and their 
rogue limb might not just be an issue of control however; indeed, the hand might be so 
anarchic that if fails to be seen as a proper part of one‘s body. One can lose a sense of 
ownership of his or her body or its parts as well. Clearly, this is the case in 
somatoparaphrenic patients who literally denounce ownership of an extremity or limb. 
But, as Gallagher (2005) notes, ―sense of ownership does not require an explicit or 
observational consciousness of the body, an ideational, third-person stance in which I 
take my body as an object. Rather, it may depend on a non-observational access that I 
have to my actions, an access that is most commonly associated with a first-person 
relationship to myself‖ (29). Thus, in normal embodiment, we don‘t stop to question, as 
we go to pick up a glass of milk for instance, ‗is this my hand picking up this object?‘ It is 
simply that we have a reflexive and seamless relationship with ourselves, one that is 
typically unnoticed, automatic, and below the radar of conscious representation. 
 Much like Heidegger‘s hammer however, when the tool we are so accustomed to 
using breaks down, we can and do stop to reflect upon the relationship between ‗I‘ as the 
subject, author, and owner of all these bodily actions and ‗the body-object‘ that performs 
them. I like to think of my countless experiences as a ballet dancer trying to perfect a 
pirouette and exclaiming in frustration that I just could not seem to get my belly to stay in 
and my spine to be straight and that my arms were ‗in a world of their own.‘ Cases of 
dissociation such as these are fairly common, but they do not signal any sort of pathology 
or disorder in the way that an ALS or Möbius Syndrome patient would.  
 The pathological cases do however, highlight the ways in which ownership and 
agency are often highly conjoined experiential domains, but can also be teased apart. The 
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somatoparaphrenic might still feel as though she can control her limb, it is a result of its 
simply being attached to the rest of her body, but that the limb itself is not in fact her 
own. On the other hand, IW might have never lost the sense that he owned his body, but 
during the initial stages of his illness, he certainly lost all sense of agency over it. 
Gallagher suggests that such teasing apart of ownership and agency can also occur in 
normal embodiment when external forces are at work, such as in the case of someone 
knocking you down by surprise. If I get pushed by a reckless football fan at the game and 
go tumbling down the bleachers, I will certainly not think that I was the author of this 
fall, but, Gallagher suggests, it is still I who am falling. Again, the point is that while in 
extreme cases of dissociation, the feeling of lacking agency or ownership or both might 
be persistent and hence, pathological, in normal everyday embodied action, we rarely, if 
ever, experience this ‗dysphoria.‘ 
 The point of highlighting the ways in which agency and ownership can be 
disrupted in both pathological and non-pathological cases is to allow a space in which to 
ask the more pressing question: exactly what should we make of the phenomenological 
fact that ‗I‘ can sometimes be dissociated from ‗my‘ body? In other words, have we not 
simply spun our wheels describing and trying to understand all these bodily breakdowns 
only to come to the conclusion that the subjective accounts given by those experiencing 
them are simply at odds with a more objective or scientific understanding of 
embodiment? While it might seem that this is the case, another look at the levels at which 
dysphoria might be experienced indicates that the I-taking-myself-as-object seems to only 
occur reflectively. Consider as an example, someone with unilateral neglect. To be sure, 
upon speaking to a person with this condition, we learn that a sense of ownership is 
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missing, but, we might wonder, is this loss of ownership present all the time? If a person 
with unilateral neglect is walking down the street while talking to a friend and window 
shopping, the parts of the body otherwise neglected by the brain, are functioning 
normally insofar as they are instrumental to the task at hand. A person with this condition 
maintains agency over the disowned limb therefore at the pre-reflective level because, I 
submit, the body schema is functioning as usual. However, the body schema, given that it 
is inherently pre-reflective and non-imagistic, does not maintain ownership over one part 
of the body, while losing it over another. In what Sartre (1956) calls the pre-reflective 
unity of conscious experience, in other words, there are no divisions among parts of the 
body, or experiential axes such as owning and authoring. Once the dissociation occurs, 
we are already representing to ourselves the specific part or parts from which we feel 
detached. It is my contestation that this is the case for all bodily dysphorias – that they 
occur experientially at a body-imagistic and reflective level of awareness.  
 The point here is to demonstrate how often the scientific account of ‗bodies‘ is 
irrelevant in determining who and where we are. The pathological cases illustrate an 
extreme end of such unimportance but they shed light on the ways in which although 
normal embodiment is usually subtended by the mutual interdependence of schematic 
processes, ownership, agency, and a body image, even these can be disrupted in moments 
of reflection or in times of externally generated loss of control.  
 
3.6 Conclusion: Soft-Assembled Subjects 
 Another way to think about embodied subjectivity in light of the cases we have 
discussed is to compare the way ‗the body‘ is experienced in pathologic cases and the 
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way it shows up in manipulated experimental designs. One such example is the ‗Rubber 
Hand Illusion‘ in which participants have one hand occluded behind a curtain. Next to 
their hand, they also see a rubber hand or some such replica of a human hand. The 
experimenter will then stroke both hands simultaneously with a paintbrush while the 
participant stares at the rubber hand. The majority of persons in such experiments report 
feeling the sensation of the brushing in the spatial location of the rubber hand and not 
their actual biologically attached appendage. Thus, simply by cutting off the visual 
contiguity between ‗me‘ and a specific part of my body, external parts of the world that 
would otherwise not be part of my proprioceptive awareness become incorporated into 
my experience, so much so that I am convinced that where my experience is being felt is 
not even in my body. 
 What is striking about the Rubber Hand Illusion and others like it is that ‗where I 
am‘ is not totally about my actual biological body, but instead, this sense of self arises by 
the soft assemblage of my biological body, external props, and direct manipulation. 
Turning back to pathology for a moment, it is worth noting that in treating 
somatoparaphrenia, one preferred method is to place a mirror in between the two legs, 
with the one that is owned occluded from view, and then allowing patients to attempt to 
move their ‗owned‘ leg while looking in the mirror. The subject would move their 
unaffected leg and simultaneously see in the mirror, the unaffected leg appearing as the 
affected leg. This would then link the motor pattern and body schema to their conscious 
awareness of the leg as theirs (cf. Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). 
 Cognition involves thinking to be sure, but it also to a large extent, involves 
placing myself in space in relation to the rest of the world, a feat achieved not simply by 
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an introspective account of my ‗body,‘ but by a richly endowed embodied understanding 
of where that body is in space. Given our discussion so far concerning how malleable this 
embodiment can be, the intracranialists should be more concerned than ever. Pointing 
towards the body, or worse, the head, as the site of ‗cognitive subjectivity‘ is only one 
component among a whole array of other tools we employ in order to experience 
ourselves as agents, owners, and thinkers. If this chapter has not been compelling enough 
as to this soft assembly argument about cognition, then it might help to consider another 
important facet of embodiment that will most assuredly shape the way cognitive subjects 
are constituted. For all the claims that the new wave ‗embodied cognition‘ approaches, 
whether they be of the HEMC or the HOC variety, attempt to understand the ‗whole 
body‘ and how it ‗shapes the mind,‘ hardly any of these scientists or philosophers of 
mind have actually attempted to understand this entire organism to which they pay 
homage, in which they embed cognition, and on which they center ‗the mind.‘ Perhaps 
one of the most salient ways we can see embodiment actually molding mentality arises 
from biological sex and the gender roles that get attached to these categories. In my 
opinion, there is no better way to see the ways in which subjectivity is ‗soft assembled‘ 
than to peer into the construction of gender roles, sexual identity, and embodied 
sexuality. In the following chapter therefore, I aim to first argue that an account of 
embodied subjectivity not only must include sexed bodies as part of its story, but it must 
begin with them – indeed, a viable account of ‗having and being a body,‘ I will argue, is 
not possible without such a conceptualization. I will then go on to argue that the soft 
assemblage of gender, which is the very basis of subjectivity itself, is always already 
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constituted as a hybrid of biotechnological and sociological tools, none of which are 
reducible to nor contained solely within, the biological body. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Sexing Embodiment: The Phenomenology of Gender, Sex, and Sexuality 
 
The emotional, sexual, and psychological stereotyping of females begins when the doctor 
says, "It's a girl." – Shirley Chisholm 
 
Hence it is that the shape of something is especially meaningful. – James Gibson 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 As discussed in chapter one, an important shift in thinking occurred when Gibson 
(1954; 1979) introduced his theory of affordances. The ‗ecological approach‘ to 
perception, as it is often called, provided an interactionist framework that rejected the 
inner-outer split between mental and physical processes. The world shows up to us in 
meaningful ways insofar as it affords us a range of potential actions. However, our bodies 
themselves determine to a large extent just how useful an object in the world will be, a 
point Merleau-Ponty (1962) stressed well before Gibson‘s theory was fully codified. 
While there are marked differences between Gibson‘s and Merleau-Ponty‘s theories of 
perception, the overall picture is the same: perception is a feature of humans + their 
environments and cannot be conceived wholly ‗in‘ the human, as the standard view 
would have it.   
 Because, however, Merleau-Ponty is steeped in the traditions of Husserl, 
Heidegger, Scheler and others, he is less inclined to focus on the specific biological 
underpinnings of embodiment and more on the experiential elements that comprise 
interaction with the world.  In this regard, he employs the use of the ‗lived body‘ as a 
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means through which action and perception are possible. The lived body is not simply an 
‗organism‘ in which we can observe perception occurring. Like Gibson, Merleau-Ponty 
stresses that the dynamic interaction of our bodies with the world is what constitutes 
perception. Our environment plays a crucial role in shaping what we are able to perceive 
and what we can do, such as in the case of certain objects appearing ‗sittable‘ to us – in 
Gibson‘s terminology, they afford us sitting opportunities – while others, like cacti, do 
not. Perceiving these affordances requires interacting with the objects themselves and 
hence, perception is not a matter of inwardly cognizing an externally constituted world. 
Thus, both Merleau-Ponty and Gibson therefore emphasize the mutual interdependence 
between ‗us‘ and the world, albeit with slightly different aims. While Gibson tends to 
focus on the ways in which our physiology shapes our perception of the world – a world 
in which objects have significance for us based on their physical size, shape, and ‗fit‘ 
with our bodies – Merleau-Ponty extends this discussion to encompass not just the ways 
in which the body is lived through but how it can thought about. In particular, Merleau-
Ponty adds to the discussion the way we form images of our bodies, images which then 
come to be an important source of who and what we think we are.    
 These interactionist approaches fit nicely with the argument from chapter three, 
that embodiment, and not simply ‗the body,‘ is the proper starting point for grasping what 
cognition comprises on the one hand and what it is to be a cognitive subject on the other.  
Much like the ‗lived body‘ and its environmental affordances, the phrase ‗embodiment‘ is 
intended to capture the way that body+world should be the focal point of any theory of 
cognition and cognitive subjectivity. There are reasons to think that simply examining the 
brain, even when trying to determine the correlate of pathological embodiments such as 
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AHS, will not tell us much about what it‟s like to have this syndrome. Likewise, to talk 
about ‗the organism‘ is still only to discuss an object, whereas the ‗human subject‘ 
involves more than skin and skull. Nevertheless, there are important ways in which the 
body as a physical object delimits the range of experiences we can have. Indeed, Clark 
(2008) recognizes the necessity of the brain for cognition, as he is even willing to grant it 
a ‗central‘ role, and hence, there are certain biological facts about the body that must be 
true in order for the kinds of cognitive experiences we generally call ‗human‘ to take 
place. This chapter will therefore be an attempt to uncover some of the ways in which 
bodies – those physical organisms that I argued to be only part of the story of 
embodiment – shape cognition and help constitute subjectivity.  
 Rather than proceed by way of endless examples from vision, haptic perception, 
or skeletal construction, which provide rich accounts of the way the human body is said 
to constitute bodily affordances,
26
 I shall focus on an aspect of the body, as well as of 
embodiment, that is even more fundamental to cognition, but one that is systematically 
overlooked in cognitive science. To be sure, one can be an embodied subject and not 
have eyes with which to see. One can also be, like IW, lacking in particular 
proprioceptive abilities or perhaps, like someone suffering from a Hereditary Sensory 
Autonomic Pathology (HSAP), rendering them insensitive to pain, heat or cold.  The 
definition of being an embodied subject cannot be essentialized by reference to skeletal 
structure either. Being bipedal is a feature of most humans, but not all. And, as we have 
seen, even having all limbs intact is not sufficient for experiencing them as your own or 
                                                 
26
Besides of course, Gibson (1966), others have offered detailed accounts of the way the visual system (cf. 
Martinez-Conde, 2009), haptic perception (cf. Streri & Spelke, 1989), and the body generally (cf. Varela, 
Thompson, &Rosch, 1991; Noё & O‘Regan, 2001) shape the way the world shows up and likewise, the 
way our bodies are molded and adapted to the world. 
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maintaining control over each of them. There remains however, one element of ‗the 
body‘ as yet unconsidered, but one that is more essential than any other phenotypical trait 
thus far discussed. This facet is the sexed body and unlike ‗tall,‘ ‗fat,‘ ‗blind,‘ or 
‗athletic‘ bodies, the descriptors marking out which sex a body is are always already at 
play, even if precisely what that sex amounts to is questionable. Whenever I conceive of 
myself as this or that kind of person – a professor, a dancer, a swimmer – it is always 
implied that I am also female. I might not represent this fact to myself explicitly with 
every action I perform, much like I don‘t always represent my body generally to myself if 
I am engaged in an activity such as running, in which I need not think about my body; 
rather I simply act through it. Nevertheless, much like there is a tacit knowledge of where 
my body is in relationship to other objects, so too is there an always present awareness 
that I am not just person, but a female person. It is one of the most fundamental forms of 
identification and also one of the most universal. No matter which corner of the world or 
in what linguistic group you find yourself, checking a box for ‗M‘ or ‗F‘ is crucial to 
identifying who and what you are. For the most part, people can be classified as male or 
female, with rare exceptions, who are collectively termed ‗intersexed,‘ and this personal 
categorization is based on biological facts about the body – genitalia, chromosomes, 
hormones - but  just how much do these facts shape embodiment? To ask a slightly 
different yet related question: If there is a body schema, a program for action that 
underpins all embodiment, to what extent is this schema ‗sexed‘?  
It will be my contention that for the most part, biological sex is not an inherent 
feature of embodiment but is instead an artifact of science, which is itself a byproduct of 
sociocultural and historical context. This is not to suggest that there are not ‗female‘ and 
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‗male‘ bodies in the world, but just as it can be claimed that human ‗organism‘ is only 
one description, a biological understanding in particular, of the whole ‗person,‘ female 
and male bodies will only tell as a partial story about ‗gendered subjects.‘ While it will be 
a matter of contention to what extent sex, in the strictly biological sense is prior to, a 
result of, or reducible to gender – the way ‗I‘ show up to myself and the world as 
feminine, masculine, a hybridization of the two, or some other categorization – and vice 
versa, it will remain the case 1) that biological sex is only one among many facets of 
gendered subjectivity, and more generally, cognitive subjectivity, and 2) that both sex 
and gender have been relatively ignored in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, 
thereby overlooking several crucial constituting factors subtending cognition and 
embodied subjectivity In order to defend these claims, I will examine the ways that sexed 
bodies actually afford the subjects who own them specific actions, perceptions, and 
cognitions, but also, the ways in which the world and the objects present in it will show 
up differently based on sexual identification. Such descriptions will not however, come 
from the standard literature on cognition, as there really is not much from which to draw. 
Instead, I will turn to feminist theory about the body and embodiment in order to provide 
an account of these ‗gendered affordances.‘ In turn, by doing so, it will be my further 
claim that ‗the sexed body,‘ much like ‗the body‘ in general, can often be at odds with, is 
always insufficient for, and is never prior to gendered embodiment.  
 
4.2 Lived Bodies and Life-Worlds 
 That our bodies are important elements in the overall understanding of how the 
world shows up is deeply rooted in philosophical history. However, this idea is typically 
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founded upon the more negative assumption that the body is corruptive, and the senses, 
albeit the primary means by which we receive information about the world, are not to be 
trusted. One need only consider Plato‘s theory of the tripartite soul (cf. Republic, II-IV) 
or Descartes‘ infamous rejection of sensory knowledge in favor of ‗clear and distinct 
conception,‘ to get the gist.  Even the great empiricist, Hume, who thought all knowledge 
must originate in sensory experience, was quick to remind us that at best, we can hope to 
be fairly certain about the associations we draw from those sense impressions. What 
Hume did do however, was to remind us that despite the epistemological uncertainty 
which accompanies knowledge via sensory impressions, this source – the body – is our 
only mode of interaction with the world. Thus, according to Hume, any notion of 
disembodied egos or pure rationality detached from embodied experience was speculative 
but also uninteresting. If we want to uncover the basis of human knowledge and 
cognition, we must start, he claims, with sensory experience.  
 Consider, for example, what Husserl (1936) says of the life-world and how we 
‗arrive on the scene‘ ready to actively constitute ourselves and our environment in a 
shared ‗we-subjectivity:‘  
 In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as 
 coherent universe of existing objects, we, each ―I-the-man‖ and all of us together, 
 belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our 
 world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this ‗living 
 together.‘ [1936; 109]  
 
The universal condition of humanity remains that of ‗I-the-man‘ and so we should not 
expect any theories regarding bodies or embodiment to be concerned with sexual 
difference, as this would be somehow after-the-fact of ‗our‘ shared living together, in 
‗our‘ world.  
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 Merleau-Ponty (1962) makes some effort to account for ‗The Body in its Sexual 
Being,‘ when he claims that ―a handless or sexless man is as inconceivable as one 
without the power of thought‖ (170). In order to unpack this simply stated yet highly 
dense and problematic assertion, it is helpful to consider it in the context of the rest of the 
chapter. This section of A Vindication of the Rights of Women is full of insightful ways in 
which sexuality indeed molds cognition, but it fails to take properly into account the way 
that sex itself, the way a person is  identified biologically as female or male, provides a 
schema through which the world ‗shows up.‘ So, on the one hand, if Merleau-Ponty 
means to suggest that ‗having a hand‘ and ‗having a sex‘ are both necessary constituents 
of embodiment, he does very little to demonstrate how and why this might be the case. 
Sexuality, the way Merleau-Ponty uses it in this section, refers to some sort of 
conglomeration of gender identity and sexual orientation. Hence, he provides us with 
examples of sexual preference –   masculine males who also desire  feminine females, 
feminine females who prefer a masculine male, females who like other females, and so 
forth. And certainly, these sexual preferences will shape the way one perceives the world. 
Indeed, if I am a more masculine female but I still prefer masculine males as partners, 
one can only imagine the sorts of behaviors – from everything to my dress, the activities I 
engage in, ways I go about flirting and seducing the other sex, and so on – that are 
contingent upon the fact that I perceive myself as a more masculinized female than most 
other females, but that my sexual orientation still draws me to masculine males. 
Nevertheless, these complex and socially informed categories – gender and sexuality – 
are typically thought to be a level removed from ―sex‖ as a biological category. Thus, we 
never really get a sense that Merleau-Ponty is interested in asking the question: how does 
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the actual sexed body, prior to these gender roles and desires, inform perception, if at 
all? Nevertheless, a closer look at Merleau-Ponty‘s treatment of bodily signification 
might suggest that he means not to tease the two apart, such that when he does discuss the 
socially informed gender roles one might take up, he is at once describing the way the 
sexed body is given meaning.  
 To use ‗having a hand‘ as an analogy seems a bit of an odd similitude to draw, for 
surely, there are important ways in which having or not having a hand will alter the way 
the world appears, and Merleau-Ponty, much like Gibson, does not overlook this fact. 
The book is rife with examples of the body and its relationship to the world. In The 
Visible and the Invisible, we find a unique discussion of the hands in particular, and their 
ability to both touch and be touched – as in the case of touching one of my hands to the 
other – he is hyper-aware of the ways in which particular biological facts about our 
embodiment lend themselves to very specialized ways of knowing the world, but also our 
bodies. In a moment of touching one hand to another, there is a ―reversibility‖ of subject 
and object, which he describes as a ―veritable touching of the touch, when my right hand 
touches my left hand while it is palpating the things, where the 'touching subject' passes 
over to the rank of the touched‖ (1968; 133-4). In other words, what has come to be 
roughly termed ‗proprioception‘ – that sixth sense of where my body is ‗in the world‘ and 
where the parts of my body are in relation to one another, is highly malleable and 
contingent upon an ever shifting sense of agency and ownership of these discrete 
elements. In one moment, my hand-agent, the one doing the touching, can be turned into 
a hand-object, the one being touched. Likewise, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
there is reason to believe this sort of reversibility between subject and object of 
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perception occurs with tools as well, such as in the Rubber Hand Illusion or simply in 
everyday pre-reflective body-machine incorporation.  
 Nevertheless, we are still left wondering just how this ―necessary‖ element of 
embodiment – having a hand – is in any way like the necessity of having a sex. First, it 
should be noted that Merleau-Ponty fails to even consider those who are missing a hand 
or are missing both, either congenitally or due to amputation. Thus, we might wonder just 
how much does perception get shaped by having a hand? Moreover, despite the lengthy 
discussion of gender roles and sexual desire, there is no discussion of the ways in which 
the sexed body, qua necessary constituent of the human body, molds cognition. We do 
not find any sort of analogue between the highly interesting subject-object reversal made 
possible by the proprioception of the hands, nor are there any insights into the ways in 
which this necessary fact of human existence – that it is sexed – plays into gender roles 
and sexuality. So, on the one hand, it is satisfying to find a philosopher who recognizes 
that it is not just any body that is always already present to us in perception, but his or her 
body; on the other, it is quite unsatisfying that the analogy between necessarily having a 
hand and having a sex is never fully explained.  
 There is one way to interpret the passage however, that might help better relate it 
to Merleau-Ponty‘s overarching project, and simultaneously, to the project in which I am 
engaged. As the example of subject-object reversibility in touching the hands together 
suggests, I do not conceive of my hand necessarily as a subject nor as an object. What is 
necessary is that depending on the action, my hand can show up as either one. In the 
Phenomenology of Perception, likewise, we find this passage concerning the ‗having of‘ 
a body and its constituent parts:  
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 There is in human existence no unconditioned possession, and yet no fortuitous 
 attribute.  Human existence will force us to revise our usual notion of necessity 
 and contingence because it is the transformation of contingency into necessity by 
 the act of repetition [1962, 170].       
 
If necessity of bodily-having is only made so through repetition of otherwise contingent 
facets of embodiment, then we can begin to understand the ―impossibility‖ of conceiving 
a handless or sexless person as a fact not so much about the biological body itself, but 
instead, about the ways in which the body is utilized in action. Having hands becomes 
necessary through the repeated use of them in human activity, but they are indeed 
contingent, as not all persons have hands. In terms of sexed bodies, it is even more 
difficult to imagine a body without a sex and yet, the reason for this ‗necessary fact‘ 
about bodies is shows up as necessary through the constant repeating of gender roles, 
sexual desires and actions, and other socially sedimented truths about who and what 
males and females are. In other words, this particular reading of Merleau-Ponty on sex 
suddenly bears a strong resemblance to Butler‘s (1993) argument concerning 
performativity as the chief mode of production of sexed bodies. As she suggests in 
Bodies that Matter, the signification of bodies proceeds first by way of examining what 
bodies do – how they perform – and thus, the lived body is always cast as a man or a 
woman. The repeated performance in which we all engage as man or as woman – much 
like Merleau-Ponty‘s argument runs – allows for the ‗material reality‘ of the body to be 
cast as necessarily male or female.   
To be sure, my interpretation is reading quite a bit into Merleau-Ponty and when 
it comes to perception in general, all of the interesting differentiations he draws between 
maleness and femaleness seem to disappear. Namely, we get a story about perception qua 
human, as if all the differences in bodily comportment based on sex did not matter:  
 129 
 In perception we do not think the object and we do not think ourselves thinking it, 
 we are  given over to the object and we merge into this body which is better 
 informed than we are about the world [1962; 238]. 
 
The assumed universal humanity that merges into ‗this‘ body, supposedly contains 
wisdom of which even ‗we‘ are unaware. In fact, this is precisely how Merleau-Ponty 
characterizes his schema corporel, and what Gallagher (2005) translates as the body 
schema, both theorists suggesting that body-knowledge normally operates whether we 
consciously represent it to ourselves or not. For Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher alike, in 
most of our everyday actions, such as pouring ourselves a drink, or grasping an egg to 
make an omelet, our body ‗knows‘ all sorts of laws of physics and dynamics, such that 
when we go to explain how we were able to pick up the egg and use just the right amount 
of pressure to firmly grasp it and yet not crush it in our hands, unless we are in fact 
physicists, we usually cannot.  
 But is it true that regardless of sex, our bodies all know the same things? In other 
words, do ‗we‘ all have the same comportment to the world and does the world show up 
to ‗us‘ as ‗human bodies‘ in ways similar enough to discount sexual identity as any 
importantly formative aspect of that embodied perception? The answer to these questions 
is, I think, no. In the following section, I will explore arguments, some of which 
originated contemporaneously with Merleau-Ponty, that compel us to think that how ‗we‘ 
are sexed changes the way the world of objects affords us action and thus, how ‗we‘ think 
about and experience this world.  
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4.3 Girl Bodies 
 
 In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir (1949) provides a detailed account of the 
‗woman‘s situation,‘ paying particular attention to the ways in which women exist in a 
contradictory recognition of their humanity, on the one hand, and their objecthood, or 
being-for on the other hand. While western rational discourse tends to afford men the 
status of ‗pure reason‘ and a promise to transcend the confines of bodily immanence, 
Beauvoir argues that in particular, because of regulative bodily functions such as 
menstruation, women are never entirely free. Her body must be kept watch over, 
monitored, cleaned, and adorned – tasks that deter her from being a fully transcendent 
person. In other words, it is because of the sexed body itself that the norms of society, 
which place women in the home, with the children, and on a pedestal as an object of 
beauty, get constructed. Thus, Beauvoir contributes to an already emerging distinction – 
one that traces back at least to Mary Wollstonecraft
27
 and one that also surfaces in the 
literary works Virginia Woolf,
28
 Katherine Mansfield,
29
 and many more – between the 
sexed body and the gendered person.  Take, for example, what Wollstonecraft concludes 
at the end of her third chapter:  
 In the superior ranks of life how seldom do we meet with a man with superior 
 abilities or even common acquirements? The reason appears to me clear, the state 
 they are born in was an unnatural one. The human character has ever been formed 
 by the employments the individual, or class, pursues; and if the faculties are not 
 sharpened by necessity, they must remain obtuse [1792; 56]. 
 
                                                 
27
 A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 1792. 
28
 Most notably in Mrs. Dalloway (1925) is the tension between a woman‘s ‗nature‘ as a caregiver, mother, 
object of beauty, etc (as is the dominant theme of party-preparation, which comprises an entire day and 
subsequently the entire novel) and the author‘s own struggle to live the life of an intellectual, a tension 
presented in many ways throughout the novel, in particular, the shifting nomenclature of the protagonist 
from ‗Mrs. Dalloway‘ to ‗Clarissa.‘ See also A Room of One‟s Own (1929) and The Waves (1931). 
29
 Cf. The Garden Party, 1922. 
 131 
The idea here is that being born ‗male‘ does not imply that this nature includes with it 
superior intelligence or any other supreme achievement. Like any other faculty, 
intelligence must be acquired through learning, practice, and repetition, regardless of 
one‘s sex. It just so happens, according to Wollstonecraft, that women are not generally 
educated and as such, this socially contingent fact about one‘s role in society is 
transferred onto the body of all females as an inherent and necessary truth. There are of 
course, some interesting parallels with this account of necessity and that of Merleau-
Ponty‘s discussed above, namely, that it is through acting, over and over again, that the 
body and all its trappings begin to show up as necessarily implying this or that ability.  
 Likewise, Beauvoir teases apart sex and gender to expose the contingency of the 
latter concealed as a necessary outcome of the former. While being a female is a given, 
she claims, femininity or this ‗mysterious feminine essence‘ is entirely constructed, 
contingent, and not relegated to a particular body type by any ontological necessity. 
Nevertheless, it has historically been treated in precisely this way. Female bodies are 
passive, receptive, regulated by cycles, and less capable of performing strenuous tasks, 
and hence, female minds are incapable of robust existential freedom, that transcendence 
promised by rational contemplation by an intellect unfettered by such worldly constraints. 
If we try to dissolve the entailment between biological sex and gender roles however, 
then the distinction opens the door for invaluable reconfigurations of women‘s roles in 
society, from the home into the workplace. But, as Young (1980) points out, ―Beauvoir 
tends to create the impression that it is woman‘s anatomy and physiology as such that at 
least in part determine her unfree status‖ (29). This is because rather than focusing on the 
ways women actually move about, occupy, and live in the world, Beauvoir takes ‗the 
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female body‘ itself as the basis from which all limitations arise. While she tries to 
separate the one from the other – biological sex as the ‗given‘ and gender identity as 
constructed – Young argues that Beauvoir still insists that it is a feature of the female sex 
itself which gives rise to the common historical and societal understanding of gender 
roles and their relationship to it. 
 Like Young, I will eventually argue that the sexed body, as a static thing, is not 
enough to explain the seemingly asymmetrical lived experiences of men and women; 
rather, we must look to gender embodiment for this. Exploring gendered embodiment 
will thereby lead to the conclusion that unlike Beauvoir‘s original claim that the sexed 
body determines the unfree and factic nature of our lived experiences, it is often quite the 
other way around. Namely, the sexed body is much more an artifact of gendered 
experience and arguably does not even make sense outside of such considerations, much 
like ‗the organism‘ only makes sense within a web of scientific enquiry, social contracts 
concerning bodily boundaries, and an account of subjectivity that transcends those 
boundaries. Nevertheless, as is the case with ‗the body‘ generally, differently sexed 
bodies should afford us particular actions and perceptions to some degree, so it is worth 
exploring why Beauvoir and others postulated that the ‗giveneness‘ of these bodies 
should be so deterministic of their action potentials. 
 Young begins by examining the psychological literature about women‘s bodily 
comportment, noting specifically Straus‘ (1966) descriptions of girls‘ bodies as opposed 
to boys‘ bodies during activities such as throwing a ball. While the boy makes use of his 
whole body and extends towards the target, almost as if to travel with the ball himself, the 
girl simply swings her arm, leaving her spine, legs, and shoulders relatively still. Straus 
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goes on to claim that since these differences are observed at such an early age, there must 
be inherent anatomical discrepancies in female and male embodiment, such that girls are 
simply born bad throwers, while boys come equipped to play baseball. However, through 
extensive research, Young goes on to show that there are other bodily movements, 
postures, and attitudes that arrive on the scene much later in life, all of which are mainly 
attributed to feminine persons and female bodies, but none of which are necessarily the 
case, based solely on biological sex. For example, women tend to keep their legs close 
together or crossed when sitting, a posture little girls do not readily maintain. Likewise, 
while men move freely and openly, swinging their arms and walking with large strides, 
women tend to remain more closed into themselves, arms crossed over their bodies, 
books held into their chests, taking shorter, more careful steps. Young even cites a 
personal example from hiking with male companions; while they bounded across a 
stream, she hesitantly tested out certain stones, held onto branches, and calculated her 
movements. As she describes it, ―I do not believe it is easy for me, even though once I 
take a committed step I am across in a flash‖ (34). Here Young expounds on Beauvoir‘s 
original thesis: women experience their bodies as encumbrances, but moreover, we are 
taught to be afraid of getting hurt and as such, our actions will reflect such timidity.  
 To be sure, not all women fit this characterization, which is why it is easy to claim 
that we are taught and not born into our bodily postures and attitudes. What is more 
illuminating however, is that from this account of motility rather than from a strictly 
biological understanding of bodies, Young is at least able to begin bridging the gap 
between experiencing one‘s body ‗as an object‘ versus living through the body as a 
means to achieve desired actions. In other words, by focusing on actions themselves, we 
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can begin to give a robust phenomenology of Beauvoir‘s original intuition; namely that in 
performing tasks, women often must focus on their bodies as objects to be manipulated, 
fragile encumbrances, and a manifestation of their awkward immanence, while at the 
same time existing as human, as a free and knowing subject. Thus, women occupy the 
rather tenuous space between free and unfree, human and non-human.  A similar 
tension is present in Merleau-Ponty‘s account of embodiment generally. Although he was 
not as concerned about the differences between the sexes, save the few problematic 
passages discussed above, his account of intentionality as being rooted in embodiment 
provides thinkers like Young with a much more concrete phenomenological description 
of the way ‗the body‘ can be an object for me and at the same time can be a subject, one 
which is me. Compared to a Husserlian I-pole, wherein a relatively disembodied ego is 
always the subject of intentional consciousness or even Sartre‘s account of the ‗for itself‘ 
and the ‗in itself‘ – which describes consciousness, and not necessarily embodied 
consciousness, as both a possible intentional object but also the subject of intentionality
30
 
– Merleau-Ponty extends these discussions to encompass the body as both the subject and 
object of experience. As he asserts, perception emerges from the interrelatedness of 
situation and environment and not purely from a knowing subject. And as we have seen, 
his contemporary, Gibson, puts forth a similar thesis, namely, that while the body is 
important for determining the space of possible actions, the world is what affords us the 
ability to discern such action potentials. Likewise, the view of enactive perception (cf. 
Noё 2009; 2004; Noё & O‘Reagan, 2001; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991) seeks to 
                                                 
30
 Although Sartre is pays much more homage to the body as a constituting element of conscious 
experience. Nevertheless, we do not find such a robust account of the body-as-conscious and body-as-
object-of-consciousness as we do in Merleau-Ponty, nor do we find the extension of this experiencing 
subject into the world of objects, such as we find with the example of a blind man and his cane.  
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maintain Gibsonian currency by claiming that it is in the dynamic process of interacting 
with the world that perception arises. No example better characterizes the ramifications 
of these approaches than Merleau-Ponty‘s explication of a blind man using his cane to 
navigate through the world. In determining where to place his next step or surveying the 
terrain, the interface between the man and the world – the one that matters for the 
perceptual action that is – is not his hand, which is clutching the cane. Indeed, the cane, 
through which the man receives signals and perceptual cues and the end of which is 
actually the point of contact with the ‗world‘ the man is navigating, is the real interface. 
To put it another way, while the man is engaged actively in trying to find his way around, 
the cane is not an object-for his intentional consciousness; rather, it is a that-through-
which the world appears. This account of embodied cognition which allows for ‗the 
body‘ 1) to actively constitute cognition and 2) to encompass more than just the 
biological organism allows the further interpretation that the image I form of my body 
when I am in the mode of taking it as an object for me might very well depend upon what 
would, under other conditions, be considered ‗external to me.‘ However, Merleau-Ponty 
retains the Husserlian notion of presence-in-absence, even with respect to the body. Like 
any perceptual object, whose manifold of sides, aspects and profiles is always only 
partially given to us, the body is never entirely an object for me, as ―it is that by which 
there are objects. It is neither tangible nor visible as it is that which sees and touches‖ 
(92). While I can never escape my body and retreat into pure thought, I can also never 
have my body in its totality as an intentional object. Its presence to me consists partially 
in its absence – I am always confronted with what Noё (2009) has referred to recently as 
a ―presabsence.‖ Much like I can walk around a chair and try to see it in its entirety, but 
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fail to do so as the once visible sides retreat into invisibility while the others emerge into 
my visual field, so too will parts of my body elude me.   
 Returning to the discussion of gendered embodiment, on Merleau-Ponty‘s 
account, it would seem that all human existence, at least at some time or another, 
occupies that contradictory location between immanence and transcendence. At a 
fundamental phenomenological level, as described above, we are never entirely for 
ourselves, but our embodied subjectivity does transcend ‗the body‘ itself. Nevertheless, 
as Young (2005) ingeniously points out, by looking at the specific actions and social 
spheres that women occupy, the tension is perhaps felt stronger by women who are 
constantly expected to be both a subject and an object, rather than simply living through 
their bodies. Thus, in an action such as crossing a rocky stream during hiking, I 
experience an ambiguous transcendence – I must confront my own body as an object to 
manipulate while at the same time acting through my body as subject of the perceived 
action, an inhibited intentionality – the bodily ―I can‖ with which possibilities are opened 
up for me in the world, is often replaced with a ―I cannot,‖ (or an ―I should not,‖ or ―I 
can, but I have to really be careful about it‖) and a discontinuous unity – while being one 
unified subject, I must also take my feet as objects unto themselves, discontinuous from 
me in a sense, as I try to move myself over the treacherous terrain (35-38).  
 While I think extending Merleau-Ponty‘s phenomenology of embodiment into the 
realm of feminist theorizing about the body is a much needed and helpful endeavor, I 
want to suggest that Young‘s account is only the beginning of a successful and 
comprehensive story. Besides discussing the ways in which female embodiment is 
enacted in various motilities and postures, more needs to be said about the way the body 
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itself shows up to me, such that this last mode – discontinuous unity – is experienced. 
Young only hints at the ways I might represent my body both as a whole and as a 
collection of discrete parts, and I think this is because the focus has so far been too much 
on the ―Phenomenology‖ part of Merleau-Ponty‘s work, and not so much on the 
―Perception‖ aspect. I now turn to perceiving the body, namely in the form of the ―body 
image‖ in order to expound on Young‘s original project.  
 One way of accounting phenomenologically for the difference between growing 
up female and growing up male would be to appeal to the way the body itself is 
represented. The way I perceive my body during action is multi-dimensional; hence, 
many theorists from many different arenas have cashed in on explaining the various 
modes of body-representation. Merleau-Ponty‘s claim that knowledge of my body is 
always already a living through my body has its roots in psychological trends prior to his 
work.  Elizabeth Grosz (1994), for example, concisely traces Schilder‘s development of 
the ―body image‖ in order to show how it influenced Merleau-Ponty‘s conception of the 
‗lived body‘ as prior to the known body. Much like Merleau-Ponty, Schilder spends a 
significant amount of time discussing phantom limbs as a means to argue that the way we 
experience our bodies is often different than the objective accounts we give of them. 
Furthermore, the ‗image‘ I have of my body is not static and can change based on how I 
am living my body. To cite again Merleau-Ponty‘s example of a blind man incorporating 
a cane into his body-image such that the end of the cane and not the end of the man‘s 
hand is said to be the outer-limit of his embodiment, there is a similitude between this 
account and Schilder‘s idea that the body image can expand, contract, and can include 
‗objects‘ that would otherwise appear foreign to it, depending on the role those objects 
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play in a given action. The body image, for Schilder and Merleau-Ponty, is not an 
isolated representation of the body, but instead, as Grosz argues, is a postural schema of 
the body, its position and situation, and the environment. This is significant in terms of 
the differences in bodily comportment among various types of persons because, as she 
puts it:  
 The body image does not map a biological body onto a psychosocial domain, 
 providing a kind of translation of material into conceptual terms; rather it attests 
 to the necessary interconstituency of each for the other, the radical inseparability 
 of biological from psychical elements, the mutual dependence of the 
 psychological from the biological, and thus the intimate connection between the 
 question of sexual specificity and psychical identity [1994; 85].  
 
I think Grosz is correct to point out this important unifying element in bodily awareness 
and to suggest that it might provide the link between how my body is experienced both as 
an object for me and the subject of the actions in which I engage. Indeed, if neither my 
biological body nor my gendered psyche can solely constitute who I am, as both are 
modes of knowing my body and are always preceded by living through my body, then 
explaining the body image as a postural schema that situates me in a world, allows 
objects to show up at all for me, including my own body, seems like a plausible 
interpretation. Nevertheless, if we are to understand why I experience my body in the 
way Beauvoir describes it, as being overlain with immanence,  especially in actions 
requiring me to distance myself from my body, or in cases where I face the world with an 
―I cannot,‖ it might be rather hasty to conflate the notions of image and schema here. If it 
can be shown that for the most part, what is meant by body-image is still itself a mode of 
taking the body as an object for me, then perhaps the unifying modality is not imagistic at 
all, but is more kinesthetic, enacted, schematic.  
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 Given what was discussed in chapter three concerning Gallagher‘s definitions of 
the body image and body schema, I think there is good reason to take such empirical 
findings seriously in a phenomenology of sexed and gendered embodiment.  It is not 
enough however, to simply apply findings in cognitive science in order to embellish 
phenomenological descriptions. I intend to show as well that much of the phenomenology 
surrounding ‗the lived body,‘ is actually missing or largely overlooked in cognitive 
science and philosophy of mind. In particular, I think the differences described by 
feminist phenomenology between male and female embodiment add to the discussion 
present in Gallagher‘s body image/body schema distinction. Paying attention to these 
phenomena thereby opens up new ways of broaching the subject of ‗abnormal 
embodiment,‘ discussed in the previous chapter and if we go on to consider a case of 
‗abnormal gendered embodiment,‘ such as Gender Identity Disorder (GID), the 
distinction needed for dialogue between the two – phenomenology and cognitive science 
– will be ever more clear. Let us first recount Gallagher‘s distinction.  
 The conceptual distinction between body image and body schema is as follows: ―a 
body image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes and beliefs pertaining to one‘s 
own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system of sensory-motor capacities that 
function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring‖ (2005, 24). Of 
course, conceptual distinctions only go so far when trying to give a detailed description 
of actual embodiment, especially a phenomenology of the gendered body. Nonetheless, 
recalling Gallagher and Cole‘s rich account of IW, there is also empirical as well as 
phenomenological evidence to endorse such a distinction.  
 140 
 In terms of female and male embodiment then, the body image would include all 
the socially constructed norms of gender attached to the sexed body. As a ‗woman,‘ I 
might form an image of myself as embodied in a feminine way; for example, shorter, 
weaker, and more fatty than my male counterparts, which will thereby aid in my forming 
an ‗I cannot‘ attitude towards many tasks. To be sure, the ‗I cannot‘ attitude is 
experienced by men as well, and it is not a universally applicable attitude for all women. 
It should come as no shock that in traditionally masculine activities – including many 
sporting events and other physical activities such as automobile repair – women are less 
likely to feel at ease, while during activities traditionally conceived as feminine – 
childcare, perhaps, or knitting – men are less likely to be comfortable. Again, there are 
exceptions, but the majority of women are more concerned with their appearance, 
keeping themselves safe, and avoiding harm, and as such, will be more timid and 
awkward in a situation like the one Young describes of bounding across a rugged 
mountainous stream. These empirical facts themselves are not as interesting as are the 
modes by which they get constructed. Contrary to Straus‘ claims, it cannot be inherent in 
all female bodies that they are just bad at hiking. We are taught to keep clean, to adorn 
ourselves, and to avoid harm, while little boys are taught the opposite. All it takes to 
refute the Strausian hypothesis is to observe a woman raised as a ‗tomboy,‘ who can out-
perform her male competitors, to see that much, if not all, of the attitudes we take 
towards our embodied actions are learned. Even if we consider less robustly embodied 
activities, such as mathematical or scientific reasoning, types of thinking that until 
recently, have been dominated by men, we can see that if encouraged and properly 
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trained, women can do just as well at these activities they otherwise report being 
―naturally bad at.‖  
 The point of all this discussion is not simply to reiterate an already well-rehearsed 
argument that women and men are raised to value different things. Rather, what I want to 
highlight is that those very things women are taught to value help to ―cultivate 
immanence,‖ as Beauvoir puts it, while the traditionally masculine activities with which 
most men feel comfortable, tend to promote full subjectivity and transcendence. As 
Wollstonecraft, Woolf, and other proto-feminists note, the ability to be educated, to read, 
write, and participate in ‗the life of the mind,‘ has always been highly valued as a sign of 
fully actualized humanity, and these activities are those from which women have been 
traditionally excluded. What I want to add to this is that the very same promotion of 
subjectivity and transcendence is present in the construction of the man as the more 
physically adept and athletic of the two sexes. Being able to change your own oil, scale a 
cliff wall, or complete a triathlon have been linked to individualism, self-sufficiency, 
cleverness, and power, while, as many Marxist feminists (cf. Landry & McLean, 1993) 
have noted, housekeeping, childrearing, and other traditionally feminine activities are not. 
Thus, the  inhibited intentionality and ambiguous transcendence which accompany so 
many of women‘s attempts to engage in these activities, even today, as Young points out, 
suggests that there is still very much a sense in which ‗my body‘, as a female one, is 
incapable and disallowed the privileges of fully actualized subjectivity.    
 These examples take Gallagher‘s original notion beyond what he intended, but I 
am willing to defend them as corollary components in body image deployment. Gender 
might not always play a role in motility, but if it does, it most often is a function of a 
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body image and not a body schema.  It is malleable, subject to manipulation from 
without, and is often the product of social conditioning. This is not to say that the body 
image I have of myself as woman cannot alter my body schema; quite the contrary, as the 
examples I have discussed so far illustrate, if I have constructed an image of myself as 
fragile, in need of safe-keeping, or less physically capable than others, eventually, my 
body schema will follow suit. In other words, I will automatically act as if these 
contingent facts about my body image were necessary truths of my body schema. 
Conversely, if the schematic processes subtending an action are already a particular way, 
then the body image will alter based on the fluency of motion. We can think of IW here 
yet again – his schema was essentially non-existent and as such, his body image 
responded to the lack of motility and control by assuming some of the roles otherwise 
attributed to the body schema. Likewise, if I have a propensity toward a certain type of 
movement – for instance, if I have natural turn-out and flexibility, bodily traits which are 
necessary for ballet dancing – the resulting image I have of myself will be one of 
capability, but moreover, I will probably not use my body image as much as I would need 
to if the actions I was performing were unfamiliar, difficult, or, as in IW‘s case, nearly 
impossible.   
 There are two things worth noting concerning these examples of body image/body 
schema influence: first, while the two are easily dissociated conceptually, they are not 
always so easily dissociated at an experiential level. Perhaps the best evidence for such a 
claim comes from an embodied skill such as dancing. In particular, in ballet, body image 
plays a crucial role – as soon as I stop thinking about where my arms are or if my 
stomach muscles are engaged, I fall over – and yet, this imagistic representation of where 
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I am in space and what all the parts of my body are doing, begins to function almost 
schematically, as I improve my technique. Indeed, professional ballet dancers claim to 
not think about their bodies at all; however, if you ask them how they executed a specific 
movement, they resort back to an explanation that utilizes the body image just as much if 
not more than any automatic and unreflective schema. In more everyday examples, the 
same would seem to be true. Young‘s account of crossing a stream and feeling awkward 
is a case in which the body image might dominate, such that I conceive of myself as less 
athletic than my male friends and such already predisposed to awkwardness, but the fact 
that this conception of myself can interfere with the subconscious body schema and its 
processing suggests not two separate experiential realms, but rather two distinct levels of 
awareness, both of which are intimately intertwined, influencing and possibly interfering 
with the other, but also potentially working as a unified system. 
 Second, in discussing the way image informs schema and vice versa, we easily 
lose sight of the very concepts we set out to examine in relation to all of this, which was 
the role of the sexed and gendered body. This is because when I describe myself in 
action, I don‘t really utilize the concepts of female or feminine, so much as I do the 
concepts of ‗skilled,‘ ‗athletic,‘ ‗able-bodied,‘ ‗unable,‘ ‗awkward,‘ or ‗timid.‘ To be 
sure, I am tacitly aware at all times that I am a woman, and likewise, that my biological 
sex is female, but the extent to which this information alters my embodied action is not 
entirely clear. What is relatively clear is that in successful motor action, if I utilize an 
image of myself at all, it will be a positive one, and it should not matter what sex or 
gender I am. Conversely, if I feel awkward or timid when trying to climb a rock wall, I 
don‘t explicitly represent to myself the fact that I am a woman and this is why it is 
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difficult. I simply feel scared. I might later reflect that if only I were more like my male 
friends, I could climb more confidently, but it hardly seems that I do this in the middle of 
acting. What I do think is instead, ‗I can,‘ or ‗I cannot,‘ or maybe ‗I hope I can this time.‘ 
The superordinate categories of ‗masculine‘ and ‗feminine‘ that get attached to the ‗I can‘ 
and ‗I cannot‘ in various actions are therefore even more malleable than the body image 
itself. Women don‘t always have an ‗I cannot‘ attitude. Of course, there are skilled 
female athletes,  but there is also a vast array of traditionally feminine actions – applying 
cosmetics, walking in high-heels, cooking, and perhaps even flirting or specifically 
feminine modes of seduction – with which the women who are skilled at them are always 
in an ‗I can‘ mode of imagining. The fact that these actions are called feminine, while 
fixing a car engine, becoming a physics professor, or being muscular and athletic are 
most often conceived of as masculine, does not express a necessary contrast. However, as 
Merleau-Ponty notes, through repetition, these otherwise contingent facts become so 
ingrained and sedimented that they appear inevitable. One might wonder then, how a 
larger, socially agreed upon fact such as ‗women are just better at caring for children‘ 
becomes encoded in the form of an individual person‘s body image, and then is so 
rehearsed that it becomes an automatic and unreflective fact about the body schema.  As I 
stated earlier, it hardly seems to be the case that in any action, whether I am skilled at or 
not, I represent the fact that I am a woman to myself while attempting to perform the 
task. And yet, if the body image can and often is the product of social manipulation, 
perhaps syllogism – I am a woman, and women are good at X, therefore I am good at X – 
does become incorporated into my body image, which then can shape the pre-reflective 
body schema. Regardless if the answer to this question is affirmative or negative, what 
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remains is that the attachment of particular embodied skills to particular genders is itself 
contingent upon socio-historical context and power relations, among other things, in 
particular, the idea that whatever is masculine is to be praised and sought after, a 
connection which is itself built upon the construct of male-dominance.  
 The point of the above discussion is to highlight the tenuous nature of a ‗gendered 
body image.‘ On the one hand, to be a woman or a man always already implies a set of 
traits, abilities, and roles, all of which are contingent upon social context. Thus, to say 
that when I utilize a body image and that body image is this or that gender, what is meant 
more fundamentally, is that I can, cannot, should, should not, am really good at, am 
really terrible at, whatever action I am performing. Nevertheless, since the body image 
can always be altered, just as much as the social context from which it arose can change, 
all of these ‗truths‘ about the gendered body in action are really never essential and 
certainly not necessary.  
 What then, of the other concept I have been until now purposefully ignoring? 
How does biological sex, the part of who and what we are that appears, at least prima 
facie, to be a necessary truth about our bodies? While I have argued at length that any 
gendered body image we form of ourselves is the product of social construction, it 
remains to be discussed whether the physiological facts of our sex shape and change a 
person‘s body schema, and the extent to which biological sex figures into body image 
construction and utilization. In order to answer these questions however, what must first 
be examined is the relationship between ‗the gendered person‘ and ‗the sexed body.‘ As 
it turns out, the two are not as separable as they may seem, nor is it as easy as one may 
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think to define and delimit necessary and essential components of being a male or being 
a female, as these concepts will prove to be quite malleable themselves.  
 To begin therefore, we will need to ask to what extent the body schema is sexed – 
in other words, is there a pre-reflective motor program for males and females based on 
the biological differences of the body itself?   Most of the studies conducted by 
researchers such as Gallagher and Cole (1995)
31
 are only concerned with seemingly 
sexed-neutral general movements and usually those related to the arms, legs, and face. 
For instance, while there is a known case of deafferentation
32
 in a female subject, GL,
33
 
how her body shows up and is lived through in comparison to IW, has been relatively 
ignored. Likewise, the differences between female and male Möbius syndrome patients is 
not explored, although it would seem that facial expressions and emotion conveyance 
would be a fascinating place to look for differences that are potentially the result of a 
sexed schema.  Regarding phantoms, Gallagher (2005) does mention that research has 
shown that mastectomy patients often experience a phantom breast. Even phantom 
penises have been reported (cf. Gallagher, 2005; 151). Of course, these phenomena imply 
nothing about any innately sexed body schema, as we could just as easily explain the 
phantom sexual organs in terms of a learned process of assimilation. Women get 
accustomed to carrying around breasts after forty years of doing so, and when one or both 
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 See also: Gallagher, Cole, & McNeill, 2002, and Gallagher, 2001. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, deafferentation typically involves severe damage to the mylenated nerve 
fibers generally thought to be crucial for proprioception. In IW‘s case, the damage he incurred constituted a 
loss of proprioceptive awareness from the neck down, although he could still receive proprioceptive 
information. He just had no idea from where such information was coming.  
33
 In particular, see Cole & Paillard, 1995. GL‘s damage was more severe and as such, she was paralyzed 
from the chin down, rather than the just the neck. The only mention of difference between the two patients 
in terms of sex or gender is that IW‘s main concerns with rehabilitation centered on walking again and 
eventually going back to work, while GL was attempting to regain her ability to run a household and raise 
children, differences which, according to my characterization so far, would be gendered, and not the direct 
result of biological sex, per se.  
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are suddenly removed it is hardly surprising that phantoms are experienced. Also, 
considering the plasticity of the brain and body to incorporate new parts or learn to live 
without lost ones, arguments about innate ‗body parts‘ and their schematic representation 
can be easily deflated. But, as was suggested at the beginning of the chapter, it is an 
inherent feature of bodies that they be sexed, at least insofar as there are two distinct 
types of chromosomal, hormonal, and genital configurations to which nearly all humans 
fit one. The chief question thus remains: how, if at all, does this essential body-fact form 
part of the schematic processing subtending all embodied action, thereby potentially 
shaping body image and cognitive subjectivity more generally?  
 
4.4 Sexed Schemas? 
 According to Grosz and many other feminists, gender is constructed and therefore 
learned behavior, and although science would have us believe that biological sex is a 
given, much of recent feminist thought (cf. Lorber, 1992; Butler, 1990, 2004; Haraway, 
1989) rejects this, favoring instead, the idea that the sexed body is just as much a 
construct as is the gendered person. For instance, Judith Lorber (1992) argues that 
―bodies differ in many ways physiologically, but they are completely transformed by 
social practices to fit into the salient categories of a society, the most pervasive of which 
are ‗female‘ and ‗male,‘ ‗women‘ and ‗men‘‖ (569).  Arguments such as these typically 
run in the following way: 1) People tend to label as ‗masculine,‘ whatever traits we find 
to be dominating, active, strong, and virile and then we label those traits which are more 
submissive, passive, weak, and receptive as ‗feminine.‘ 2) Science then proceeds to 
confirm the hypothesis that there are two sexes by using, as a dual-assumption, a) that 
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there are only two genders, and b) that those two genders map isomorphically onto two 
biological sexes. 3) Science then discovers ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ chromosomes, hormones, 
and phenotypic traits and concludes that there must indeed be essentially two sexes. But, 
claims the critic, this reasoning assumes the very thing it is trying to prove and hence, it 
is unfounded. In other words, the presupposition that ‗male‘ and ‗female‘ denote the only 
two types of bodies that occur, which is itself based on the presupposition that ‗feminine‘ 
and ‗masculine‘ refer to an exhaustive categorization of gender, is flawed at the outset, 
since we are interested in learning whether or not it is essentially true of human beings 
that they must be either male or female. Anne Fausto-Sterling (1999) discusses the way 
brain science is conducted in precisely this way in a chapter of her book titled Sexing the 
Brain. Most of the studies attempting to discover essential differences between ‗male‘ 
and ‗female‘ brains, she claims, have put the cart before the horse insofar as the very 
discoveries that one hopes to make – namely, that there are two distinct brain types – are 
assumed at the outset and are built into the experimental methodology. Likewise, Nelly 
Oudshoorn (1994) tracks a similar story regarding the history of the ‗discovery‘ of the 
hormones, estrogen and progestin, wherein she describes the crucial role that gender 
norms played in locating ―agents of sex‖ – one passive, submissive, penetrable, the other, 
active, dominant, penetrating.  
 Another way to further illustrate the paradoxical nature of assuming that males 
and females and feminine and masculine roles 1) pick out natural kinds and 2) are 
essentially exhaustive is by way of a sort of reductio thought experiment. Suppose that 
there is a possible world, much like Putnam‘s (1968) Twin Earth, in which most of the 
facts that hold true in this actual world obtain in our possible world, call it GenEarth. On 
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GenEarth, however, sexual reproduction happens quite differently, insofar as there is a 
hermaphrodite-like sex who is capable of both inseminating herself and giving birth to 
new members of the species. Should she choose, she can be inseminated by the other sex, 
which would be much like the male sex as we know it here on Earth. Thus, reproduction 
can occur asexually or sexually and this all depends on the whims of the hermaphrodite 
sex. (It turns out that the worm species C. Elegans reproduces in precisely this way and 
so the thought experiment need not be so fanciful after all). 
 Now, given the nature of reproduction on GenEarth, what might we conjecture 
about the gender roles of the two types of persons found here? One response would be to 
assume that the inhibited intentionality, discontinuous unity, and ambiguous 
transcendence with which Beauvoir argues Earth women are subjected to based on their 
physical structure and biological sex would be experienced to a lesser degree, if they 
were experienced at all. Indeed, if the hermaphrodites on GenEarth were capable of 
producing sperm and eggs and thus, were the more powerful of the two sexes in terms of 
evolutionary necessity, then we should expect to find that they would have developed a 
more robust sense of autonomy, unified sense of self, and an overall ‗I can‘ 
phenomenology to accompany most actions. ‗I can‘ propagate my entire species all by 
myself seems to quite easily entail all sorts of other attitudes of capability regarding 
action. Furthermore, we might find out that because of the extra testosterone and 
androgen present, the hermaphrodites would have evolved to be just as strong if not 
stronger than their male counterparts. But if we were to make such assumptions, on what 
would they ultimately be grounded if not the fundamental fact that there are two naturally 
occurring kinds of persons on GenEarth and that we can identify these kinds of persons 
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based on the roles they perform, which are themselves products of the biological sex 
which they have? It would be undesirable to identify biological sex in this way because in 
order to prove that it is the substrate of all other identifications, we must rely on an 
assumption that it is the substrate of all other identifications.  
 The problem is best explained like so: On GenEarth, to believe that the 
hermaphrodites would be the more powerful of the sexes, or that they would be at least 
equals to the males, would be to tacitly agree that it is a universal fact that possessing 
traits such as strength, virility, motility, and freedom are valuable and moreover, that 
these are inherently masculine qualities. In other words, this assumption implies the 
corollary assumption that masculinity is a natural kind. But the original thesis was that 
biological sex, not gender identity, was fundamental and more naturally occurring kind of 
identification, while masculinity and femininity are constructed upon already existing 
biological roles and functions. And yet, do we not need the descriptions ‗masculine‘ and 
‗feminine‘ to even begin to understand what would count as a ‗male‘ biological function 
and a ‗female‘ one? Indeed it seems we must, and our GenEarth example only illustrates 
just how absurd it is to try to determine which comes first on our possible planet, the 
male-hermaphrodite biological distinction, or the masculine-feminine/masculine 
distinction. To understand the one, we need to assume the other is a natural kind and to 
understand the other, we must rely on the one being ‗given.‘ Thus, to further ask from 
whence these differences between the sexes arise, would be a non-starter because in order 
to even broach the topic of sexual difference, we must rely on gender difference, which is 
far from being shown to be inherent to the species, here on Earth, on GenEarth, or 
anywhere else.  
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 A particularly compelling reason to side with the constructionist view of sexed 
bodies stems from the real-world occurrence of intersex births. We need not fantasize of 
a ‗third‘ type of sex, as nearly one in every one hundred births does not fit the standards 
of scientifically determined sexual identity.
34
 Rather than accepting that we might have 
made a mistake in judging there to be only two naturally occurring sexes however, 
medical technology is often used to ‗discipline‘ these bodies that do not conform to the 
dual-sex model. Complications from invasive surgeries, psychological trauma, and social 
ostracism are often what follow from such stubborn insistence on scientific realism (cf. 
Foucault, 1980; Butler, 2004; Dreger, 1998) and such suffering is cause for those like 
Fausto-Sterling (1985, 2000) to argue for multiple sexes, rather than only two.  
 While intersex births provide good reason to question the supposed scientific fact 
that there are only two sexes, just because there are those for whom the appellations 
‗female‘ and ‗male‘ do not so easily apply entails that it impossible to have a ‗sexed 
schema.‘ To be sure, there might be more than two types of sexed schemas if there are 
such things at all, but if we assume for the moment that the majority of persons cluster 
around one of two identities defined chromosomally, hormonally, and genitally, then we 
might wonder if there is anything further that might divide these two types of persons 
along lines of motility, comportment, and proprioception. Straus obviously thought there 
must be, as he argued that girls were simply born less athletic, more timid, and weaker 
than boys. In fact, it seems to permeate a large part of the history of sexual oppression, or 
as Shirley Chisholm puts it, the fact that as soon as babies are born – or even prior to this 
when they are first identified via ultrasound, for example, and they are labeled ‗male‘ or 
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‗female,‘ they are immediately subject to stereotyping, and for females, this is often a 
negative labeling.  
 By drawing a parallel between the socially constructed ‗disability‘ associated with 
being born female and the disabilities associated with other bodily abnormalities, I am in 
no way attempting to equate femaleness with deafferentation, AHS, or any other extreme 
pathological embodiment. The idea is simply to consider that the duality of sexes is not 
simply an objective division of persons based on their material reality; it is often couched 
in such a way so as to place half of all humans in a category of ‗able to move about freely 
and capably‘ and the other half into the category ‗incapable of athletic dominance, 
strength, or agility.‘ It is worth discussing therefore, whether or not Gallagher intends for 
the body schema to be inherently sexed, such that some bodies and/or brains come 
predisposed to comport themselves in very different ways based on the physiological 
status. We have only just begun to see the difficulties inherent in trying to ‗schematize‘ 
experiential modes such as inhibited intentionality or discontinuous unity, as those seem 
to be highly contingent and learned; in other words, they occur at or are at least products 
of the body-image. In order to talk about the body-schema as being sexed therefore, we 
must seriously consider what such a thing would involve, without referencing anything 
gender-specific. From a purely biological standpoint, what would a sexed schema entail 
for proprioception, movement, agency, and ownership?  
 Considering IW again, his entire proprioceptive awareness was lost due to a 
specific neuropathology and thus, we should expect that if there were some part of the 
body schema that encoded what the biological sex of the body was, that it should also be 
capable of being disrupted or destroyed. In IW‘s case, as far as we know, he never 
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admitted to forgetting that he was indeed a male, but then again, we might wonder if this 
was all imagistic representation; he never ‗pictured himself‘ as anything other than a 
male, but did his brain, damaged so severely to the point that it forgot where its limbs 
were located in space, also ‗forget‘ that it was a male brain? There seem to be no 
experimental cues to determine whether or not the body schema encodes anything like 
biological sex because we have yet to find a specific neuropathology that knocks out the 
‗sex module‘ of the brain. Furthermore, it is difficult if not impossible to provide a list of 
criteria for determining how one might behave differently were their schemas to no 
longer be sexed without simultaneously referencing already gendered actions. For 
example, if IW‘s loss of body-schematic processes had also resulted in no longer having 
a sexed-schema, then if he began to move less freely, to experience himself as both an 
object to be manipulated and a subject of his own actions, or to approach tasks more with 
the ‗I cannot‘ attitude, we could say that his schema is no longer male. Indeed, all of 
these experiences were and continue to be to a large extent had by IW. Would it be 
correct to then say that his schema is now a female schema, simply because he is unable 
to move freely? Surely not, because then we would have to say that the body schema is so 
malleable that every time someone lacks a sense of agency over his or her body, they are 
undergoing a ‗sex change.‘ In other words, on such an account, the body schema would 
turn out to be, just like gendered norms of behavior, entirely socially constructed, which, 
as Gallagher has demonstrated quite convincingly, is not the case.  I think herein lies the 
true difficulty of assigning the schema any sex at all. As soon as we try to, we are already 
buying into the gender roles that define masculine and feminine motility and then trying 
to map those isomorphically onto biological sex, assuming that the schema somehow 
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already ‗knows,‘ simply by virtue of its being male or female, that it ought to be timid 
and clumsy or bold and agile.  
 So, suppose we dispense with talk of a sexed schema. Does this ultimately rule 
out the possibility of a ‗gendered schema?‘ It would seem really strange to talk about the 
body schema as knowing that it will be more passive, reticent, and careful as opposed to 
active, intrepid, and daring. For one, these categories of motility are hardly exclusive and 
exhaustive. It is not as if there are only two types of movement and comportment in the 
world. To believe so would be to ascribe the ultimate duality to the world. Not only are 
there two sexes and two genders, but moreover, there are two kinds of embodied action, 
and every body is either one or the other. Another problem with the gendered schema is 
that it would not so readily allow for change from one type of embodied action to the 
other. If your schema is hardwired to be ‗feminine‘ then it seems it would be really 
difficult to assume more masculine motility and yet, as we discussed earlier, this happens 
all the time. But most importantly, as the foregoing discussion has illustrated, one‘s 
identity as feminine and/or masculine does not necessarily imply that one possesses a 
particular set of bodily skills over another. The linkage between, for example, masculine 
and athletic, or feminine and graceful, is a byproduct of social contrivance. To be sure, 
the body schema is relatively fixed and one might be born with a natural propensity to be 
graceful, such as a ballet dancer who was born with long limbs and hip rotation, or a 
basketball player who is tall. But this fact in no way means one is born ‗a man‘ or ‗a 
woman.‘ Moreover, the body schema can change, for instance, as a child develops, as a 
person acquires automaticity and control over a movement that once was new and 
awkward, or, of course, when the schema is disrupted, as in the case of IW or GL. All of 
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these facts make it nearly impossible to speak of a gendered schema in any meaningful 
way, unless we want to entirely disrupt the original intent behind the concept.  
Nevertheless, I think if we consider more carefully what I will loosely term ‗Body 
Dysphorias‘ (BDs), we might begin to see that the idea of a gendered schema is not so 
easily dismissed. In the long run, I will reject the notion that gender roles and 
comportment are in any way pre-specified at the schematic level, but I want to spend 
some time discussing Gender Identity Disorder (GID) and Intersexed Embodiment (IE) 
on the one hand, and a whole other array of BDs on the other, for several reasons. 1) I 
will claim that although extreme, GID and IE remain on the same continuum of felt 
unheimlichkeit or dysphoria with one‘s body that constitutes bodily experience generally. 
2) In all these dysphoric experiences, the tendency, both by professionals and persons 
with the dysphoric experiences, is  to nativize or schematize complex social identities 
such as gender, sexuality, even athleticism and occupational identity and that this 
phenomenology is misguided. In order to make this second claim however, I will take 
seriously the experiences reported, in particular from GID and IE, namely that there is a 
gender the person with GID often feels as though he or she was ‗born with.‘ Likewise, as 
is evident in cases from IE, in which persons who are given corrective surgeries to force 
their bodies into one or the other sexual category, there are often reports of a mistake 
made, such that the ‗real me‘ is now trapped in this body made by medical science. These 
phenomenological accounts, along with a host of others, from tall people trapped in short 
people‘s bodies to athletic women trapped in big-breasted bodies, will be the focus of the 
next chapter. My aim is to argue that although people may feel as though they were born 
into this or that social role, even sexual identity is something highly constructed and 
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learned, and hence dysphoric experience with one‘s body and its place in society is just as 
much externally induced as it is internally driven.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Transgressed Binaries: Body Image and Subjectivity in Transgender Embodiment 
 
The ―third‖ is that which questions binary thinking and introduces crisis…The ―third‖ is 
a mode of articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility. Three puts in question 
the idea of one: of identity, self-sufficiency, self-knowledge. – Marjorie Garber  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 The preceding chapter began with a premise – that embodiment always shows up 
as sexed and gendered, even if only tacitly – and concluded with the argument that this 
fact about embodiment is never rigidly fixed, either in the form of a body image or a 
body schema, either as male or female, feminine or masculine. While the body image is 
much more highly susceptible to social conditioning and alteration than the body schema, 
even the schema is to some extent, malleable, as automatic and pre-reflective motor 
actions can and do change, are acquired, and even lost, as in cases of deafferentation such 
as Ian Waterman (IW). Furthermore, in terms of a sexed schema, the only way such a 
program for action could ever be described would be in terms of bodily comportment, 
movement, and actions that are already gendered – hence a ‗female schema‘ might be one 
that includes among its traits the ability to give birth,  being shorter, having less muscle 
mass, and so forth. And again, these actions are never inherently necessary simply 
because one is born a male or a female. Thus any talk of a sexed schema will, like the 
body image, admit to a degree of plasticity and learnability.  
 Nevertheless, there are at least two bodily experiences – Transgender (TG) and 
Intersexed Embodiment (IE) – that challenge the notion that body schemas have no 
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inherently ‗female‘ or ‗male‘ encodings. Someone who is born biologically male but who 
has identified with the female body and the feminine gender for as long as he/she can 
remember, or a person born with ambiguous sexual morphology, who is surgically altered 
at birth to fit one sex, but grows up identifying with the other – these are both instances in 
which the necessary nature of ‗having a sex‘ is plausibly not the result of learned 
behavior or socially internalized cues, but is rather an innate ‗sense‘ of who one truly is. 
As I suggested at the end of Chapter 4, I will examine the theories and phenomenological 
studies of TG and IE, but my intentions are themselves not strictly theoretical, nor purely 
phenomenological. As I have argued in previous chapters, in agreement with Gallagher 
and Zahavi (2008), complex phenomena such as cognition are best studied and 
understood from multiple vantage points. This is so when it comes to TG and IE as well. 
Accordingly I will examine these experiences from various theoretical and 
phenomenological vantage points, but will begin by looking chiefly at Queer Theory 
(QT). This is where we find the bulk of TG theory and IE discussion, and more 
importantly, QT  is itself at least partially a product of the lived and shared experiences of 
the transgender and intersex community. Through examining QT‘s appropriation, in 
particular, of the transsexual as a figure that subverts the traditional gender binary, my 
first claim will rest on the idea that by juxtaposing monstrous and natural bodies, QT runs 
the risk of replacing one binary for another. Namely, in dismantling the natural/non-
natural divide, it is often the case that a new dichotomy – that between the figurative and 
the literal – comes to stand in its place. As I intend to show however, this binary of 
figure/ground is no more necessary or ‗given‘ than any of the others of which QT seeks 
to subvert.   
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 While I will follow Jay Prosser‘s (1998) critique of QT to some degree, insofar as 
I think he reveals important oversights, such as the one just mentioned, I will diverge 
from his account slightly when it comes to characterizing the role of body image in the 
formation of transsexual subjectivity. Whereas QT tends to cast how one imagines and 
thus identifies oneself – as part of this or that group, for example – mostly, if not entirely, 
as a product of power and socially constructed and enforced norms, Prosser attempts to 
reclaim the body image of the transsexual as prior to the socio-medico-technological 
practices that inconsistently act as the ―cure‖ of a pre-existing disorder while at the same 
time functioning as the creator of this disorder. Both QT and Prosser extend the concept 
of ‗the body‘ beyond its typical referent – i.e. the human organism – and hence how the 
body is thought or imagined never refers strictly to a biological or material entity that is 
prior to medico-scientific discourse. Whereas a queer theorist such as Butler (1990), for 
instance, will argue that the concept of ‗the body‘ never simply refers to a material reality 
independent of discursive practice, Prosser on the other hand, attempts to reclaim some of 
the literality of ‗the body‘ as a concept. By considering the way bodies are imagined in 
narratives and lived experiences of trans persons, he avoids an overly deconstructive 
view of ‗the body,‘ insofar as for Prosser, what this concept refers to remains importantly 
rooted in the material reality of the flesh. This grounding, I argue, is lacking in QT. 
However, Prosser‘s amended account tends to characterize the body image as somehow 
independent of all external influence, independent from even the body itself. This aspect 
of Prosser‘s work sidesteps the question of ‗sexed schema‘ and in its place, offers a 
‗hardwired image‘ one that I find implausible. Prosser‘s account overlooks an invaluable 
contribution made by QT – the deconstruction of the naturalness of the gender binary. In 
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the end, I argue, neither a body image prior to technology nor a hardwired sexed schema 
are plausible. Although body schemas, as we have seen in Chapter 4, are more fixed and 
less influenced by sociotechnological practices than body images, it is quite plausible that 
this is a matter of degree, and that the two systems – the schematic and the imagistic – 
mutually inform, influence, and shape each other.  And, as it turns out, any notion of a 
sexed schema is itself a byproduct of the socio-medical discourse that would have us 
believe, like Straus (1966), that the way little girls and little boys comport themselves to 
the world is already worked out in a complex pattern of motor behavior somewhere in the 
brain. Thus, a sexed or gendered body image that is prior to technology and what I will 
call ‗sociotechnological hybridity‘ is, I will further argue, even more ‗unimaginable‘ than 
a sexed schema.    
 Several methodological and conceptual clarifications are in order before I begin, 
however. First, although I am interested in recounting the role of body image in shaping 
the embodiment of transgendered and interesexed persons and thus will discuss them 
both throughout the chapter, my focus will be more on transgender. First, there is an 
entire theoretical movement, Transgender Studies, devoted to such investigations, and so, 
I not only have an abundantly rich resource for personal narratives, but as well, there is a 
large group of transgendered scholars who offer both theoretical and first-person 
accounts of their experiences. Second, some terminological distinctions: I will use the 
term transgender to refer to a consistent queering of accepted gender norms, such as 
persistent cross-dressing or cross-gendering, or a continual feeling of ‗not-being-at-home-
with‘ the body and the embodiment of that gender. Hence, transvestite denotes a 
particular type of transgendering, namely, a cross-dresser. The term transsexual refers to 
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a person who identifies with another sex and hence, this term applies more at the 
anatomical level. In other words, a transsexual might feel genuinely female, despite male 
physiology, and while not all transsexuals who identify with the opposite sex will seek 
sexual reassignment surgery or any other bodily modification, persons who do seek such 
bodily changes can be characterized as transsexual.  This term, the way I am using it, is 
broad enough to encompass those who are ―pre-op,‖ mid-transition, and ―post-op‖ and it 
does not limit itself to persons who have had the full surgery or any surgery at all. Simply 
feeling as though one has the wrong ‗parts‘ as it were, suffices for inclusion in this 
category.  The term cissexual, on the other hand, is used to denote a person who is non-
trans in any way; someone who is comfortable in their own skin, has never questioned 
what gender he or she truly is, and who does not have problems with the roles he or she is 
expected to perform is ‗cissexual.‘ All of these terminological distinctions are founded in 
trans literature (cf. Stryker & Whittle, 2006; Shepherdson, 2006; Serano, 2007).  I also 
recognize the discrepancies inherent in utilizing a particular taxonomy to generalize over 
lived experiences. To this end, I will take special care to address such concerns, and will 
even aim at a phenomenology of individual experience that is ambivalent to the 
particulars of these terms.   
 
 
5.2  Inner Selves, Outer Bodies, and the Construction of a Disorder 
 
 Prior to detailed phenomenological descriptions, which I will mostly glean from 
trans- and intersexed narratives, and without examining the theoretical and historical 
frameworks from which these phenomena are typically thought, it is easy to take a 
cursory glance at the experiences, generalize over the superficial ‗data,‘ and reach the 
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conclusion that anyone suffering from Gender Identity Disorder (GID) has the sense of 
being ‗trapped in the wrong body‘ – his or her ‗true self‘ ensconced within a flesh that is 
foreign and unwanted. Furthermore, a quick survey of the way gender reassignment 
surgery is allotted reveals that most persons awarded ‗new bodies‘ have to have 
sufficiently demonstrated that they have felt this dissociation for as long as they can 
remember (cf. Hale, 2007; Spade, 2006). Given this totalizing picture of all trans 
embodiment, it is therefore not a huge leap to make the assumption that there must be 
some element of sexual (or gender) identity that is 1) independent of the specifics of 
one‘s particular body and 2) prior to social influence. In other words, we might say that 
GID involves forming a body image of oneself that does not correspond in any 
meaningful way to the body schema; a body image that has arisen without making use of 
said schema. Or, we might characterize the experience as suggestive of an innate, 
hardwired, and pre-social facet of embodiment that cannot be fully realized due to the 
actual material substance in which it is housed – namely, the ‗opposite‘ sexed body. 
Either way, the phenomena of cross-dressing, seeking sexual reassignment surgery, and 
even committing suicide in response to GID can at first appear as though what is really 
being experienced is some sort of disembodied self, or an ‗inner self‘ that is independent 
of the outer body and is trapped within its confines. Put differently, we might conjecture, 
based on trans phenomenology, that we all have sexed schemas after all, some of which 
are not aligned with our imagistic ‗genders.‘ A brief look at the history of transgender 
reveals that there has not always been a consensus regarding the phenomenon and, 
fascinatingly, the thinking has shifted from radical materialism concerning sex and 
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gender, to a psychologism that more closely reflects a substance dualistic view of the 
mind/self versus the body. 
 The reason such conjectures about the nature of transgender and transsexualism 
are so easy to make stems, in part perhaps from the relatively scarce amount of 
scholarship devoted to it. More importantly, the larger culture typically consumes the 
medicalized, psychologized, and overly generalized accounts, as they are presented in 
popular media. For example, the movie, Transamerica, which although it was an 
independent film was nominated for two Oscars and so far has been one of the few films 
about a trans person to reach so many viewers, tells the story of a road trip taken together 
with a pre-op MTF and her son, who is unaware that he is riding cross-country with his 
father-soon-to-be-woman. While the plot is innocuous enough, the depiction of the main 
character, Bree, helps to further the notion that what is really at stake for transsexuals is 
that their ‗outer bodies‘ match their inner selves and in this particular movie, Bree‘s 
desire to link the two is portrayed via a hyperbolic obsession with appearance, in 
particular, appearing feminine. To be sure, putting forth a feminine image is important to 
many transsexuals and transgendered persons alike, but certainly not all of them, and 
certainly not to the degree with which Bree was preoccupied. Julia Serano (2007), for 
instance, has claimed that portrayals such as Bree in Transamerica work to maintain two 
negative images. First, the stereotype of trans persons as only concerned with superficial 
gender appearances – makeup, voice, clothing, etc – which thereby effectively erases 
nuanced differences in the phenomenology of transsexualism, transgenderism, 
transvestitism. Second, by portraying women in general in this way – i.e. as obsessed 
with appearance – the depiction of females, including all MTF trans persons, as objects of 
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sexual desire is reinforced. Serano‘s assessment is certainly debatable, but what is less 
objectionable is that films such as Transamerica, which often serve as the only insight 
into trans-lives thatcissexual and mainstream culture receive, should be scrutinized so as 
to determine what those images are that are being consumed. Along with Serano, I agree 
that if this is all the exposure most people will get to transsexualism, transgenderism, and 
the like, then the overly simplified account of ‗real soul/self trapped in wrong body‘ as 
applicable to all of these various modes of trans-experience is what will be thought by the 
viewers. Again, this overlooks the differences among individual lives, and serves to 
bolster the claims already made by psychology and medical science regarding ‗the‘ trans 
experience.  
 Regarding medicalized and psychologized accounts, they have worked to 
establish the idea that what is essential to trans experience is a desire to ‗cross over‘ to 
the ‗opposite‘ sex or gender, a desire which of course implies that each of us has a solid 
notion of what it means and what it feels like to be that other gender, let alone, that there 
are only two from which to choose. As Prosser (1998) points out, even in 1864, the year 
that one of the first cases of ―inversion‖ was recorded, medical science was the dominant 
authority and source of information. That is, prior even to the coining of the terms 
―transgender‖ or ―transsexual,‖ and prior to the availability of any surgical intervention, 
narratives of ―inverts,‖ as they were called, ―appear to offer up the very stuff of 
transsexuality: the expression of being differently gendered; the recounting of a plot that 
pulls toward being the other sex; even sometimes the articulated desire to change sex‖ 
(140). Likewise, some of the first genuine attempts to materially alter sex – a double 
mastectomy obtained by a woman to masculinize ‗her‘ body, or an even more obscure 
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record of genital masculinization in 1882
35
 - were recorded by Magnus Hirschfield, a 
prominent sexologist. Although openly homosexual and an avid defender of gay rights, 
Hirschfield was not equipped with the nuances of the sex-gender distinction, nor was 
there anything like queer theory, postmodernism, and the like, for him to follow, given 
that he predates such movements by several decades. As such, his accounts remain first 
and foremost, biological.  Like his contemporaries (cf. Ellis, 190; Krafft-Ebing, 1886), 
whose accounts also have an air of biological essentialism to them,  he sought to diagnose 
―inversion‖ via somatic markers – deep voice, manly gait, and small breasts, for example, 
as Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1886) proclaimed, ―makes the impression of a man in 
woman‘s clothes‖ (410). The driving force behind these proto-trans accounts was the 
hope that the bodies of the patients themselves would reveal their own narratives. Much 
like the story of Herculine Barbin (Foucault, 1980), a French hermaphrodite who spent 
the first twenty years of her life as a woman but was later discovered to have masculine 
genitalia, and was then forced to live life as a man, the biological body represents the sin 
qua non for both sex and gender. The notion that one‘s gender might supersede the 
somatic markers of genitalia, hormones, and secondary sexual characteristics such as 
hair, muscles and breasts, was not considered at these early stages. Hence, stories like 
Herculine‘s are at once tragic – she committed suicide as a result of never fully 
assimilating to the newly prescribed gender – but are also indicative, quite interestingly, 
of an early somatic essentialism – i.e. the belief that when it comes to identifying a 
gendered ‗self,‘ one need only look to the materiality of the body.   
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 How then do the more familiar narratives of a ‗true self‘ trapped in the ‗wrong 
body‘ emerge? Elizabeth Loeb (2008) traces the legal history surrounding corporeal 
practices in the early 1900s and the concomitant drive in psychology to catalogue an 
array of mental ‗perversions‘ in order to suggest that body modification practices 
generally, including sexual reassignment surgery, soon came to be markers of 
psychological disorders, due at least in part, she claims, to ―the arrival of Freud, Valium, 
and postwar trauma in U.S. fashion.‖ What was once seen as ―property damage‖ – a 
solider purposefully amputating his leg so as to escape the war, e.g. – became ―firmly 
established within law, medicine, and psychiatry as evidence of ―gender identity 
disorder‖ or ―body dysmorphic disorder‖ or ―body integrity disorder‖‖ (51).36 In other 
words, the attempt to alter one‘s body for the sake of gender or any other ‗deviant‘ 
reason, such as elective amputations, by the mid 1900‘s began to be seen as a 
manifestation of a disordered psyche. It is not surprising therefore, that medical practices 
concerning transgender, in particular, the guide for those practices, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM) for psychiatry, began to characterize the phenomenon as a 
mismatching between one‘s self and one‘s body. Despite the historical contingency and 
social malleability of the gender roles that characterize the ‗inversions,‘ which the DSM 
IV labels as ‗disorders‘ – boys with GID, for example, ―enjoy playing house, drawing 
pictures of beautiful girls and princesses…avoid rough-and-tumble play and competitive 
sports, and have little interest in cars or trucks‖ – psychology and psychiatry treats the 
symptoms as arising solely from within the subject, as if the dominant social norms 
which police count as suitably female and male have nothing to do with the behavior 
                                                 
36
 See also: Spade, 2003; Yates, 1961; Roman, 2006 
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showing up as ‗abnormal.‘  It is, as Spade (2006) puts it, ―in the minds of the ill that 
gender problems exist, not in the construction of what is healthy‖ (319).  
  In a similar vein, the autobiographical narratives of persons seeking sexual 
reassignment surgery reflect the idea that ‗gender‘ as an identifying category is 
psychological, or is at least irreducible to the strictly biological body. Catherine Millot 
(1991) recounts that many of the trans-patients she has spoken with feel as if their ―true 
self‖ or ―true identity‖ had no ―body‖ to call its own. Raymond Thompson, a female-to-
male transsexual, describes his experience as being comprised of two bodies, an inner 
and an outer. Although Thompson does not necessarily evoke a disembodied and 
immaterial self trapped within a material body, his two-body identity remains consistent 
with the notion that there is some aspect of gender identity that escapes the narrative told 
simply by the fleshy, outer body. To quote his narrative at length: 
 I needed to be out of my body, to be free. It felt as if my ―inner body‖ was forcing 
 itself to the ends of my limbs. It was growing ever larger inside of me, making 
 me feel I was bursting at the seams and wanting out…out…out!  Because this was 
 impossible, this process would abruptly reverse and I would start to shrink inside 
 myself. My whole inner body shrank until I became very small inside. It was as if 
 I became so small I had to find some safe place to hide inside myself. My tiny 
 inner body was in unfamiliar surroundings, in a place it didn‘t belong and I felt 
 utterly unsafe. I became like a little shadow inside my physical body, a shadow 
 running around everywhere trying to find somewhere inside [Thompson & 
 Sewell, 1995, 200]. 
 
In some sense, Thompson‘s narrative echoes accounts given by persons with some of the 
bodily pathologies discussed in chapter three; for example, patients with Möbius 
syndrome who characterize their ‗true emotions‘ as being locked away behind their 
emotionless faces (Cole, 2008), or patients with misoplegia, who often seek amputative 
surgery to match the image they have of themselves ‗inside‘ to the ‗outside‘ of their 
bodies. Thompson even goes on to describe unexplained blisters that form on his face as 
 168 
manifestations of his ―internal stress,‖ which resonates with all sorts of attempts to link 
inner psyche with outer soma, from biblical correlations between leprosy and ‗inner 
demons‘ (cf. Leviticus 13; Matthew 10:8), to the current trends in plastic surgery to allow 
one‘s inner beauty to be expressed more fully as outer beauty. As Kukla (2008) recounts, 
even the case of the ―snaggletooth killer‖ depicts what she terms a ―phrenological 
impulse‖ that persists today, despite the downfall of phrenology itself, or the ideal that 
outer bodily morphology indicates inner charactereological traits. Ray Krone, as he was 
officially named, was wrongfully convicted of murder due to the ‗snaggletooth marks‘ 
found on the victims which matched his dental patterns. After DNA testing proved that 
Mr. Krone was not in fact the murderer, he sought reconstructive dental surgery, so that 
he would no longer be conceived of as a killer. As a blog from a friend remarks, post-
surgery, ―I just saw Ray on Extreme Makeover and he looks great. Now his outer beauty 
matches his inner beauty.‖  
 Prosser (1998) claims that narratives such as these, in which an inner self or body 
is felt to be ―pushing out‖ and demanding external embodiment, suggest the re-
materialization of the psychological phenomenon of dissociation. By looking at the 
―skin,‖ he claims, we can find the connective surface that binds together psychical and 
physical, inner and outer. As Anzieu‘s (1974) Skin Ego argues, the body‘s surface is that 
which most robustly constitutes the self – the body‘s physical skin is how ‗we‘ relate to 
the world, in proprioception, in the sensations we derive from it, and in its unique 
position as a ‗border‘ between that which is inside and that which is outside. Thus, 
Prosser takes Anzieu‘s ―skin ego,‖ which he sees as a literal rendering of Freud‘s 
―surface‖ – that which the ego projects – and argues that the skin is the ―pivotal 
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connective surface‖ which explains how the ―trope of being trapped in the wrong body 
can be materialized.‖ In other words, the skin provides the ―mechanics of this 
catachresis‖ (71). For Thompson, and for other transsexuals therefore, it is often not 
enough to simply restructure the material body, surgically or otherwise, nor is it sufficient 
to cross-dress and cross-gender without bodily modification. This skin, as it represents 
both Thompson‘s inner and outer ‗bodies‘ must project his true nature, both in its 
reception by society, but also as he himself recognizes it as part of that true nature. 
Hence, before his surgery, he speaks of ―detaching‖ himself from his body so as not to 
have to notice those parts of its projected surface that were hindering expression of who 
he truly believed himself to be. 
 This rather lengthy digression about Thompson‘s transformation illustrates two 
things. First, the autobiographical narratives of trans-persons are much more complex 
than the medical literature would have us believe. To obtain surgery, at least in the U.S. 
and Canada, it is required that prospective candidates demonstrate an unheimlichkeit, 
first, by being diagnosed as ‗disordered‘ and then by demonstrating that ―living like the 
opposite sex,‖ is actually healthier for them – in other words, that they are ‗at home with‘ 
the opposing gender roles and norms they have adopted. (Millot, 1991). In a real sense, 
therefore, they must ―pass‖ as the desired gender, even prior to the surgery itself (Spade, 
2003; Prosser, 1998). But according to Thompson, this is impossible so long as his skin 
ego is mismatched. Hence, the psychiatric demands made by the ―gatekeepers‖ of 
reassignment surgery might turn out to be impossible to meet, not to mention founded on 
a lack of understanding of the complex phenomenology surrounding trans-experience. 
Second, by insisting that we have a ―master narrative‖ for GID, the DSM overlooks 
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differences among individual persons who are gender variant. Unsurprisingly therefore, 
as Spade (2006) points out, the distinction between a ‗normal‘ child who is simply a 
‗sissy‘ or a ‗tomboy‘ and an ‗abnormal‘ child who has genuine GID, is murky. Covering 
over specific differences among narratives in the name of a unified science of gender 
identity is not only personally harmful to the patients seeking to finally live in a ‗skin of 
their own.‘ It is also damaging to the culture at large, who, rather than actively learning 
about the lives of transgendered persons by reading such a vast array of autobiographies 
and actually meeting and talking to persons in the transgendered community, are satisfied 
with the superficially scientific reductive explanation of gender deviance provided by the 
DSM, which is then filtered through mainstream media such as news stories, Hollywood 
sitcoms, or movies. As Sandy Stone (2006) claims of this erasure, ―polyvocalities of lived 
experience, never present in the discourse, but present at least in potential disappear;‖ this 
involves a covering over in which ―both the transsexual and the 
medicolegal/psychological establishment are complicit‖ and one that ―forecloses the 
possibility of a life grounded in the intertextual possibilities of the transsexual body‖ 
(231). In order to make sense of how reclaiming the intertextualized transgender body – 
that is, a body that is not reducible to medico-scientific discourse, nor simply the product 
of it – might afford the transgender community a better voice in the construction of their 
social identities, a closer look into the theoretical framework that has dominated the 
relatively brief history of what is now known as Transgender Studies will be necessary. 
This will not only allow for a more diverse rendering of trans embodiment, but such a 
reclamation might also open up a new theoretical space for understanding, both by 
scholars and by the culture at large, an understanding that does not cover over differences 
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or autobiographical narratives, but instead incorporates them into its ‗body of 
knowledge.‘   I will now turn to the intimately interwoven pair that is Queer Theory and 
Transgender Studies, examine the former‘s reliance on the latter for its prominent 
‗figure,‘ and eventually discuss this coupling in terms of our larger task, which is 
approaching a more comprehensive understanding of cognition and embodied 
subjectivity generally.  
 
5.3  Queer Theory and the ‘Figure’ of the Transgender Body   
 
 In the introduction to The Transgender Studies Reader (2006), Susan Stryker 
provides a definition of Transgender Studies, which is: 
 
 A field that claims as its purview transexuality and cross-dressing, some aspects 
 of intersexuality and homosexuality, cross-cultural and historical investigations of 
 human  gender diversity, myriad specific subcultural expressions of ―gender 
 atypicality,‖ theories of sexed embodiment and subjective gender identity 
 development, law and public policy related to the regulation of gender expression, 
 and many other similar issues [3].  
 
This is a considerably broad categorization and it becomes even more extensive if we 
consider what the co-editor to this volume, Stephen Whittle, says in his foreword about 
the denotation of ‗transgender‘ as encompassing:  
 
 Discomfort with role expectations, being queer, occasional or more frequent 
 cross-dressing, permanent cross-dressing and cross-gender living, through to 
 accessing major health interventions such as hormonal therapy and surgical 
 reassignment procedures [xi]. 
 
A cursory read of these two passages might suggest to the reader that ―Transgender 
Studies‖ (henceforth TGS) is just an offshoot of QT, or even more generally, an offshoot 
of Gender Studies. Indeed, as Stryker points out, TGS includes discussions of gender 
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diversity, sexual embodiment, and personal gender development, which are all elements 
that Queer Theory, among other branches of Gender Studies, examines. Likewise, if 
being transgender implies  ―being queer,‖ we might wonder on the one hand, does the 
converse hold – namely, does being queer imply being transgendered? – and on the other 
hand, why bother having two separate domains of inquiry, if both TGS and QT claim as 
their purviews, ‗the queer?‘ Nevertheless, as is the case with most terminological 
differences based on historical antecedents of and transitions between theoretical 
frameworks, a closer look into the dialogues between the two shall reveal perhaps why 
TGS has effectively claimed territory that is just as broad, if not broader than QT.  
 To be sure, the characterization given by Stryker and Whittle is far from 
representing unanimously agreed upon definitions for transgender and TGS. Even my 
definition at the outset of this chapter was a bit more restrictive. Likewise, not everyone 
will so readily accept QT‘s use of the transgendered person as a model for deconstructing 
gender. In Second Skins (1998), for example, Jay Prosser spends the first chapter arguing 
that while QT has done a great deal to bring TGS into academic focus, the problem with 
its ―arrogation of transgender is that it allocates to nontransgendered subjects (according 
to this binary schema, straight subjects), the ground that transgender would appear to only 
figure; this ―ground‖ is the apparent naturalness of sex. For if transgender figures gender 
performativity, nontransgender or straight gender is assigned the category of constative‖ 
(32). Much like a literary figure comes to stand in for a specific element of human nature 
or a personality trope – King Lear as the figure for all human greed, for instance – if 
transgender illuminates the performative nature of all gender, then there still remains a 
dichotomy, that between this ‗figure‘ of the transgendered performer and its grounding in 
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reality, namely, in that this is the ‗nature‘ of gender itself. Of course, more will need to be 
said about how performativity features for both QT and TGS and whether or not Prosser 
makes a good case, but theoretical skirmishes aside, one thing does appear to be rather 
unanimous among those who write in TGS and QT; namely, that the ―figure‖ of the 
transgendered person has been an indispensible element for people like Butler (1990, 
1992) and others seeking a ―theory of (homo)sexuality distinct from feminism‖ (Prosser, 
22). Thus, to better understand this intimate connection, we must turn to Butler‘s seminal 
text, Gender Trouble, which, according to Prosser, ―yoked transgender most fully to 
queer sexuality‖ (24).  
 Although transgender occupies just a few paragraphs of Gender Trouble, what 
Butler‘s brief discussion of drag has functioned to do for QT is to subvert all conceptions 
of gender that treat it as a natural, stable, and necessarily binary category. Because drag 
carries with it the potentiality for ―passing‖ – that is, the person performing drag can 
sufficiently act out the desired gender roles so as to be attributed, by him/herself and by 
others, that gender – transgendering reveals that occupying a particular gender is a matter 
of performing that gender convincingly.. As Butler puts it: “In imitating gender, drag 
implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself‖ (137, italics original). However, 
what gender performances imitate turns out to be altogether unclear.  Consider that the 
term ‗gender‘ is itself an amalgam of several conceptual and experiential components: 
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1. Subjective Gender Identity – how ‗I‘ feel, who I believe myself to be – man, 
woman, other – my sense of femininity/masculinity, but also, my sexual 
orientation 
2. Gender Attribution – can be both subjective and objective. ‗I‘ can name my 
gender, label it as ‗man‘ or ‗woman,‘ and likewise, others can identify me as 
belonging to this or that gender category.  
3. Gender Roles – the actions one performs that align with a particular gender 
and the ―cues‖ or signs that are used to determine this attribution 
 
This list, adapted from Kate Bornstein‘s Gender Outlaw (1995),37 suggests that when a 
person is ‗gendered‘ they are engaging in a complex and dynamic system of 
phenomenological, social, and symbolic rituals. Each of the three components is 
dependent on the others – for example, one cannot act in a particular gender role if one 
does not also have a sense of what that gender is, how it feels to be it, etc. – and yet, each 
can be teased apart from the others, as one might feel as though they are feminine, but 
perform as masculine and therefore be attributed as such. Likewise, one‘s performance is 
not always ‗good enough‘ and so I might attempt to be a woman because I feel like one, 
but I might still be attributed by others the label ‗man.‘ Perhaps most complex among the 
list is the third item, gender roles. As Bornstein points out, performing the role of a 
gender involves at least these cues: physical, biological, behavioral, textual, mythic, 
power dynamic, and sexual orientation. There are likely more to add and ways to further 
refine these, but it suffices to simply note that acting as a man, for instance, is more than 
simply having a penis (although this is part of it) – it involves one‘s entire body looking 
like a man, dressing and behaving like a man, which includes having sex the way ‗men‘ 
do (whatever that means), possessing the correct documents that prove one‘s manhood, 
engaging in and with mythologies of manhood (for example, the myth that all men are 
sex-crazed or that they can only focus on one thing at a time), and occupying the specific 
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nodes on the power grid that signal manhood (traditionally, the dominant nodes). It is 
worth reiterating, since the concept has retreated into the background during this 
discussion, that ‗sex‘ – the term I have so far used to denote one‘s bodily and biological 
markings as either ‗male‘ or ‗female‘ – under this performative framework, becomes just 
another way to imitate gender. Hence, having particular genitalia is just one sign among 
many – indeed only one physical/biological sign among many – and to be sure, one‘s 
anatomy can easily narrate a gender that is in conflict with what one‘s social status or 
sexual orientation signal..  
 Nevertheless, how these various cues come to all triangulate upon the same 
gender or conversely, how they might conflict with one another, only highlights their 
instability as strict referents. It is not inherently contained within the concept of 
possessing an XX chromosome that one will be a heterosexual, female, feminine, mother, 
who is intrinsically passive So, if someone attributes the wrong gender to me because 
they notice that I like to have sex with transsexual women, this misidentification results 
from my failing to meet certain established norms of behavior on the one hand, but it also 
highlights the arbitrary nature of the connections drawn between and among the various 
categories pertaining to gender performance. To cite the rest of Butler‘s quote from 
above, “In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender 
itself – and its contingency.” Drag makes visible not just the performative nature of 
gender, but also the fact that what it imitates, the ‗original‘ that it seeks to copy, is a 
fiction. What it means to be a gender – what ‗man,‘ ‗woman,‘ ‗other‘ and the like denote 
– are matters of historical, social, and political constructions, and hence these terms don‘t 
refer to stable, dichotomous categories. . For Butler, drag exposes the heteronormative 
 176 
myth that ‗sex‘ and ‗gender‘ have literal referents. The ‗figure‘ of transgender therefore 
serves to subvert the supposed naturalness of gender. What gender is thought to be 
grounded in – what Butler (1992) later refers to as the ―heterosexual matrix,‖ is made 
possible only by the arbitrary positing of the binary systems of male-female, feminine-
masculine, and heterosexual-homosexual. By imitating gender and hence, exposing the 
imitative nature of gender itself, drag therefore exposes these binaries for what they really 
are: fluid, figurative, and eminently transgressable.   
 Despite QT‘s rendering of drag, one might protest that transgender actually 
reinstantiates the dominant heterosexual matrix. By seeking to become the opposite sex 
or to perform as the ‗other‘ gender, one might be led to identify transgendered identity as 
supportive of the two-sex/two-gender model. As Shepherdson (2006) points out, this 
view is set up in contrast with the ‗deliterlization‘ view for which Butler is most often 
credited – in other words, the view that obscures what the concept of body‘ refers to.  
Seen in this way, drag would simply bolster the already given binaries by implicitly 
endorsing the notion that one can only cross from gender X to gender Y or from sexual 
orientation X to sexual orientation Y.  Unlike Butler, who argues that the figure of 
transgender serves to undermine the notion that what gender amounts to is a two-part 
system, there are feminist theorists and even queer theorists who view the use of trans-
identity as actually reinforcing the binary system (cf. Raymond, 1979/2006; Hausman, 
2006);  but the majority of Queer Theory tends towards seeing the figure of trans as 
elucidating the ease with which the signifiers, ‗gender‘ and ‗sex,‘ can be detached from 
what they signify, which is whatever in the world the terms ‗woman,‘ ‗man,‘ ‗feminine,‘ 
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‗masculine,‘ and so forth, are supposed to pick out (Prosser, 1998, 27, 64; Shepherdson, 
2006, 98).  
 Nevertheless, in the larger culture, these categories – in particular, the male-
female dichotomy – are taken as ‗given,‘ as natural, and as necessary. The process by 
which ‗sex‘ is brought forth as a literal referent is, as Butler (1990) dubs it in Bodies that 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (1992), ―citation.‖ ‗Sex‘ is created through our 
citing it – by its repeated use in language, for one, but in all other modes that citation 
might take, such as recognizing and being recognized as this or that sex, and so forth –  
and our continual compulsion to recite it. Likewise, gender and sexual orientation 
achieve their statuses as ‗real‘ by the repetition and reproduction of the norms thought to 
ground them. Citationality is not exactly the same thing as performativity, although my 
reading of Butler‘s use of the two terms is that the former is one mode of the latter. 
Insofar as she immediately references speech-act theory
38
 in the introduction of Bodies 
that Matter, as well as her intentions to adapt and adopt parts of Derrida‘s reading of it, 
citation can be seen as a new way of conceiving performance. Indeed, as Austin (1962) 
originally conceived it, we often ‗do things‘ with words – that is, speech acts can be 
performative. In pronouncing a couple man and wife, for example, the illocutionary act is 
also the performance of the ritual of marriage. Likewise, the statements, it‟s a boy or it‟s 
a girl, when uttered by a physician in reference to a newborn or a developing fetus, serve 
to ―cite‖ sex, thereby, ironically but quite fittingly, reproducing the binary categorization 
of male and female in order to call forth a subject to which one of these labels can be 
attached. And every time I engage in citing – by clicking a box on a form that reads ‗F,‘ 
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by behaving as a woman or being attributed by others as such – the binary is reiterated. 
reinforced. Thus, for Butler,  citationality shows that while drag might undermine the 
binary, for the most part, our daily routines, behaviors, speech acts, and other forms of 
citing gender actually serve to make it appear as thought that which we are citing is 
indeed necessary, stable, and given. 
 As we saw in Chapter 4, Merleau-Ponty (1962) viewed embodiment in a similar 
fashion. While never strictly necessary, ‗having two hands‘ shows up as an essential 
defining feature of the body through the repeated actions that bodies engage in which 
involve two hands. This includes of course, the way objects are produced and reproduced 
as well; indeed, the world of objects is continually made for people with two hands and 
as such, we come to think of this as a necessary element of embodiment. Similarly, 
having a sex is viewed as natural and necessary because it is repeatedly cited, performed, 
and enforced. In particular, the enforcement aspect is important to Butler, as she locates 
these discursive ‗recitations‘ as emerging from the powerful heterosexual matrix. Much 
like Foucault (1975, 1980, 2007) she argues that power relations congealed within this 
matrix produce the illusion that it is logically impossible to be unsexed.  Intersexed 
narratives, such as Herculine Barbin, along with the medico-political narratives regarding 
surgical practices on intersexed infants continually recite the necessity of sexual 
embodiment (cf. Fausto-Sterling, 1999; Hird, 2004). As Dreger (2004) claims, ―The way 
intersexuals are treated today has much of the same effect intended by the conceptual and 
practical treatment of the last century: to keep two clear sexes and to retain the notion that 
heterosexuality is normal and homosexuality is not‖ (197).  Thus, in a mutually 
interdependent and reinforcing fashion, gender is also cited as necessarily binary, so that 
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contrary to Beauvoir‘s intuition, one really must be born a woman, or a man, and 
according to heteronormative standards, this will mean either being straight (normal) or 
gay (abnormal).  
 I want to now turn back to transgender, and consider specifically the DSM and the 
Standards of Care (SOC) which regulate sexual reassignment surgery for those 
transgendered persons who seek it. My aim in doing so is to examine the ways in which 
QT, in particular Butler‘s account, is 1) critical of the DSM and the SOC and 2) utilizes 
the figure of the transsexual as it is construed by such medicalized practices to draw 
important conclusions about gender in general. Psychiatrists, or ―gatekeepers,‖ as they 
are often called in the QT and TGS literature, quite literally evaluate the performance of 
surgical candidates based on a manual whose ―criteria and the version of transsexuality 
that it posits produce and reify a fiction of a normal, healthy gender that works as a 
regulatory measure for the gender expression of all people‖ (Spade, 2006, 329). The SOC 
insist that a trans person passes as the desired gender well before the surgery – they must 
live as the ―opposite sex,‖ take hormones, and effectively ―prove‖ that they are a suitable 
member of this new group (cf. Hale, 2007; Loeb, 2008). But by successfully performing 
the desired gender, as Spade notes, what counts as normal gender expression for all 
persons is recited. Not only do the practices surrounding and leading up to sexual 
reassignment surgery help to reinforce the binaries of sexual difference, but they 
highlight the inconsistency with which the heterosexual matrix views gender itself. 
Intersexed narratives provide a nice point of comparison. The soma at birth – and in 
particular, the external genital morphology – is taken to be the sin qua non of what 
Bornstein (1995) refers to as ―Gender Attribution,‖ or that first act of naming/citing a 
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person as this or that gender, and yet, as we have seen this is just one among a wide 
variety of ways in which gender can be performed and expressed. When it comes to 
proving that you are suffering from GID, or if you are simply trying to demonstrate that 
you are the gender you ‗feel‘ to be on the ‗inside,‘ behavioral cues – i.e. performances 
that go beyond the physical body – are privileged.  
  In her memoir, Bornstein recounts that no one ever told her ―what it feels like to 
be woman,‖ and that all she could ever get clear on was that she was not a man. Based on 
the above discussion and QT‘s subversion of gender via the figure of the transsexual, it 
would seem that this is because there is no satisfactory definition. By telling a trans 
person how a woman acts, this is only one element of being a woman and it turns out that 
all attempts to define the concept fall short in providing a comprehensive picture of ‗what 
womanhood feels like.‘ I might try to define what it feels like to be a woman by referring 
to how I dress, but then in order to understand why the way I dress expresses my feeling 
of womanhood, I must refer to some other thing, like, say, acting like a woman. 
Nevertheless, acting ‗like a woman‘ is still a step removed from explaining what it is that 
unites all these things under the category ‗feels like womanhood‘ and as such, the cycle 
continues. In the end, in order to answer the question, what does it feel like to be a 
woman, the answer will involve some vague description of womanhood that fails to 
capture the essence – if there is such a thing – of the complex phenomenology behind 
‗being a woman.‘ Likewise, ‗the sexed body,‘ in the wake of QT cannot be sustained as a 
concept that refers to an essential category, nor one that is independent of social 
construction, medicalization, or science, since the sexing of bodies is itself a performance 
which seeks to reproduce a binary that already has been shown to be unstable. 
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 While there is much to offer here in terms of QT‘s contribution to deconstructing 
the sexed and gendered body and how the transgendered person dramatizes the 
performative nature of both, I don‘t think that we ought to adopt the equation, one 
suggested by Whittle (2006), e.g.  that all transgendered persons are queer.  Nor must it 
always be the case that transgender is subversive. For one, not all transsexuals and 
transgendered persons have subversion ‗in mind‘ – the problematization of gender is 
often a theoretical addendum to the lived experiences of individual trans-persons, a result 
of what Spade (2006) refers to as autobiographical ―picnicking.‖ Secondly, not all queer 
theorists exonerate the figure of the transsexual as a paradigm for subversion. Lesbian 
Feminists (cf. Raymond, 2006), for example, are often critical of medical procedures they 
see as only buttressing the patriarchy. Indeed, weaving QT together with TGS, or 
weaving either of these two branches together with feminism more generally can turn out 
to be problematic, given the border wars and boundary politics often present even in 
those frameworks which seek to dismantle such exclusionary discourse. Prosser‘s (1998) 
concern over seeking to imbricate QT with TGS stems from the notion that the body 
becomes so inessential that it features only as a ―costume‖ among all the other 
adornments – clothing, behavior, sexuality, etc – that one might choose to express their 
gender. Of trans experience, Prosser asks, ―for if the body were but a costume, consider: 
why the life quest to alter its contours?‖ (67).   
 There are several responses one could give to this question off the cuff, but none 
seems sufficient. A quick rejoinder is to assume that the inability to sustain the body as a 
literal referent, which is the logical conclusion to Butler‘s account, is an undesirable 
consequent – in other words, it is not the case that the body is a mere costume and hence, 
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transgendered experience highlights this fault with QT. But then again, transgender and 
transsex do remind us that the sexed body is highly constructed, malleable, and certainly 
not necessarily fixed, nor does it always align to the gendered self. Thus, another 
response to Prosser‘s question might be to suggest that the body, albeit not just costume – 
we are after all, always stuck in some body and as such, cannot entirely disrobe from this 
particular adornment – is still a mode of presentation that, much like clothing, can be 
altered to suit one‘s felt identity. In fact the body, under this read, would be the ultimate 
costume, the one we must always tote around with us, and in which we must always be 
seen. Nevertheless, like Prosser, I think unproblematically adopting the body-as-costume 
framework of QT can and does conceal much of the lived experiences of trans-persons. 
Furthermore, if we take seriously, as I suggested we do in Chapter 2, the notion that the 
body is one among several tools for constituting cognition, and then extend this idea to 
the way in which we utilize this body-tool to fashion ourselves as this or that gender, then 
it seems we face a dilemma. Either who I really am must somehow be independent of all 
the transitory and unnecessary modes of embodiment I can take up and hence, my gender 
is really not grounded in my body, or, we must do away with the concept of a ‗true self‘ 
altogether. Neither of these is palatable, as the former denies the importance of the body 
and embodiment in shaping who and what we think ourselves to be, while the latter 
would dismiss any claims – from trans persons or otherwise – to a self that is identifiable 
regardless of the body and its morphology. In order to explore these possible 
interpretations, and to hopefully resolve the dilemma, it will not be enough however to 
simply adjudicate between QT and TGS in order to decide the best ‗theory of the body.‘ 
Again, doing so always overlooks the particular phenomenology of lived experience. An 
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account of subjective experience, as I have argued in this and the chapters preceding, is 
crucial to any ‗theory of cognition‘ and transgendered experience highlights just this 
necessity of taking seriously the nature of experience. As it turns out, Prosser‘s account 
of the role of body image in forming a transgendered identity, as well as any gendered 
identity, will serve not only to allow just such a phenomenological approach, but will also 
resemble in important ways our discussion of body image and body schema from Chapter 
4. What this discussion will add, however, will be a richer understanding of embodiment 
generally – one that simultaneously queers ‗the body‘ while reclaiming it as a literal and 
material constituent in the formation of gender identity. 
 
5.4 Imagining the Transgendered Body 
 
 Ironically, to approach the way ‗the body‘ shows up in subjective trans-
experience, I want to begin by examining how the medicalization of the phenomenon is 
portrayed by TGS. As it turns out, there is a sharp contrast between the way the 
experiences of trans persons are recounted individually and the way they are discussed 
within the framework of medico-scientific discourse. Because the dominant voice in 
assessing and assigning treatment or surgery is this medico-scientific discourse, the 
transgender theorists often claim that  the individual concerns, desires, and narratives of 
the patients are overshadowed by a the ‗master narrative‘ of science, which seeks a more 
objective and general account. One underlying assumption, according to transgender 
theorists (cf. Stryker, 2006; Spade, 2003; Shepherdson, 2006) that is made by medical 
science is  that transsexuals seek to become the ―opposite sex‖ and that this binary 
framework of choice between the sexes is real; indeed, such ‗naturalness‘ of sexual 
difference is only made stronger by the presence of transsexualism. While the SOC 
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refrains from making any claims as to whether the existence of transsexualism actually 
bolsters the idea that there are only two sexes from which to choose, it is the case that an 
assumption of ‗opposing‘ sexes/genders is at play in diagnosis of GID. For example, the 
first criterion for inclusion in the category ‗transsexual,‘ according to the current SOC39 
is:  
 1. The desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually 
 accompanied by the wish to make his or her body as congruent as possible with 
 the preferred sex through surgery and hormone treatment [2001; 5]. 
 
Hence, as Shepherdson (2006) suggests, medical science treats transsexualism as a 
psychological disorder with an anatomical solution and she further claims that ―the 
surgeon works with the conception of anatomy that presupposes a natural version of 
sexual identity, thereby foreclosing the question of sexual difference‖ (95).  Perhaps 
Shepherdson‘s claims are a bit overly dramatic; indeed, it would be difficult to support 
the claim that all surgeons operate with the same conception of sexual difference. The 
surgeons themselves might simply be carrying out an operation for the sake of fulfilling 
their role as a medical practitioner. Furthermore, the SOC do recognize that 
transsexualism involves more than mere anatomy alteration, and sometimes anatomical 
change is not requested or needed. In fact, a large part of the ―Real-Life Test‖ to 
determine one‘s eligibility as the opposite gender is what is known as a ―Real-Life 
Experience‖ – the attempted assimilation into the desired gender in one‘s work, school, 
leisure activities, name change, and so forth (16-17). What Shepherdson is right to point 
out however, is that the question of sexual ‗opposition‘ – the idea that there are two and 
only two sexes and/or genders and that there are decidedly specific behaviors, dress, and 
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activities that belong to each – is not even a question raised by the SOC, or the DSM for 
that matter. It is presupposed that if one feels uncomfortable in their gender roles or 
anatomical sex then there are two paths available. First, one must engage in 
psychotherapy followed by a ―Real Life Experience‖ or test – which involves hormone 
therapy and living as the other gender – to see if surgical transition to the ―opposite‖ sex 
is required. Then, one either makes the transition or it is recommended that therapy 
continues in an effort to achieve comfort with one‘s assigned gender. There is not an 
option to live ‗ambiguously‘ or as a gender-queer, at least not as it is written in the SOC 
or the DSM. In this way therefore, medical science treats reassignment surgery and 
hormonal therapy as helping to create and sustain sexual difference – in other words, as 
helping to maintain a ‗healthy‘ gender binarism.  
 Another interpretation worth exploring regarding the manner by which sexual 
reassignment surgery is prescribed is that to some extent, transsexualism – the type of 
transsexualism in which surgery is sought – is a modern phenomenon, brought about by 
the advent of the technological means to enact such body-modification. Alongside 
discoveries of neural plasticity, improved organ and tissue transplanting, and advances in 
surgical techniques generally, the body becomes less and less static, more malleable, and, 
one might argue, more like a costume that one can readily change. In order for a genuine 
MTF or FTM post-op transsexual to exist, certain technological innovations had to arise 
on the one hand, but also, the ideology of the body as a relatively stable entity – in 
particular, that biological sex was a permanent endowment – likewise radically altered 
with more and more ways in which technology could alter the flesh. In a similar vein, 
Shepherdson (2006), e.g. sees the history of science, in particular, the history of 
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technology, perpetuating the idea that the body is ―present-at-hand, a material substratum 
inhabited by a ‗spiritual substance,‘ an ‗animated subjectivity‘‖ (95). I am hesitant to 
view technological history as a trajectory towards such a robust ghost-in-the-machine 
metaphysics of self, although there is something compelling about the idea that the more 
manipulable the body becomes – the more materially and objectively real it is made by 
our abilities to ―fashion‖ it like any other tool – the less and less essential it becomes. In 
other words, what is the body but a costume, if it is constantly alterable and never truly 
who ‗we‘ are? The body, like any other tool, is something to be manipulated and utilized 
in order to perform certain functions, and in the case of gender, it is a mechanism for 
acting out various gender roles. In order to ‗properly‘ be a woman for instance, one must, 
according to medical science, have a vagina, and as such, an anatomical male who 
identifies as a woman, will qualify for surgery that can transfigure those bodily parts – 
the ‗tools‘ of sex as it were – such that they are appropriate to the ―other‖ sex. But this 
leads us back to the earlier problem of sexual reassignment qualification: if an essential 
part of enacting the desired gender/sex is possessing the correct anatomy, then how can 
one go about proving that he or she really is the ―opposite‖ of what is narrated by the 
body?  
 To be sure, according to transgendered persons themselves, but also, as the SOC 
in determining surgical candidacy attest, a particular kind of body is not sufficient for 
realizing gender. It would seem, nonetheless, that it is not necessary either, because, as 
the SOC dictate, at one can and in fact must prove his or her gender without the 
supposedly requisite body. In other words, there is a presupposition when someone is 
diagnosed as having GID severe enough to warrant sexual reassignment surgery that the 
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proper idea of embodiment is already possessed and that this idea transcends the 
materiality of the physical body.  Nevertheless, for many transsexuals, this material body 
is precisely what is precluding full realization of the ideal embodiment. If we contrast 
transsexuals – and here, I mean transsexuals who are in fact dissatisfied with some or all 
of their anatomical sex - with transvestites, it becomes all the more clear that ‗the body‘ 
is quite literally a site of identity crisis for the former, but not for the latter. While 
transvestites can simply ‗vest‘ themselves in another gender by cross-dressing, 
performing, and so forth, and this suffices for the role-shifting they are seeking to attain, 
transsexuals who opt for surgery are cannot simply behave as the desired  sex/gender and 
be satisfied. And yet, this behaving as is precisely what is required of them in order to 
‗prove‘ that they really do identify with the opposite sex/gender.  It seems that for many 
transsexuals, the body, although not sufficient for enacting the desired gender, is at the 
same time a necessary component of it; however, this missing piece, prior to surgery, 
prevents the full realization of that desire. Shepherdson comes to conclude regarding this 
differentiation between transvestites and transsexuals as such: 
 
 Perhaps we could say that cross-dressing is the act of a subject who plays with 
 what we call ―gender roles‖ while the transsexual is someone whose capacity to 
 act (in the sense not only of ―performance,‖ but of speech-act theory) waits upon 
 (an idea of) embodiment [2006; 101]. 
 
Shepherdson goes on to say that distinguishing between ―embodiment‖ and ―gender role‖ 
is no easy task, and is certainly not reducible to biological differentiation. Perhaps the 
embodiment of which the transvestite has an idea just is the gender role they enact and 
because their idea of gender does not need to be constituted by specific anatomical 
material, this idea serves its function well enough. I don‘t like this answer, however, as it 
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seems to overlook the quite obvious fact that transsexuals must have some idea of 
embodiment. How else would they ‗know‘ that they are trapped in the wrong body? To 
add to Shepherdson‘s account, therefore, I want to argue that transsexuals do have an idea 
of embodiment, a body image that for them does not correspond to the gender roles that 
their actual body is expected to perform (or that they wish it to perform). This idea of 
embodiment, since it does not correspond to any material reality (at least not pre-op) is, 
unlike a transvestite‘s image, incomplete and is therefore not felt as ‗matching.‘ In fact, 
looking at the way many transsexuals describe their experiences, as well as the ways in 
which transsexual theorists such as Prosser and Shepherdson characterize themselves and 
others, I will further argue that there are actually two separate body images formed, one, 
the ideal embodiment – the desired gender – is a projected image of wholeness, while the 
other, the body image which the actual body subtends, is fractured, incomplete, and 
above all, not experienced in an ‗at-home-with‘ manner.. By examining how these 
transsexual body images are formed and transformed, I will then suggest a way to read 
transsexual narratives that avoids the pitfalls of QT and the radical anti-essentialism 
pertaining the body that results from the body-as-costume model.  
 Given the accounts of many transsexuals, it is not surprising that their 
phenomenological descriptions of embodiment are appropriated by Queer Theorists as 
signaling that the body, like a suit or a uniform, is interchangeable and thus no more 
constitutive of one‘s identity than any other external prop or aid. Consider these 
testimonies:
40
  
 
                                                 
40
 From Prosser (1998). 
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 ―I might throw off the hide of my body and reveal myself pristine within – forever 
 emancipated into that state of simplicity.‖ – Jan Morris   
 
 ―I think how nice it would be to unzip my body from forehead to navel and go on 
 vacation. But there is no escaping it, I‘d have to pack myself along.‖ – Leslie 
 Feinberg 
 
 ―Because my body was becoming more and more alien to me as I developed, 
 there was an urge to rip off my own skin, for lack of a better description. The 
 frustration and anxiety were tearing me to bits.‖ – Raymond Thompson 
 
 ―I used to look at my body and think it was a bit like a diver‘s suit, it didn‘t feel 
 like me inside‖ – Anonymous  
 
 
It is tempting to cast GID as an experience that reveals that the body is not sustainable as 
any real indicator for sexed or gendered identity. As the above narratives suggest, the 
body seems to have little to do with one‘s ‗true sex/gender‘– it is even described as a 
diver‘s suit or as something one can unzip and step out of – but to make the leap that the 
experience of Unheimlichkeit felt by persons with GID demonstrates that all of 
embodiment is a performance and that the body is one among many props is, I want to 
argue, too hasty. Prosser (1998) suggests that ―transsexuals continue to deploy the image 
of wrong embodiment because being trapped in the wrong body is simply what 
transsexuality feels like‖ (69, emphasis mine). Given these narratives, coupled with my 
own ignorance of the ‗what it‘s like‘ element of transsexuality, I can accept that for many 
trans persons,  it must feel as though one is trapped in the wrong skin and if given the 
opportunity, they would jump out of it. However, the experience of dissociation between 
self and skin does not imply that the concepts of body and embodiment are not literal 
indicators of one‘s identity. Indeed, Feinberg (1980) recognizes the true impossibility of 
her desire – the body is ―inescapable‖ – and Thompson (1995) alludes to the 
unavailability of a better description for his felt need to tear off his skin. It appears that 
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the narrators here are quite aware that the immediacy of the experience shows up in ways 
that are not expressible in language and, moreover, that the body cannot just be sloughed 
off like a coat. In some sense therefore, QT can be accused of reading into these body-
narratives precisely what it has renounced – the ‗figure‘ of the transsexual actually comes 
to ground the distinction between the physical body itself and the body image(s), which 
are rarely, if ever, literal ‗pictures‘ of that body. In other words, the dichotomy of figure-
ground is itself another engendered categorization, one that is the product of QT‘s 
attempt to use transsexuality as a foil for the supposed naturalness of sexual difference. 
‗The body,‘ as it is interpreted via this figure/ground distinction, comes to occupy a 
tenuous position in the formation of sexed and gendered identity – it is both a ‗that which 
I am not,‘ and yet, a ‗that inside which I feel trapped.‘ But it seems that this is not quite 
the message conveyed by the narratives; rather than claiming that their experiences 
highlight the non-essential nature of the body in the their sense of identity, the trans-
persons narrating here seem to all have reached the conclusion that the body is both a part 
of their identity as trans but is also an object, costume-like though it may be, that they 
wish to alter.  
 Thompson‘s story, in particular, is interesting because he describes his true 
identity as his ―inner body‖ and characterizes his ―outer body‖ as that in which ‗he‘ is 
trapped. Again, it is enticing to read this as suggesting that ‗the body‘ has no literal 
referent, but why not read Thompson‘s narrative in reverse? What if ‗embodiment‘ – the 
―idea that transsexuals wait upon,‖ as Shepherdson (2006) characterizes it – is the term 
that does not have a referent? Prosser suggests something similar, as he argues that 
embodiment for Thompson is ―incomplete‖ and not fully realized, since being a man 
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cannot be performed adequately without the proper body. This ―inner body,‖ is an image 
of oneself that is comprised of a body that does not even exist. Citing Oliver Sacks‘ 
(1984) work on phantom limb patients, Prosser (1998) claims that transsexuals, like those 
who ‗re-member‘ the otherwise non-existent limbs when experiencing phantom pains, are 
themselves ‗phantomizing‘ a newly configured body, one that goes beyond the material 
body itself. Although the body phantomized never actually existed, and as such, unlike a 
phantom limb experienced after amputative surgery, the referent picked out by the 
transsexual body image has no past material reality, ―the body of transsexual becoming is 
born out of a yearning for a perfect past – that is, not memory but nostalgia: the desire for 
the purified version of what was, not for the return to home per se (nostos) but to the 
romanticized ideal of home‖ (84). Based on this interpretation, it makes sense to think of 
the ‗dual-body‘ characterization Thompson provides as denoting, on the one hand, the 
material, the body itself, or what he calls his ―outer body,‖ and the body image, 
Thompson‘s embodiment, or what he calls his ―inner body.‖ It is not that either one of 
these experiential domains is any more or less literal – both are ‗real‘ – but Thompson‘s 
embodiment, an embodiment that is other-to, or better, one that goes beyond the material 
body, is whole and complete. It is an ideal of heimlichkeit, a body constructed by the 
imagination that is waiting to be embodied by his ―inner body,‖ which, until successful 
transitioning, dissociates from its ―outer body.‖ We might say that in the case of extreme 
bodily dissociation such as GID, there are two conflicting body images – one which 
corresponds to the ‗inner‘ sense of bodily identity and one which corresponds to the 
‗outer, ‗ and hence, visible body. Again, Anzieu‘s notion of a skin ego is helpful here as a 
metaphor by which to interpret the sense of confinement that is felt by the inner self of a 
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transsexual who describes the desire to jump out of his or her own skin. The skin serves 
as a boundary between the inner and the outer body images, but it also helps to form them 
both.  
 Further evidence that body image is key to anchoring transsexual embodiment as 
a future ideal of completion, suggests Prosser (1998), can be gleaned by considering the 
history of the formation of transsexuality as a concept. Prior to ‗the transsexual,‘ persons 
who today would be classified as having GID, were called ―inverts.‖ In fact, the term 
inverts in the mid- to late 1800s referred to a much broader variety of ‗gender variance‘ – 
being homosexual, cross-dressing, hyper-masculinity in females, etc. But the narratives 
of the inverts who were said to feel as though they needed a ―new body‖ or to change 
from one sex/gender to the other, Prosser claims, deploy the same body image that we 
find in transsexual narratives today. In other words, the protention of transsexual 
embodiment, which we might be tempted to think was made possible by medical 
technology, actually preceded it. Before there was any real future body for which to hold 
out hope – before technology made possible attaining a new sexed body – transsexual 
embodiment existed, in the form of projected ideas of heimlichkeit. Specifically, the body 
image correlated with the present body and that correlated with the ―inner‖ body image – 
which is also projected as a future, real body – are in conflict with each other, whether 
surgery is possible or not.  
 While I see no problem in claiming that transsexualism is a phenomenon that 
predates the medico-technological invention of the term, I am concerned here that Prosser 
might be overlooking and/or underemphasizing the role that ‗the technological‘ plays in 
the construction of transsexual body images specifically, and in the formation of body 
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images generally. If technology played no role in forming one‘s identity as transsexual, 
or as any other identity, my question is then, from whence do such images arise? As I 
have argued in previous chapters, while both body schema and body image can alter, it is 
the latter that is more susceptible to modification from ‗outside‘ – namely, socially 
constructed norms of embodiment, ideals of  beauty, and technological mediation. 
However, as Prosser casts it, the body image seems to be just as fixed as the schema; 
indeed, he never discusses a body schema and as such, the two are either conflated or 
body schema is just not a concept he considers. Regardless of this discrepancy, Prosser‘s 
use of body image is, I want to argue, a move too far back in the direction of 
essentialism. In other words, while his critique of QT has been fruitful for regaining a 
sense of the body as a real referential component of embodiment, the claim that 
transsexual body image is technologically unmediated runs the risk of sliding back into 
the dilemma claiming either a strict biological-body-as-gender-identity or a disembodied 
‗true self,‘ one that is independent of its body, but that also strangely must anchor itself in 
some body. Neither of these views captures fully the crucial role that technology does in 
fact play in shaping how we imagine ourselves to be qua embodied subjects.  
 I will argue in the next chapter that Prosser‘s account, along with all of the 
phenomenology of transsexualism thus far discussed, actually shows that embodiment is 
always already constituted by technology. To defend this claim, I will need to clarify 
what I mean by technology, as well as return to some important insights from QT 
concerning embodiment, namely from thinkers such as Donna Haraway (1988), whose 
image of the cyborg will provide a framework for better understanding transgendered 
subjectivity. My claim is that cyborg embodiment is the subtending phenomenology of 
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all embodiment and that the body images deployed in extreme cases of bodily 
disownership, such as in that of a transsexual, or any other sense of unheimlichkeit, are 
not philosophical markers for ‗the rest of us,‘ nor do they simply establish, as Butler 
(2004) claims, ―the limits of what we think we know.‖ As it will turn out, the 
natural/unnatural divide, a myth perpetuated by juxtaposing non-transsexual with 
transsexual as well as human and machine, is, I will argue, another level of concealment, 
one which serves to mask the fundamentally hybridized, eminently dissociable, and yet 
always already technological nature of all cognitive subjectivity.  
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Chapter 6 
 
The Technology of Queered Cognition 
 
―Technologies, as organized systems, produce a range of products, effects, 
representations, and artefacts, chief among them … what we could call technologies of 
gender, race, and sexuality‖ – Terry & Calvert, 1997; 5. 
 
―Cognition and signification, Self and Other, are not opposed to sensibility or affectivity, 
but rather presuppose it; discourse and figure, meaning and sense, the speakable and the 
unspeakable are mutually constitutive yet incommensurable. The relation is one of 
duplicity rather than duality‖ – Sullivan, 2001; 165. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 In this final chapter, I will return to several claims from the previous chapters 
concerning cognition; in particular, the notion that ‗we‘ are never entirely ‗in our heads,‘ 
but are instead, a conglomeration of organism + external processes. No image is better 
suited to expressing the nature of this hybridized human than the cyborg and as such, I 
will utilize the cyborg as it is evoked both in cognitive science as well as in feminist 
theory, in order to draw parallels between the two usages and further show how this 
image actually serves to elucidate embodied subjectivity. While the cyborg is utilized for 
various purposes by philosophers like Clark (2003) and feminists such as Haraway 
(1988), I want to focus on a common thread running through both disciplines, namely, 
the idea  that who and what ‗we‘ are is always an organism+artifact coupling. To be sure, 
this position will require some defending, as well as some clarification as to what 
precisely is meant by the second half of the always-already hybridized human – i.e. the 
technology to which the organism is coupled. To this end, I will differentiate between 
 196 
visible and invisible technologies in order to maintain that complete dissociation from our 
tools is impossible, as we are often – in fact always, I will argue – in the grips of 
technology, albeit oftentimes of the invisible or ‗transparent‘ type. In order to begin this 
process of defining ‗the human‘ as an always already technological being, I will first look 
to some of the more extreme modes of organism-machine coupling found in the work of 
surgical artists, Orlan and Stelarc.  
 Having explicated and defended the claim that human cognition and embodiment 
is always a hybridization of organism, machine, and/or transparent technology, I will 
return to the discussion of Transgender (TG) and Intersexed Embodiment (IE) to revisit 
the overriding phenomenology expressed in these experiences, namely, that of dysphoria 
or unheimlichkeit. When one‘s actual body is not aligned with one‘s body image, or when 
one‘s projected or desired bodily presence in the world is precluded by the body, the 
resulting accounts we have seen tend toward describing the experience as being ‗trapped‘ 
in a ‗wrong body,‘ or having the urgent need to ‗jump out of one‘s skin.‘ It is this 
ambiguous bodily-being-towards-the-world that is really the source of Unheimlichkeit in 
GID or any of the other bodily pathologies mentioned thus far. In other words, 
embodiment and not merely ‗the body‘ is often what one does not feel at home with in 
cases of dissociation or pathology. I will examine various modes of ‗embodied 
unheimlichkeit‘ and will argue two things in this final chapter: First, we should treat 
one‘s sex and/or gender as one mode of embodiment, and more specifically, as argued in 
Chapter 5, as an embodied practice of performance. That I feel like a woman and am 
labeled as such, is achieved through repeated behaviors that indicate or ‗cite‘ 
womanhood. Sex and gender are just two examples of the multifarious ways in which 
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embodiment generally is a means of performing as this or that type of subject. One of the 
key ‗tools‘ utilized in enacting embodied performance is of course, the body itself, 
although it is not the only one. In fact, the second claim I will defend is that we ought to 
think of sex and gender and other modes of embodied subjectivity themselves as tools. 
Indeed, they can be used to enact yet further performances, all of which, I argue, are part 
of the larger phenomenon we call ‗cognition.‘ Based on this notion that we utilize a host 
of different ‗tools‘ at different times – bodies, sexual identity, gender performance, and 
so forth – in order to cognize, I will further suggest that we begin to see cognition 
generally, as Clark (2003) does,  as ―a shifting coalition of tools.‖ In this way therefore, 
what is actually dissociated in cases of GID or other ‗bodily dysphorias‘ is a person‘s 
relationship to the tools they are using. Again, our notion of ‗tool use‘ will need to be 
broadened and refined, so as to include among its exemplars, dress, language, and other 
sociotechnical systems. The payoff to all of this is that by treating the phenomena of 
dissociation experienced by persons with GID or IE as a mode of embodiment dysphoria, 
or more specifically, as cases in which there is a breakdown between person and world, a 
crucial possibility of human embodiment generally is made more explicit. This possibility 
I claim, is the always present possibility of breakdown, wherein I feel dissociated from 
parts of my body, the tools I am using, or the larger social context in which I find myself. 
My account will be overtly Heideggerian for the most part, insofar as the potentiality for 
breakdown – be it with tangible tools, such as hammers, or intangible tools such as 
language – can be described as a feature of my interfacing with the world. What I will 
add to Heidegger‘s account will of course be the notion that the artifacts of sex and 
gender are ‗sociotechnical systems of use‘ from which we can and often do dissociate. In 
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fact, as I will claim more strongly, our embodied subjectivity is always caught up in 
attempting to ‗be at home with‘ one or more of these ‗systems‘ and hence, sexed and 
gendered identity, much like language, are ‗tools‘ from which we very rarely, if ever, 
entirely decouple.  
 
6.2 (Ex)Change Artists and Bodily Queering 
 
 The year is 1993, and New York‘s Sandra Gering Gallery is witness to an exhibit 
unlike any other it has hosted. The French surgical artist, Orlan, has reconstructed her 
face in order to resemble five separate computer images of famously beautiful women: 
Mona Lisa, Diana, Botticelli‘s Venus, Moreau‘s Europa, and Gérard‘s Psyche. She 
considered her surgeries to be part of the art and therefore also part of the exhibit. Since 
the early 1970s, Orlan has experimented with her body as a means to weave beauty 
together with the abject, and her work has thus come to be known as ‗carnal art‘ (cf. 
O‘Bryan, 2005). Influenced by the bodily transformations in the Mayan and Olméques 
cultures, in 1998, she worked with Pierre Zoville to create several images and video 
installations based on her own surgically modified face and pictures with headdresses, 
facial implants, and piercings. Below are the images from this project: 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The Many Faces of Orlan 
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 Jay Prosser (1998) had the opportunity to ask Orlan questions, in particular about 
the ways in which her identity was maintained or lost throughout all the transformations. 
Because, as Orlan claims, ―skin is a mask of strangeness,‖41 one that she can peel off, 
restructure and resurface, it is a means of identification, but only loosely. It is an 
eminently penetrable surface, one that, as Moos (1996) describes it, ―is Orlan's metaphor 
for the thin, osmotic surface of being, its existence as interface, intercourse between 
inside (flow) and outside (appearances)‖ (70). Recall that thinkers like Merleau-Ponty 
and Anzieu have argued that the skin is an ‗interface‘ between world and self, between 
external objecthood and internal, conscious subjectivity. Given that Orlan‘s art construes 
the skin as so eminently alterable, extendable, retractable, and even ―strange‖ as she calls 
it (implying an otherness of the flesh), the term ‗interface‘ itself becomes tricky to 
understand, as that boundary between self and world so often shifts. This implies the 
continual transitioning of what we mean when we identify as this or that, juxtaposing 
ourselves against the other.  
 In further responding to Prosser‘s question about identity, Orlan went on to say 
that she felt like ―une transsexuelle femme-á-femme.‖42 Prosser notes that on the one 
hand, Orlan‘s use of transsexuality plays with the very idea of transitioning itself – she 
(ex)changed her identity for another one – but it was a female-to-female operation.  
Orlan‘s embracing transsexuality, according to Prosser, ―made of surgery a spectacle‖ 
and ―brought to the surface of a commonplace assumption about transsexuality: that is, 
that transsexuality is precisely a phenomenon of the body‘s surface‖ (62). However, 
sexual identity generally cannot be relegated to the surface of the skin, as we do not 
                                                 
41
 Cited in Prosser (1998) from Louis Gray (1996), ―Me, My Surgeon, and My Art,‖ The Guardian 2, 8.  
42
 Personal communication cited by Prosser (1998), 61. 
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locate sex any one place on that surface (i.e. it is not just genital), nor do we find sexual 
identity by looking at all of that surface; indeed, much of sexual identification has to do 
with internal processes and chemicals. So, one might interpret Orlan‘s rendering of her 
body art as ―transsexuelle‖ – as problematizing the very idea that we can ever look 
exclusively to the body and hope to ascertain true identity, sexual or otherwise. 
Regardless of how we want to read Orlan‘s performances – as suggesting identity is 
beyond the skin, internal to it, or is altogether nowhere – the point remains that her art 
queers the boundaries between artist and artwork. This line between the artist as she is 
seen through her artwork – i.e. an externally constituted subjectivity – and the artist‘s 
internal or experienced subjectivity is thereby also blurred in body-art such as Orlan‘s. 
As she describes it, she changes ‗from woman to woman‘ with each modification and 
surgery, both on the ‗inside‘ and ‗out.‘  
 Another artist who plays with bodily boundaries in a similar manner, although his 
‗materials‘ differ quite drastically, is the Australian techno-artist, Stelarc. Probably best 
known for his ―Third Hand Project‖ (1976-81), wherein a robotic arm is attached to 
Stelarc‘s body such that contractions in his stomach muscles send messages to the arm to 
control and move it about, Stelarc has since continued to expand and invade the flesh. In 
an interview with Paolo Atzori and Kirk Woolford (1995), he claims ―the body is an 
impersonal, evolutionary, objective structure…the desire to locate the self simply within 
a particular biological body is no longer meaningful. What it means to be human is being 
constantly redefined.‖ Like Orlan, Stelarc recognizes that the skin is eminently malleable. 
Perhaps taking this interpretation a bit further, he maintains that the skin is a means of 
identifying ourselves and others, but claims that it is not the constancy of the flesh that 
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makes us who we are so much as its transformative potential. It is through the alterations 
of the flesh and hence, for Stelarc, the subsequent ―new body architecture‖ that we come 
to know our true identities qua human. His more recent project, ―Ear on Arm‖ (2007-
present) highlights the way in which a seemingly rigid structure – the auditory system – 
turns out to be much more malleable and transitory than we might have thought. By using 
skin extenders, his own living cells, microphones, and transmitters, he has implanted an 
ear on his left arm that he hope eventually will be able to send the sounds it ‗hears‘ not 
just to Stelarc himself, but to others as well. He has designed it such that the transmitters 
would be in his mouth, allowing for only he to hear what his third ear hears, unless he 
opens his mouth, in which case, the sound will come out of his mouth and be audible for 
nearby persons. Eventually however, he hopes to have it connected wirelessly to the 
internet so he can transmit what he is hearing through his third ear in Sydney, can be 
heard by a friend online who is physically in Prague.  
 Interestingly, MIT‘s Touch Lab has begun developing similar means of 
incorporating audio-visual-communication devices into the body. Their ―Sixth Sense‖43 
project would allow, for example, the use of one‘s hand as the dial pad of a cell phone or 
the observation of ‗meta-data‘ immediately upon viewing an object, text, or even another 
person. All of this would be possible because of a mini-projector hung around the neck, 
wirelessly transmitting to a cell phone (which could always stay in the pocket) with 
internet access, and a blue-tooth enabled ear set. Upon scanning an image of, say, an 
approaching friend, the face-recognition technology coupled with a linked database of 
information could conceivably project onto the surface of said companion important 
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 P. Maes, P. Mistry. Unveiling the "Sixth Sense," game-changing wearable tech. TED 2009. Long Beach, 
CA, USA 2009 
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information such as his/her name, birthday, even a link to his/her facebook profile. These 
developments, along with Stelarc and Orlan‘s artwork, lend credence to the idea that 
detaching artist from art, human from machine, and self from world, is not a matter of 
tracing the surface of the skin.  
 
           
 
Figure 6.2: Stelarc‘s Third Ear  Figure 6.3:MIT‘s ―Sixth Sense‖ 
 
 
 
The underlying philosophical importance to all of this, claims Stelarc, is that it reveals the 
importance of the body in understanding human cognition on the one hand, while 
simultaneously showing that ‗this body‘ to which we attach so much importance in 
marking us as individual humans, is not merely a conglomeration of flesh, bones, and 
blood. Rather, we are biotechnological hybrids and the idea that ‗we‘ have any identity 
independent of our tools is a misunderstanding. ―Technology has always been coupled 
with the evolutionary development of the body. Technology is what defines being human. 
It's not an antagonistic alien sort of object, it's part of our human nature. It constructs our 
human nature‖ (Interview with Atzori and Woolford, 1995). This view is reminiscent of 
what was discussed in Chapter 2, namely Clark‘s (2003) idea that if there is a human 
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nature at all, it consists in that nature being eminently changeable, a ―shifting coalition of 
tools,‖ as he terms it.  
 These extreme versions of human+tool+art intertwining seen in  the work of 
Stelarc and Orlan serve to illustrate several important points about embodiment, which in 
turn sheds light on ways in which the terms ‗body‘ and ‗cognition‘ ought to be reworked. 
First, it should be noted that I have purposely chosen to compare ‗art‘ and ‗technology,‘ 
as they are themselves not so easily distinguished and often become intermingled in each 
other. Etymologically, they have similar base meanings – a skill, technique, or craft 
knowledge, much like the Greek word, technē – and in terms of the products created by 
artistic or technological know-how, it is often difficult to determine whether the objects 
ought to be properly considered ‗artwork‘ or ‗tools.‘ In the case of some artwork and 
technology, it is difficult to tease apart the tool or instrument itself from the skillful use of 
it. Architecture, for example, if done well, achieves a seamless blending of function and 
beauty, such that the skilled use of tools, design, building and finished ‗product‘ are just 
as much artwork as they are technology. In the case of dance, it is even more difficult to 
separate tool use from the tool itself – namely ‗the body‘ is both the tool and the user, the 
product and the process.  Similarly, in The Question Concerning Technology (1977), 
Heidegger claims that the ―poetic revealing‖ of truth – poiēsis – that occurs in and among 
the fine arts can also shed light on the essence of technology. The two are united, he 
claims in the ancient Greek conception of technē (339) and yet they remain conceptually 
distinct: 
 Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection 
 upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, 
 on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, 
 fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art [1977; 340].  
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Much like Stelarc‘s work forces us to consider that ‗art‘ is not just about the final product 
– in other words, the ‗essence of art is not any one piece of artwork – Heidegger points 
out that the nature of technology is not to be found in something technological. To be 
sure, tangible tools such as hammers and computers count as part of what we mean by the 
term ‗technology,‘ but they are only one component of a much larger conceptual 
framework. As Stephen Kline (1985) concurs, technology is not limited to this 
―hardware‖ version of its definition. There are also at least these three alternative 
conceptions, in which technology might be treated as: 
 A Sociotechnical System of Manufacture: wherein technology is not limited to the 
 tools it produces, but includes the entire system of production itself – the tools 
 needed to make the tools, so to speak, the machinery, the persons involved in 
 production, and so forth.  
 
 A Knowledge or Know-How: similar to the ancient Greek conception of technē, 
 here, technology refers to the information and skills necessary to produce tools or 
 artifacts. 
 
 A Sociotechnical System of Use: refers to the ―combinations of hardware and 
 people (and usually other elements) to accomplish tasks that humans cannot 
 perform unaided by such systems – to extend human capacities‖ [1985; 215-18]. 
 
To illustrate this last version, Kline cites military weapons as an example of hardware 
that is necessarily caught up in a system of use – for the purpose of inflicting harm upon 
the enemy, which is undoubtedly enhanced by weaponry –  a system that is itself only 
understood in the larger context of conflict among persons and nations. In this way, the 
‗hardware‘ interpretation of technology is only one version of what we mean when we 
say ‗military technology.‘ To be sure, a weapon qua single object is not identical to the 
larger system of use in which it plays a part, but the weapon has no meaning as a piece of 
technology without that larger context. Thus, the production of military weapons goes far 
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beyond the individual guns, grenades, and tanks that are manufactured. Likewise, art is 
not just about the product, but also the process and of course, the processor (artist). 
Examples that help illustrate this fact can be found easily in the performing arts – dance, 
theater, etc, in which the ‗art‘ really consists in its being done – but even within the realm 
of fine arts, artists such as Pollock have argued that painting is just as much process as 
product – indeed painting is both a noun and a verb. What both art and technology share 
therefore is an ambiguity in meaning, between thing and process, creator and created. In 
other words, art and technology are hybrids, mixes of tools, tool-users, actions, objects, 
and information systems.  
 Another point behind these examples that is both crucial to my overarching 
argument and more contentious: the fine line between art and technology, which is also a 
blurring of process and object, serves as a reminder that ‗we‘ are just as much a mixture  
of process and object, partial identities, and boundary transgressions.  By this I mean that 
when we closely examine the melding of art and technology, particularly evident in 
Stelarc‘s work, it becomes all the more difficult to pin down where and who ‗we‘ are 
without referencing and relying upon the tools otherwise thought to be other-to our 
‗essential‘ identity. Simply pointing to the biological body will not do; besides Orlan and 
Stelarc, we have encountered numerous examples about how embodiment goes beyond 
the body, and because embodiment is a necessary constituent of cognitive subjectivity, 
pointing to myself is always going to supersede my body. This is also evident if we 
consider again the way embodiment often involves forming a body image, a picture of the 
body in one sense, but a picture of the body as a woman, as able-bodied, or as not-at-
home with itself. These images we form of who and what we are as embodied beings, I 
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want to claim, necessarily invoke technological mediation. In other words, embodiment is 
always already technological, as Stelarc and Clark claim. However, there are reasons to 
disagree with this version of embodiment as always already coupled to technology. For 
instance, if we treat the body too much like any other tool, we might overlook the very 
important sense in which the body, unlike other tools, functions both as tool and as user. I 
will address some of these concerns and in so doing, will refine further the conception of 
‗technology‘ in order to show that teasing ‗it‘ apart from ‗us‘ is difficult, if not 
impossible.  
 
6.3  Hard and Soft, Opaque and Transparent: Technology Above and Below the 
Radar 
  
 It is not only painful to undergo surgical modification in the ways Stelarc and 
Orlan do; it is expensive, time-consuming, and perhaps, one might even argue, a waste of 
resources. More importantly, to use such extreme body modification practices as 
exemplars of ‗human nature‘ reeks of a fallacious hasty overgeneralization. Most of ‗us‘ 
do not engage in these practices. Indeed, the very thought of doing so is often repulsive. 
Orlan‘s work, for example, is often described as belonging to the realm of abject art. It 
seems that the only element of human nature revealed by these excessive bodily 
transfigurations is that we are much more comfortable ‗in our own skin‘ as it were, and 
rarely, if ever, are so coupled to machinery and artwork. 
 This is a fair point and one worth addressing. To begin, let‘s consider body 
modification in a broader, less extreme context. Take tattooing and piercing for example. 
A recent Harris poll
44
 indicated that as of 2003, 16% of all U.S. adults (≥18 years) have at 
least one tattoo, while 36% of those aged 25-29 years have at least one. As for piercings, 
                                                 
44
 http://www.vanishingtattoo.com/tattoo_facts.htm 
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it is estimated that 15% of adults have at least one ―body piercing,‖ although strangely, 
the term ―body‖ here does not include the earlobes. One of the earliest forms of body 
modification, ear piercing, is so commonplace, it is not even considered in studies of 
piercing and tattooing of ‗the body.‘45  Ear piercings, nonetheless, just like any other 
body-modification practice, can and do signal status, sexuality, achievement, and 
willingness to take risk, just as much as any other body art. In a different but related vein, 
consider plastic surgery. In 2002, there were 6.6 million procedures carried out in the 
U.S. and the American Society for Plastic Surgeons estimates that by 2015, 17% of all 
Americans will have sought plastic surgery.
46
 It is more difficult than one might think in 
fact, to find someone who has not altered the contours of their flesh with metal, ink or 
implants. If we include things like earrings, navel rings, hair waxing, and dental 
procedures such as braces and whitening, it becomes nearly impossible. While the 
reasons for altering the body are vast and complex, in one way or another, piercing, 
tattooing, and surgical transformation mark the body as belonging to this or that type, 
class, culture, race, gender, or group. Modifying the body to fit within a certain limit of 
acceptable appearance – or modifying it so as to not to fit within a particular group, in 
cases such as dying one‘s hair so as to cease belonging to a stereotyped group, or 
tattooing the body to mark oneself as not part of a gang (although, in both cases just 
mentioned, the body modification, while excluding a person from one group, 
simultaneously includes them in another) – is the same sort of practice, regardless of the 
extremes to which it is taken. In other words, if we are talking simply about the attempt 
to locate oneself in a particular social group or to mark oneself as being this or that kind 
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 http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2006/06/tattoos.html 
46
 http://www.livescience.com/health/080624-plastic-surgery.html 
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of subject, then piercing an infant‘s ears as a rite of passage into ‗girlhood‘ is only a 
difference in degree, not kind, to implanting lights in one‘s forehead.  
 An immediate response to all of this is to argue that while common, these 
practices do not actually imply that who and what we are is essentially artistically and 
technologically modified. Stripped away of all of its tools and alterations, ‗the body‘ 
remains an organic compound of flesh and bone, all other accoutrement being optional 
add-ons. I will table this particular concern for a moment and redirect the discussion to 
‗the mind.‘ While our bodies may not always be altered by technology perhaps, if we 
revisit Otto and his notebook, for instance, we might reason that cognition is always 
dependant on some sort of coupling with external tools. Indeed, while Otto is only a 
thought experiment, his kind is not so fictional, it turns out. Clark (2003) recounts a story 
of stepping onto a crowded subway car and noticing that while all of the people on the 
train were physically there, because they were so immersed in cell phone conversations, 
it was as if a part of them were not there. In a real sense, our technologies today allow us 
to be transported from one place to another. When we consider what it‘s like to be at a 
dinner party, or, as Clark (2003) suggests, on a crowded subway, and see that our 
companions are not really ‗there‘ but are instead skyping, texting, or talking on the 
phone, it seems as though cognitive presence often has little to do with the physical 
location of the organism. Where ‗we‘ are is often directly influenced or changed by the 
tools we use, especially tools like the internet, which allow for telepresent 
communication, synchronous chatting across the globe, and video conferencing. Switch 
the focus yet again to the way these tools, as Kline (1985) put it, extend human 
capacities. Like Otto, most of us are dependent on at least one device for ―cognitive 
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offloading,‖ such as the use of a PDA for the storage of data about our business contacts 
and friends. Even the more Luddite types among us are likely unable to compute large 
sums without the aid of pencil and paper. As I argued in Chapter 2, this fact suggests that 
cognition is not occurring entirely within the confines of the skull-brain, and while this 
conclusion may still be debatable, the idea that we simply cannot perform certain 
cognitive tasks without ‗help‘ is far less contestable. Our memories pale in comparison to 
our computers‘ and even our sense of direction is often a disaster without having ―an app 
for it‖ such that we can depend on our iPhones, GPS, or other navigational software just 
to know where we are and where we are going.  
 Again, however, it might be objected that not all of us are so dependent on tools 
for thinking and thus, what it is to be human does not imply a technologically constituted 
being. If we are only considering specific types of technologies then this might be so.  
According to recent data,
47
 in 2009, only 26.6% of the world‘s population had reliable 
internet access. Estimates concerning phone use are not unanimous, with some studies 
suggesting that nearly 70% of the world‘s population have made a phone call and others 
indicating that 70% have not.
48
 Either way, it stands to reason that the technologies I have 
argued to be so ubiquitous and constitutive of who ‗we‘ are, are nowhere nearly so 
prevalent. However, I intend to maintain that embodiment – not simply the body, and not 
simply the mind, but the embodied mind – is always technological, and I think that if we 
reconsider the various types of technology and their relationships to embodiment, I can 
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 See for example: http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/irwp/events/braga_presentation/sld005.htm, as well 
as a full discussion at http://answers.google.com/answers/main?cmd=threadview&id=20411. The more 
dramatic numbers suggesting that only 30% of the world‘s population has made or received a phone call is 
taken from Hayles, K. (2002). 
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convince the reader that this is so. The interweaving of the tangible and intangible in 
sociotechnical systems of use such as gender, body art, and so forth, remind us that 
technology has at least two distinct dimensions. I have so far referred to these levels as 
the tangible and intangible, while others (cf. Sullivan, 2002) have discussed technology 
as being either ―hard‖ or ―soft,‖ but the idea is the same: there are technologies that we 
can ‗see‘ and ‗hold,‘ such as hammers and computers and then there are technologies that 
are oftentimes much farther below the conscious radar, such as practical know-how. 
Social institutions, Sullivan claims, can serve as ‗tools,‘ – I can use the university as a 
means to achieve status in my career, e.g. – but, these tools, if they are to be conceived as 
such, are inextricably tied to the know-how associated with using them. In other words, it 
makes no sense to talk about them as tools, without the correlated technē involved. 
Because of this ambiguity, it is often difficult to separate tool from tool-use, and it is also 
hard to ‗see‘ these practices as technological, because they become so assimilated into 
one‘s identity and embodiment.  
 I want to argue that we ought to consider gender as an example of a ―soft 
technology,‖ specifically, as a kind of institution, or ―system of use.‖ Not usually 
considered technological in any way, the social institution of gendering serves as a tool 
for classification, identification, and moreover, for shaping one‘s individual embodiment. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the body image which accompanies envisioning myself as this 
or that gender can actually change the way I comport myself toward the world and the 
ease or difficulty with which I accomplish bodily tasks. Being a woman – i.e. having the 
know-how or technē associated with performing ‗woman‘ properly – or being a man, are 
not constant constituents of embodiment – we can slide between and among them – and 
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as such, according to our imaginary objector above, these modes of embodiment should 
not be part of who we essentially are, and yet, as I have argued, it is impossible to not be 
gendered in some way or another. I suggest that gendering is a necessary soft technology 
that constitutes who and what we are as cognitive subjects at a given time, one that is 
eminently mutable, but constantly present, in one form or another.  
Since gender-as-soft-technology might not be a convincing idea yet, we can back 
up a few paces to the original claim that some technologies are best considered ‗hard‘ 
while others are ‗soft.‘ The idea behind hard versus soft technologies is not just to 
catalogue the tangible or intangible natures of the ‗tools‘ we use. It is also a 
phenomenological distinction, one that serves to illustrate an important facet of 
embodiment generally. We have already discussed ways in which the body image and the 
body schema operate at substantially different levels of awareness. My body image is 
often a conscious representation of myself that I can use to manipulate my actual body in 
performing an action, while my body schema simply acts, without thought as it were, 
since it is a pre-reflective motor program. These levels of awareness, one reflective, and 
the other pre-reflective, as Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) term them, are important to 
consider because as it turns out, most of my everyday movements and embodied actions 
are executed pre-reflectively; that is, I do not form an explicit and reflective image of 
myself in order to walk to the fridge and grab a beer. It is only in cases of bodily 
breakdown, such as in a disruption of ownership or agency found in persons with 
Unilateral Neglect or Anarchic Hand Syndrome – or in cases of non-pathological 
embodiment such as hiking a new trail or tightrope walking for the first time - that the 
body must be reflected upon and utilized as an image for manipulation. This distinction 
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between pre-reflective versus reflective use also applies to the tools we use and dovetails 
nicely with the difference between what Donald Norman (1999) calls ―transparent‖ and 
―opaque‖ technologies. Similar to the notion of soft versus hard, distinguishing between 
the transparency and opacity of a tool adds a phenomenological element to the story; 
namely, the distinction maps how we can incorporate a tool seamlessly into our bodies-
minds whilst using it, but can also reflect on that very relationship and detach ourselves 
from our tools, taking them as things that are not us. As Clark (2003) notes, some 
examples of opaque technologies might be things like computers, cars, cameras, 
hammers, and the like – in other words, ‗hard‘ technologies – while transparent 
technologies, such as a well-functioning cochlear implant or a well-incorporated 
prosthesis, are relatively invisible. However, what we consider to be a hard technology 
can easily become invisible, and likewise, soft technologies can and do become opaque. 
It is thus, my relation to these tools that determines their opacity or transparency.  A car, 
typically thought to be a highly visible and ‗hard‘ technology, might fade into near 
invisibility if I am so accustomed to driving it, or moreover, if the road I am traveling is 
so familiar (cf. Haugeland, 1998; Dreyfus, 1990). As Idhe (1990) explains it, the ―alterity 
relation‖ between me and my technology in cases like these is best described as the 
following (I + tool) + world, wherein the parentheses indicate a unified subject acting in 
the world. Pre-reflectively, therefore, technology can and often does show up as 
transparent and thereby undifferentiated from ‗us.‘ In cases of breakdown or in reflective 
moments of differentiation, ‗I‘ can dissociate quite easily from my tools – hammers, cars, 
and traditional ‗hard‘ technologies to be sure, but also, ‗soft‘ technologies such as gender 
can show up as present-at-hand, and distinctly other-to me. 
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 For the dissenter who will now claim that despite all of this, we can still retreat 
into our physical bodies and can still think, act, and move about without incorporating 
technologies into our pre-reflective awareness, consider that soft technologies, by 
definition, already (i.e., before we have a chance to decide about it) show up as 
transparent to us. Even the most Luddite of humans, or the person living in a third-world 
country without phones, books, or even shoes, has access to one of the most invisible and 
pre-reflectively incorporated technologies in existence. Clark (2003) claims that the 
ultimate artifact humans have created is language, and while I tend to agree, I want to be 
sure to clarify that language is not just a ‗product‘ or tool that we have created, it is at the 
same time a sociotechnical system of use that works to create ‗us.‘  
 
6.4 The Ultimate Artifact 
  
 When I ask my students to name some of their favorite technologies, rarely do I 
receive ―language‖ as a response. Most of the answers tend to be of the ―hardware‖ 
variety, which Kline (1985) describes as one form of technology – cell phones, 
computers, microwave ovens. Nevertheless, if I press the students on the idea that not all 
technologies are tangible – hard or opaque – it quickly becomes evident that language 
must in some way count as a technology. But what kind? Clark (1998) has referred to 
language as the ―ultimate artifact‖ and he goes on to say in Natural-Born Cyborgs (2003) 
that our ability to use language was likely an important factor in our learning to design all 
sorts of other tools – to build ―better worlds‖ in which to live. ―When we freeze a thought 
or idea in words, we create a new object upon which to direct our critical attention. 
Instead of just having thoughts about the world, we can then make those very thoughts 
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(and thought processes) the targets of more thinking‖ (79). Put another way, language 
opens up a space for metacognition. When we can think about our thinking, we can then 
learn to think more efficiently, Clark argues. By creating ―cognitive shortcuts,‖ we can 
offload mental tasks onto external objects, thereby freeing up space for our brains to 
solve other problems. The first and perhaps still most effective means of such delegation 
of duties is the written word. The use of writing not only enhances our ability to ―freeze‖ 
thoughts and make them ―targets‖ or objects of further thoughts; writing also frees up 
memory space.  
 Language might therefore be seen as a ―sociotechnical system of use‖ insofar as it 
―extends human capacities.‖ Although, it might be objected that Kline‘s definition also 
means to include hardware and as such, language is not really a sociotechnical system of 
use because after all, not every language has a written form, and certainly there is no 
hardware needed to produce it in its spoken form. That is of course, unless ‗we‘ are the 
hardware. Humans are the ones who utter, write, reproduce, recreate, and modify 
language, but as Clark (2003) notes, ―instead of seeing our words and texts as simply the 
outward manifestations of our biological reason, we may find whole edifices of thought 
and reason accreting only courtesy of the stable structures provided by words and texts‖ 
(82). In other words, on this view, language is not just an extension of our already 
cognitively adept minds – it is often what creates cognition. Being caught up in language, 
we rarely consider that it is also a type of knowledge or know-how, a means of relating to 
the world in a particular way. In this sense, we might see language as potentially 
spanning all of the categories of Kline‘s taxonomy. It can be produced like other 
hardware, in the form of books, for example, but it is also productive. In fact, it can even 
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be made into art – literature, poetry, and song – and so, it goes beyond even Kline‘s list in 
its uses. Thus, his list provides an excellent example of how such a taxonomy is really 
only a conceptual distinction among components that are in reality, inextricably linked 
and moreover, not exhaustive of all the possible modes of technological production, 
know-how, and interfacing. 
 Our relationship to this ‗tool‘ – language – is unique and allows for some 
important insights regarding our distinctively cyborg nature, according to Clark (2003). 
As an example consider language in relation to another soft technology – gender. The 
very terms ‗man‘ and ‗woman‘ are systems of use – ways of cognitively economizing the 
world – and as such, ‗we‘ are always already sexed and gendered. In other words, ‗we‘ 
always decomposes into a collection ‗he‘s‘ or ‗she‘s.‘ Thus, I would like to suggest that 
what ‗we‘ are amounts to the sociotechical system of hardware (biological bodies), and 
―other elements‖ (technology now broadly construed to include invisible ‗tools‘ such as 
language) that work together to enhance who we are and of what we are capable.  
 Who we are and what we can achieve are not fixed identities, however. Just as 
language itself is an evolving process, so too are we. This is perhaps what is most 
confusing about Clark‘s depiction of humans as natural cyborgs. On the one hand, he 
claims that cyborgs are human+artifact couplings, which seems at least to imply two 
elements, a human and its technology, but on the other hand, he says:   
 No single tool among this complex kit is intrinsically thoughtful, ultimately in 
 control, or the ―seat of the self.‖ We, meaning we human individuals, just are 
 these shifting  coalitions of tools. We are ―soft selves,‖ continuously open to 
 change and driven to leak through the confines of skin and skull, annexing more 
 and more nonbiological elements as aspects of the machinery of mind itself 
 [2003; 137].  
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This latter interpretation of what it means to be a cyborg is more radical insofar as ‗we‘ 
are not limited to contingent couplings, but are instead ―shifting coalitions.‖ In particular, 
the idea that there is no central comptroller that is ‗I‘ means that there can be no original, 
naked, pre-technological ‗me‘ who is de-couplable from my tools. Rather, ‗I‘ am always 
in transition from one coalition to the next. And to further complicate matters, what 
defines something as a coalition is itself a shifting identity. Indeed, there are strange 
‗assemblages‘ – consider the rather odd example from Chapter 2, wherein a CEO and her 
secretary might count as a ‗coalition‘ that in some cases will only constitute on ‗cognitive 
system‘ – that we might not always consider to be coalitions of tools. The fact that ‗we‘ 
and the shifting assemblages of tools that comprise us are so malleable need not imply 
that meaningful cognitive subjectivity is impossible, however. In discussing identity, 
Prosser (1998) makes a similar claim, namely that although this transitory notion of 
selfhood can be discomforting, one cannot deny its legitimacy in being that which 
actually constitutes who we are. Transition ―pushes up against the very feasibility of 
identity. Yet, transition is also necessary for identity‘s continuity; it is that which moves 
us on‖ (3).  
 As we saw concerning transsexual identity in Chapter 5, it is not simply a matter 
of ―correcting‖ the misguided Cartesianism of trans-narratives who claim to be someone 
independent of their bodies – one of the many ‗tools‘ used to construct gender identity – 
one must look beyond the body itself, namely to embodiment. In so doing, we found that 
body images, the products of socially informed norms and ideals, are a large part of what 
shapes one‘s identity, particularly, one‘s gender identity. It is not surprising that if our 
ultimate tool – language – is constructed so as to categorize us as either/or, male/female, 
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feminine/masculine – that we will naturally construct body images that follow suit. In the 
exact same manner however, language works to ―freeze‖ other categories of existence 
that might be otherwise fluid. The very dichotomy of biological and non-biological is one 
constructed by the sociotechnical system of biology and through the larger discourse of 
scientific practice. Science, it may be argued, is a ubiquitous ―cognitive economizer‖ as it 
endlessly taxonimizes, categorizes, sets up boundaries, and makes static and stable that 
which is often, in actuality, a leaky mess. In this sense therefore, Clark‘s (2008) 
amendment to the hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC), the HOC – organism-
centered  cognition – still presupposes the organism as one ‗type‘ of tool, and the rest of 
the non-biological arsenal of technology as another. Furthermore, by centering cognition 
on this part of the coalition, it allows for a hint of homuncularism to sneak its way back 
into the story. But, if this is just one among countless ways of carving up the world and 
our relationship to it – one that is a contingent fact of our sociotechnological system of 
science – there is no reason to think that it might not be better explained in some other 
fashion.  
 I do not mean to suggest that we do away with all of biological science in order to 
more fully capture what it means to be human. What I am arguing however, is that while 
language is an ultimate technology by which we construct and are constructed, one which 
often expands our cognitive capacities and makes us better thinkers, it is not always such 
a clearly beneficial tool. It can and often does blind us to the very transitory nature that 
supposedly characterizes our uniquely cyborg existence. In particular, Clark‘s version of 
humans as shifting coalitions of tools leaves out one of the most important tools of all 
that shapes who we are and what we think we can do. Quite simply, it overlooks the 
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difference between the scientifically idealized biological sex –  which is supposed to 
provide a ‗neat‘ and tidy system of classification –  and cyborg sex, which is just as 
messy, leaky, and transitory as any other soft assemblage. Biology constructs bodies as 
stable entities opposed to the non-biological world. As well, the language of science 
constructs sexual identity as 1) a necessary component of the body and 2) necessarily 
dualistic.  While I have argued that (1) is an inescapable facet of who we think we are, (2) 
is hardly a necessity. (cf. Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Hird, 2004).We do however, have a very 
difficult time thinking bodies outside the paradigm of sexual difference and this 
difference just happens to be one of duality. In fact, many of the dualisms afforded by 
language – male/female, human/world, body/mind, us/our machines, sex/gender – are 
technologies so transparent and intricately interwoven into our cognitive architecture, 
they often go unnoticed. By taking notice of these contingent dualities, however, and the 
role they play in shaping who and what we are, I think we might recognize our inherently 
cyborg natures. To do so however, we must examine another version of the cyborg that 
goes beyond the organism/tool binary. 
 
6.5 When One is too Few and Two is too Many: Haraway’s Cyborg 
 
 Donna Haraway‘s Cyborg Manifesto (1991) marks a pivotal point in feminist 
theory concerning technology. Continuing to insist, as she does elsewhere (1989), on the 
rejection of an ―anti-science metaphysics,‖ the postmodern feminist relationship to 
technology, she argues, must neither demonize nor worship it.  As well, Haraway‘s 
Manifesto has inspired some of the founding texts in Transgender Studies, one of those 
being The Empire Strikes Back: A Post-Transsexual Manifesto (1996), written by 
Haraway‘s student, Sandy Stone, a piece which then ushered in the critical ―post-gender‖ 
 219 
analysis common to so many important trans texts (cf. Bornstein, 1998; Feinberg, 1992).  
Haraway‘s Manifesto is a politically, culturally, metaphysically, and epistemologically 
charged text, interdisciplinary in its aims, and unfaithful to its origins. Much like the 
―cyborg‖ Haraway imagines, the text is itself a hybrid, monstrous, and blasphemous 
thing, and as a technology itself – qua text – it functions doubly as a piece of ―science 
fiction‖ and a ―social reality.‖ As such, it is impossibly dense and so, I shall not feign a 
comprehensive, line-by-line analysis of it. What I will offer is a look at some of the 
standard interpretations (cf. Sullivan, 2001 Stone, 1991; Stryker, 2006) in the hopes of 
providing a general summary of some crucial intentions and outcomes of Haraway‘s 
seminal essay. Doing so, I argue, will open up a space for seeing yet another implication 
of the Manifesto and how it reaches another discipline, something that has been entirely 
ignored. Queer Theory and Transgender Studies alike, as well as Cognitive Science and 
Philosophy of Mind have failed to recognize the much-needed dialogue that can and 
should occur among these seemingly disparate areas of inquiry. There is no better text in 
which all of these disciplines converge – a convergence that is, I argue, long overdue and 
absolutely necessary.  
  While transgender embodiment is never explicitly mentioned, as Stryker and 
Whittle (2006) claim in their introduction to the Manifesto,
49
 the cyborg has come to 
depict borderline bodies:   
 Haraway‘s cyborg demonstrates how a panoply of other marginalized embodied 
 positions – such as ―women of color,‖ which she discusses in detail – become 
 sites for critical, cultural, political, and intellectual practice.  
 
                                                 
49
 As part of the Transgender Studies Reader 
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Hence, weaving transgender and intersex embodiment into the story is, they claim, no 
difficult leap to make:  
 
 Transgender and intersex figures have likewise become politically charged sites 
 of cultural struggle over the meaning of the human being and of being human in 
 an increasingly technologized world [2006; 103].  
 
A closer look at Haraway‘s cyborg will provide more evidence for the claims made by 
Stryker and Whittle – that is, the Cyborg Manifesto is about monstrous embodiment of all 
kinds. By carefully considering ‗the monster‘ as it features in the text, it will become 
evident that we ought not limit the purview of Haraway‘s cyborg solely to ―women of 
color,‖ transgendered, intersexed, or any other specifically marginalized figures. Rather, 
her discussion concerning the chimerical nature of all human embodiment – and therefore 
all human cognition – offers up an important lesson for cognitive science and philosophy 
of mind.  
 Unlike the two-part ―coupled‖ systems of human+machine that populate Clark‘s 
(2003) discussion of cyborgs, Haraway‘s account shies away from a strictly dualistic 
system. To be sure, her first pass at explicating cyborgs is to call them machine and 
organism hybrids, but she goes on to queer the rather sedimented ideal of hybrids as 
being necessarily composed of two parts. She begins by playing on some of the received 
dichotomies, in particular, that between fiction and reality. The cyborg is, she argues, ―a 
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction,‖ but then she goes on to say that 
―social reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-
changing fiction‖ (149). Twisting the commonplace conception of science as the arbiter 
of reality, science is made into fiction and social relations are reality; and yet, social 
relations, as constructed, are also fictitious. Likewise, science is as much a social relation 
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as it is anything else and hence, it is both reality and fiction. Haraway claims that the 
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an ―optical illusion,‖ one that 
works to reproduce further ―leaky distinctions‖ – between human and machine, human 
and animal, and mind and body. What usually marks a machine as not „us‟ is, for one, 
that it was made by us; however, as we have seen, machines are constructed so as to be 
seamlessly incorporated into our embodiment, such that they become transparent, 
invisible even. Furthermore, the distinction between being ‗live‘ and being an inanimate 
object is far from clear. As Haraway claims, ―our machines are disturbingly lively, and 
we ourselves, frighteningly inert‖ (152). The cyborg – being a mix of human and 
technology – hovers somewhere between concrete, organic organism and intangible, 
cybernetic information.  
 Each of these ―leaky distinctions‖ belong to a larger assumed dualism, one that is 
perhaps the most insidious of all, and is yet tacitly evoked, even in the most 
deconstructive of analyses. Namely, there is a supposed distinction between nature and 
culture, between the ‗given‘ world and the ‗constructed‘ or ‗made-up‘ one. Even 
Stryker‘s (2006) brilliant analysis of the monster as that which gives rise to the very idea 
of belonging and not belonging, itself perpetuates the ―myth of the inner and outer,‖ 
struggles with its own myth – what Haraway refers to as the ―sacred image of the same.‖ 
In other words, to belong to a class of monsters is to count monsters as a sort of kind; and 
just as there is no ‗we‘ to which all women or all men belong, it is hardly likely that all 
monstrous figures fall under one totalizing type. As Haraway (1992) argues elsewhere, 
―Who am I? is about (always unrealizable) identity; always wobbling it still pivots on the 
law of the father, the sacred image of the same. [W]ho are ―we‖? – that is an inherently 
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more open question, one always ready for contingent, friction-generating articulations. It 
is a remonstrative question (324). Furthermore, to posit monsters as an ―identity‖ is 
already to assume a juxtaposed category of non-monster. Just as Stryker (2006) and 
Butler (2004) argue that monsters establish the limits of what counts as normal, it works 
the other way around as well – what we call normal, natural, and not queer work to 
establish that which does not get to be included among those borders. Hence, even the 
distinction between monstrous and normal is one in which the two opposed identities – 
natural and unnatural – are themselves neither entirely real, nor entirely mythical. As 
Sullivan remarks, ―nature, in this sense, is the truth-effect- both fiction and fact- of a 
reproductive optics, of historically and culturally specific technologies (humanism, 
equality feminism, radical feminism, and so on) that reproduce the ―sacred image of the 
same.‖50 
 Likewise, she argues, the image of ‗the human‘ is already structured by the high-
tech mythology of ―the same‖ and as such, ‗we‘ and our ‗machines‘ are never entirely 
dissociable. In fact, Haraway claims, we are our technology. ―The machine is us, our 
processes, an aspect of our embodiment‖ (180). And in this sense, speaking of cyborgs as 
coupled systems is slightly misleading because they are never really de-coupled, not even 
in imagination. On the other hand, a cyborg is by definition a hybrid, a chimera, so it is 
not a simple and undifferentiated being either. This helps explain the rather curious 
passage we find in the Cyborg Manifesto:  
 To be One is to be autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be 
 an illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet 
 to be other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is 
 too few, but two are too many [1989; 177]. 
                                                 
50
 http://scan.net.au/scan/journal/display.php?journal_id=83 
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For Haraway, encoding the self as one that transcends the dualisms of inner/outer, 
animal/human, human/machine, nature/culture, and myth/reality, is the ―double vision‖ 
socialist feminists must adopt in order to finally escape the demining identity politics 
plaguing feminism generally. This is an explicitly intended aim of her work. In addition 
to Haraway‘s own insights regarding her work, I think a case can be made for locating, 
among passages such as these, the convergence of Queer Theory, Transgender Studies, 
and Cognitive Science. The payoff of doing so, is, as I will argue in this final section, that 
we can achieve a more holistic understanding of embodied cognitive subjectivity, one 
that is aware of the co-constitutive nature of minds and machines.  
 
 
6.6 The Sociotechnological Hybridization of Gender and the Construction of Human 
Nature 
 
 Although the stated aims of adopting the image of the cyborg are, for Haraway, 
different than the intentions Clark (2003) has for thinking cognition as a hybrid of 
organism and machine, the overarching themes that emerge are not so far apart. Consider 
the question Haraway poses:  
 Why should our bodies end at the skin, or include, at best, other beings 
 encapsulated by skin? [1991; 178]. 
 
Likewise, the original thesis of Extended Cognition (Clark and Chalmers, 1998) was that 
cognitive processes are not bound to the organism, nor are they encapsulated by ―skin 
and skull,‖ a claim that is furthered in Clark‘s (2003, 2008) argument that we are always 
coupled to our technology, whether opaquely or transparently. An always already 
hybridized being, ‗the body‘ therefore becomes one among many tools utilized in 
embodiment – the bodily-cognitive comportment to and interaction with the world. 
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Moreover, we see the body-as-prop motif carried out in TGS and QT; namely, when ‗the 
body‘ is treated as a costume among many others to be utilized for performance purposes. 
We are always acting out a gender or a sex. We might likewise say that for Clark, the 
cyborg is always performing as well. It is acting out the role of human. In fact, it is 
precisely this coupling capability that allows us to successfully ―pass‖ as human, whereas 
other beings, such as those artificially constructed minds we saw in Chapter 1, fail to pass 
in this regard, continually falling short of meaningful environmental interaction and 
incorporation. In a similar vein, those of us who do not engage properly with the 
‗mechanisms of gender‘ – clothing, mannerisms, sexuality, and even linguistic cues, the 
ultimate ―soft technology‖ – are desubjugated, pushed to the margins, or even beyond the 
bounds of comprehensibility.  
 We find therefore, an underlying theme running through each of these movements 
regarding embodiment, subjectivity, and technology; namely, that ‗we‘ are never entirely 
separated from our tools. Nevertheless, as I have argued in the previous sections, 
Haraway goes a step further than Clark by subverting even the coupling of human and 
machine. ―These machine/organism relationships are obsolete, unnecessary. For us, in 
imagination, and in other practice, machines can be prosthetic devices, intimate 
components, friendly selves‖ (178). Much like the discussion in Chapter 5 concerning the 
body image formed by transsexuals and how this imagined being conjures up a body that 
goes beyond the literal body – i.e. the embodiment of this coupling – Haraway‘s claim 
that the relationship between human and machine is a contrived one echoes the idea that 
even in our imagined embodiment, we are always already hybridized. Thus, even though 
we find similar claims being made by philosophers of mind like Clark, Queer Theorists 
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such as Sullivan, and Transgender Theorists like Stryker – that being human, being 
female, being male, and so forth are all technologically mediated modes of subjectivity – 
nowhere among these texts do we find it stated as strongly as Haraway presents it. 
Coupling is too much focused on the duality of machine and organism, and the notion of 
a literal versus figurative or normal versus monstrous subjectivity also relies too heavily 
on a dualism that, according to Haraway, will always fail to capture the truly fluid nature 
of cyborg identity. Hence, she claims: 
 One is too few, and two is only one possibility…The machine is not an it to be 
 animated, worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an 
 aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines; they do not 
 dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they [1991; 
 180].  
 
I agree, and in addition to Haraway‘s critique I will add that the notion of a ‗coupled 
system‘ perpetuates the idea that decoupling is always a possibility, such that there is 
always a naked, non-technologically mediated ‗me‘ once I have disrobed myself of all 
my tools. To be sure, some tools – hard technologies, like cellphones and prosthetics – 
can and do get detached from our bodies, but this does not imply that all technologies are 
so easily decoupled, nor does it entail that is possible to be embodied in an entirely non-
technological way.  
 As perplexing as this passage of Haraway‘s is, it is important because it 
exemplifies the very confounding nature of being human, which, as we have seen so far, 
can only be understood through the lens of technology. At the same time, because ‗the 
human,‘ is always already technological and as such, to ‗understand humans through 
technology‘ does not quite capture the inextricability of ‗us‘ and our tools – such a view, 
in other words, still treats technology itself as detachable, non-necessary, and ‗other-to‘ 
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us. The nature of technology is not simply that it is a means by which we come to 
understand ourselves – it is in a very real sense who we are. And yet, to fully understand 
the nature of technology, we must have some idea of ‗the human‘ behind its production, 
consumption, and most importantly its bodily incorporation, a comprehension which can 
only take place through technological mediation. This circularity makes it difficult to talk 
about a body, a self, or an individual as detached or decoupled. Attempting to imagine 
such a being only propels one into conceiving yet another technologically mediated 
image. ‗The Biological Body‘ is a scientific (i.e. technological) body; ‗Who I am‘ is 
always a matter of my involvement in or with some sort of sociolinguistic context (and 
hence, ‗the self‘ is always a soft-assembled gathering of both hard and soft technologies; 
and embodied subjectivity is always already sociotechnologically hybridized.  
 In terms of sexed and gendered embodiment, as we have seen, these are 
inextricable modes of imagining our bodies and ourselves and yet, much like what Clark 
claims of cognition generally, these aspects of our embodiment are not skin-skull bound. 
Neither are sex and gender wholly other-to us; indeed, ‗they‘ are machines of a sort, but 
not the kind of hardware from which we can more readily detach. Instead, sex and gender 
are soft technologies or, as Kline‘s (1985) terminology might allow, ―sociotechnical 
systems of use,‖ because they represent a dynamic web of relationships between human, 
hardware, production, and utilization. To be female, male, transsexual, gay, straight, or 
any other type of human just is to be hybridized in this way; in other words, to be caught 
up in a complex system of sociotechnologicality. This is why Haraway‘s cyborg is not a 
coupling of machine and organism so much as a hybrid – a being that transcends 
wholeness, refuses duality as its only possible subjectivity, and yet remains constantly 
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chimerical. More importantly, as was discussed earlier, being a cyborg means dispensing 
once and for all with the hope that ‗I‘ can ever be a stable and fixed referent. ‗I‘, 
according to Haraway is an ―always unrealizable identity,‖ one that depends on the 
sacred image of the same. Thus, ‗we‘ as a collective whole – i.e. us qua human, women, 
queers, and so forth – ―is an inherently more open question, one always ready for 
contingent, friction-generating articulations‖ (1992; 324). The only reason ‗we‘ show up 
as a stable or category is, to articulate Merleau-Ponty‘s claim once again, through 
repetition. Or, to use Butler‘s (1992) terminology, by repeatedly citing gender, we make 
it necessary. As Butler also claims, while reproduction is a mode of copying, the 
‗original‘ for which the copy is made does not exist. To reproduce forms of ‗the human,‘ 
‗the woman,‘ or ‗the transsexual‘ is to copy an image of something that was never and 
will never be whole, but will instead always be in performance, transitioning from this 
role to that. In a move that resonates with Prosser‘s (1998) claim that ―transition is 
necessary for identity‘s continuity‖ (3), the same notion of a never-stable gender identity 
is put forth by transgender theorists like Judith Halberstam (1995), who argue, like 
Haraway, for the simultaneous universality and categorical non-existence of 
transsexuality:  
 
 We are all transsexuals except that the referent of the trans becomes less and less 
 clear  (and more and more queer). We are all cross-dressers but where are we 
 crossing from or to what? There is no ‗other‘ side, no ‗opposite‘ sex, no natural 
 divide to be spanned by surgery, by disguise, by passing. We all pass or we 
 don‘t…There are no transsexuals [1995; 212]. 
 
The phenomenon of passing, according to Halberstam, implies that the notion of 
transitioning from one sex to the other is not a matter of finally arriving somewhere and 
resting there. We are always performing, always trying to pass, and as such, transition is 
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an eminent possibility. Thus, there are no ‗real‘ transsexuals, and yet people like Prosser 
(1998) interpret Halberstam‘s statement to mean that ―Trans-R-Us‖ (14). Because there is 
no stable where to which all of us who are transitioning are traveling, it makes little sense 
to differentiate between the static (or non-trans) and the transsexual when talking about 
sex and gender.  Each time any of us passes as this or that identity, which is every time 
we allow ourselves to be subsumed under the ―sacred image of the same‖ – in other 
words, to be denoted by a personal pronoun, captured by inclusion in a unified group, or 
labeled as a particular gender or sex – we obscure this transitory nature of identity. It 
appears as a necessary, static, and unitary category. Nevertheless, even as Clark (2003) 
argues, we are, all of us, a ―shifting coalition of tools‖ and so, to understand human 
nature, if this is even possible, we must return to the notion that ‗we‘ are never ‗the 
same.‘  For Clark, this means articulating cognition as an ever-expanding and altering, 
albeit organism-centered phenomenon. Although he does not fully realize the 
ramifications of his position for cognitive subjectivity, in particular, in terms of gendered 
embodiment, his claim that ‗we‘ are never skin-bound and are always incorporating, 
exploiting, constituting and constituted by our tools, is an essential step to take in 
reaching a theory of ‗mind‘ that actually pays heed to the fundamentally necessary 
lessons we have gleaned from Queer Theory and Transgender Studies. 
 Hence, rather than take these boundary-blurs as a hindrance to any productive 
research in cognitive science or gender theory, it is my contention that the ―pleasure in 
confusion‖ of which Haraway advocates is an essential next step in developing a 
comprehensive and interdisciplinary story about the meaning of being human. It is a story 
of the sociotechnological hybridization that makes us who ‗we‘ are, allows us to conceive 
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ourselves as otherwise, and to be otherwise, and frees the mind from the confines of a 
boundary that has been artificially erected. Once this boundary is usurped, as Clark 
claims, we can begin to ―better appreciate what we already are: creatures whose minds 
are special precisely because they are tailor-made for multiple mergers and coalitions‖ 
(2003; 7, emphasis original).   
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Conclusion: Post-Cyborgs? 
 The preceding project has attempted to draw together two otherwise disparate 
areas of inquiry regarding cognition, embodiment, and subjectivity. By bringing into 
discourse philosophy of mind and feminist theory, I hope to have convinced you of at 
least these three things: 
 
- The two seemingly unrelated fields have a lot more in common than might be 
assumed and therefore have a lot to offer each other 
- Much of what the each field can do to supplement, improve upon, and even 
methodologically alter the other has been overlooked, an oversight that is 
hindering genuine progress in determining who, what, and where we are 
- By focusing on the ways in which technology – both in the form of hardware and 
software, such as gender – is a constantly penetrating facet of our embodiment, 
the cyborg is not only a fitting image to depict humanity, but it helps us overcome 
some of the traditional difficulties in explaining how the mind works, in what it is 
realized, how we ought to explain bodily pathologies, gender identity disorder, 
and above all, embodied subjectivity generally.  
 
 
In order to get to this last point in particular, I have provided an account of the last fifty 
years of failed attempts in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial 
intelligence to properly explain and replicate human thinking. It is not until theories such 
as Clark and Chalmers‘ Extended Mind come into play that, as I argued in chapter 2, we 
have a real shot at truly appreciating just how complex ‗we‘ really are. This ‗we,‘ even in 
Clark‘s (2008) ―Supersized Mind‖ however, has been shown to be too centered on our 
biological bodies and brains. While these components are indeed important, and are most 
assuredly necessary causal constituents of cognitive subjectivity, it is better not to think 
of the brain and body as ―senior partners‖ in cognitive processing, but rather as ―equal 
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partners,‖ coupled to non-biological machinery at all times in creating ‗the mind.‘ 
Moreover, any story of who we are must, I argue, take account of our inherently sexed 
and gendered subjectivity. Like cognition, my sex and gender are not located in my body, 
although the body remains an essential site for identification. Nevertheless, through the 
use of the ‗tools‘ of gender – language being chief among them – we can see, particularly 
in cases of transgender and intersexed embodiment, that what we mean by ‗male,‘ 
‗female,‘ ‗feminine,‘ and ‗masculine,‘ does not refer solely to a biological organism, nor 
do these terms pick out essentially the same process across time and location. How we 
come to imagine our bodies and ourselves as sexed and gendered subjects – an 
achievement made possible only through the coupling of our biological bodies to the 
―soft technologies‖ of language and gender – will in turn shape the way we think and 
how our embodied interactions take place.  
 Above all, I think my project furthers an idea Clark (2007) put forth, when he said 
that what he is ―optimistic that we will soon see the end of those over-used and mostly ad 
hoc appeals to the ‗natural.‘‖ By incorporating sexed and gendered embodiment into this 
story of subverting ‗the natural,‘ especially when it comes to embodied subjectivity, I 
think Clark‘s hopes come closer to reality. To be sure, treating human cognizing subjects 
as cyborgs does introduce its own set of difficulties in terms of delimiting, as Rupert 
(2004) points out, precisely what the subject of cognitive science ought to be. As I hope I 
have shown however, first, we cannot reject a proposal simply because it forces us to 
consider just how complex the phenomenon in question is, and second, by examining 
what goes into making us cognitive subjects, all signs point toward a messy, 
biomechanical, gender-queered, linguistic, and sociotechnological hybrid of a being. 
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Taking seriously this cyborg image of who we are and using it to go beyond current 
theories of embodied subjectivity both in philosophy and gender studies is, I suggest, the 
key to solving some of the most protracted problems in defining and delimiting ‗us‘ as 
‗thinking things.‘  
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